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 1 
Summary 
Situated in the East China Sea lays a remotely located island group 
consisting of five small islands and three barren rocks. The islands sustain 
scarce vegetation and there is most likely no fresh water on the islands. Due 
to their inhospitable character, the islands have historically been considered 
to be of little economic value and they have since ancient times, apart from 
a short period during the early 20th century, been uninhabited. The island 
group is known in Chinese as Diaoyu and in Japanese as Senkaku and since 
1971, Japan, the PRC and the ROC all claim sovereignty over the islands. 
The dispute arose as a consequence of a UN sponsored survey in 1968, 
which suggested that large oil and gas deposits might be located in the 
vicinity of the islands. Although the present dispute emerged as a 
consequence of the oil discovery, the potential economic benefits are far 
from the only reason why the dispute remains alive today. The main reason 
why tensions keep re-erupting relates to Chinese and Japanese nationalism, 
which continue to impede on any possible solution. Today, Japan is in de 
facto control over the islands, which she has been since 1972 when the US 
reverted the administrative powers it had acquired following the end of 
World War II. This control is additionally strengthened by the mutual 
defense treaty between the US and Japan which covers the disputed islands.  
 
The Japanese sovereignty claim is based on occupation, which is one of the 
established modes of territorial acquisition. Japan claims to have discovered 
the islands in 1885 and after ten years of investigation regarding the status 
of the islands, decided to incorporate them in 1895. Japan further claims to 
have maintained sovereign title to the islands ever since and the islands 
weren’t an integral part of neither the Treaty of Shimonoseki nor the 
declarations signed during and shortly after the end of World War II (the 
Wartime declarations). Treaty law is therefore irrelevant to the sovereignty 
issue, according to the Japanese stance. The stances by the PRC and the 
ROC are fundamentally the same since they share a common history. The 
stances deviate only in relation to events that occurred after 1949. The 
Chinese stance is also based on the mode of occupation, they claim to have 
discovered and named the islands prior or during the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644) and then treated the islands in accordance with the international law 
requirements of occupation until the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
on April 17, 1895, through which the islands were ceded to Japan. 
According to the Chinese stance, the islands were lawfully Japanese from 
1895 until 1945 when Japan formally surrendered. This document of 
surrender incorporated two other Wartime declarations, which obliged Japan 
to return sovereignty of the islands to China, according to the Chinese 
stance.  
 
Should a court or tribunal ever adjudicate the present dispute, the 
adjudicating body would have to decide on a number of legal issues that are 
both case-specific and of general interest to the international law discipline. 
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One such issue, and arguably the most controversial feature of this paper, 
relates to the applicability of the international law rules of territorial 
acquisition in non-western parts of the world, which historically have been 
governed by a different system of international relations and different 
notions of sovereignty. Since Chinese scholars have contended that 
international law cannot appropriately adjudicate the present dispute since 
East Asia is founded on different ideas of international relations, this paper 
introduced an alternative framework which was analyzed parallel to the 
international law requirements of occupation.  
 
Although this paper was written from a perspective similar to that of a court 
or tribunal, the purpose of the paper wasn’t to decisively adjudicate the 
present dispute and determine which claimant has the better claim to 
sovereignty. Having stated this, the author is of the opinion that, based on 
the historical data presented in this paper together with the linguistic 
interpretations accepted in this paper, Japan appears to have a stronger 
claim. The strength of the Japanese claim is primarily derived from the 
second branch of intertemporal principle, which, in cases of territorial 
acquisition, favors the State that, at the critical date, fulfills the requirement 
of “actual, continuous and peaceful display of State functions in regard to 
the territory”. The Japanese control during 1895-1952 appears to have been 
sufficient and the US administration, 1952-1972, didn’t aim to affect the 
underlying sovereignty and therefore, Japan maintained residual 
sovereignty.    
 
The Japanese claim is additionally strengthened by the fact that they appear 
to have the stronger argument in relation to every enclasping legal issue 
discussed throughout the paper. The first such issue discussed was whether 
China ever acquired sovereignty. The difficulty of this analysis is that the 
international law requirements of occupation during the relevant time 
haven’t been sufficiently established. The author is of the opinion that a 
conservative approach, wherein mere visual discovery isn’t enough to 
establish sovereign title, is more reasonable and therefore, China has a weak 
case under international law. However, should the political realties of East 
Asia be taken into account in this evaluation, China has a stronger case. The 
second issue discussed was through which mode Japan acquired 
sovereignty. Regarding this matter the author is of the opinion that it cannot 
be deduced from the Treaty of Shimonoseki that the disputed islands where 
an integral part. Moreover the Japanese process of incorporation, as 
deceitful as it may have been, can hardly make the incorporation invalid. 
The third issue discussed was whether the Wartime declarations obliged 
Japan to return the islands to China and therefore made them lawfully 
Chinese. Regarding this matter, the author is of the opinion that such a 
stance cannot be supported since neither of these declarations where meant 
to deal with sovereignty of the islands.  
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Sammanfattning 
I Östkinesiska havet finns en avlägset belägen ögrupp bestående av fem öar 
och tre karga klippor. Ögruppen har en nödtorftig vegetation och det 
förefaller inte finnas något sötvatten. På grund av ögruppens ogästvänliga 
egenskaper har öarna genom historien ansetts vara av mycket litet 
ekonomiskt värde och de har sedan urminnes tider, bortsett från en kortare 
period i början av 1900-talet, varit obebodda. Denna ögrupp benämns på 
Kinesiska för Diaoyu och på Japanska för Senkaku och sedan 1971 gör både 
Japan, Folkrepubliken Kina och Republiken Kina suveränitetsanspråk på 
ögruppen. Denna dispyt uppstod som en följd av en FN sponsrad 
undersökning som genomfördes 1968 vilken uppmärksammade att stora 
olje- och gasfyndigheter kunde finnas i närheten av dessa öar. Även om 
dagens dispyt uppkom som en konsekvens av oljefyndigheterna så är de 
potentiella ekonomiska fördelarna långt ifrån de enda anledningarna till 
varför motsättningar relaterade till denna dispyt fortsätter att blossa upp 
idag. Den främsta anledningen till dessa motsättningar är relaterad till 
nationalism, från både kinesisk och japansk sida, vilket fortsätter att 
försvåra för en lösning på konflikten. Japan innehar idag de facto kontroll 
över ögruppen, vilket hon har gjort sedan 1972 då USA återlämnade den 
administrativa kontroll USA hade erhållit efter andra världskrigets slut. 
Denna kontroll är ytterligare stärkt av det ömsesidiga försvarsavtalet mellan 
USA och Japan vilket även omfattar de bestridda öarna.       
 
Det Japanska suveränitetsanspråket är baserat på ockupation, vilket är en av 
de etablerade metoderna att förvärva territorium. Japan påstår sig ha 
upptäckt öarna 1885 och efter en tioårsperiod av undersökningar rörande 
ögruppens status, beslutat att införliva dem 1895. Japan påstår vidare att de 
har vidmakthållit denna suveränitet sedan dess samt att ögruppen inte var 
avtalsinnehåll i vare sig Shimonosekiavtalet eller någon av de deklarationer 
som undertecknades under eller strax efter andra världskrigets slut 
(Krigsdeklarationerna). Traktaträtten är därför irrelevant i förhållande till 
suveränitetsfrågan enligt den japanska argumentationen. Folkrepubliken 
Kina och Republiken Kinas inställningar är i grunden densamma eftersom 
de har ett gemensamt förflutet. Inställningarna skiljer sig åt endast i relation 
till händelser som inträffade efter 1949. Den kinesiska inställningen är också 
baserad på metoden ockupation, Kina påstår sig ha upptäckt och namngett 
ögruppen före eller under Ming dynastin (1368-1644) och därefter behandlat 
dem i enlighet med de rekvisit folkrätten kräver för ockupation fram tills 
undertecknandet av Shimonosekiavtalet 17 april 1895, genom vilket 
ögruppen avträddes till förmån för Japan. Enligt Kina så var sedan ögruppen 
lagligen Japansk från 1895 till 1945 då Japan formellt kapitulerade. Som 
avtalsinnehåll till det dokument som Japan då undertecknade var två andra 
krigsdeklarationer vilka förpliktade Japan att återge suveräniteten till Kina, 
enligt den kinesiska uppfattningen.  
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Om en domstol eller tribunal någonsin skulle döma i den aktuella dispyten, 
skulle den dömande institutionen behöva ta ställning till en rad juridiska 
spörsmål som både är fallspecifika och av generellt folkrättsligt intresse. Ett 
sådant spörsmål, vilket möjligen är den mest kontroversiella aspekten av 
denna uppsats, relaterar till huruvida folkrättens regelverk rörande förvärv 
av territorium kan appliceras i icke västerländska delar av världen vilka 
historiskt reglerats av andra system rörande internationella relationer samt 
koncept rörande suveränitet. Eftersom kinesiska akademiker har 
argumenterat att folkrätten inte lämpar sig till att döma i den innevarande 
konflikten eftersom Ostasien är uppbyggt kring andra idéer om 
internationella relationer, har denna uppsats inkluderat ett alternativt 
regelverk, vilket har analyserats parallellt med folkrättens regler rörande 
ockupation.           
 
Även om denna uppsats har författats från ett perspektiv liknande en 
domstols eller tribunals, så har inte syftet med uppsatsen varit att slutgiltigt 
döma i tvisten och fastslå vilken stat som har det starkaste anspråket. Med 
detta sagt så är det författarens uppfattning att, baserat på den historiska data 
som behandlats och med de språkliga översättningar som accepterats i 
uppsatsen, Japan förefaller ha ett starkare anspråk. Styrkan i det japanska 
anspråket härrör framförallt från det andra benet av intertemporal law, 
vilket i fall rörande förvärv av territorium premierar den stat som vid den 
kritiska tidpunkten uppfyller rekvisiten att ”faktiskt, beständigt och fredligt 
uppvisa statsfunktioner i relation till territoriet”. Den japanska kontrollen 
mellan 1895-1952 förefaller uppfylla dessa krav och den amerikanska 
administrationen, 1952-1972, syftade inte till att påverka den underliggande 
suveräniteten och därför vidmakthöll Japan dess suveränitet.     
 
Det japanska anspråket stärks ytterligare av det faktum att Japan förefaller 
ha starkare argumentation i förhållande till varje övergripande juridiskt 
spörsmål som uppsatsen behandlat. Det första sådana spörsmålet som 
diskuterades var huruvida Kina någonsin förvärvade suveränitet. 
Svårigheten med denna analys bestod i att folkrättens krav rörande 
ockupation under den relevanta tidsperioden inte blivit tillräckligt 
preciserade. Författaren är av uppfattningen att en moderat ansats, där 
endast visuell upptäckt inte är tillräckligt för att erhålla suveränitet, är mest 
förnuftig and därför har Kina ett svagare folkrättsligt anspråk. Skulle 
däremot den politiska verklighet som historiskt präglat Ostasien tas med i 
bedömningen, har Kina ett starkare anspråk. Det andra spörsmålet som 
diskuterades var frågan om genom vilken metod Japan förvärvade 
suveränitet. Rörande denna fråga är författaren av uppfattningen att det inte 
går att utläsa från Shimonosekiavtalet att ögruppen var avtalsinnehåll. 
Dessutom kan den japanska inkorporeringsprocessen, hur svekfull den än 
må ha varit, svårligen göra inkorporeringen ogiltig. Det tredje spörsmålet 
som diskuterades var huruvida krigsdeklarationerna förpliktade Japan att 
återlämna ögruppen till Kina. Rörande denna fråga är författaren av 
uppfattningen att ett sådant synsätt inte kan beläggas eftersom ingen av 
dessa deklarationer avsåg att behandla frågan om suveränitet över ögruppen.  
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Förord 
Fem års juridikstudier går nu mot sitt slut och det är med en skräckblandad 
förtjusning som jag skriver dessa ord. Jag vill emellertid inte uppehålla mig 
vid sentimentala tankar utan väljer att konstatera att en rolig och lärorik tid 
är över och en annan tar sin början.  
 
Ett tack riktas till min handledare Ulf Linderfalk för engagerande och 
konstruktiv handledning och ett stort tack riktas till mina kära föräldrar, 
Bertil och Marie, för det stöd och den uppmuntran de villkorslöst visat mig 
genom åren.  
 
Lund i januari 2015,  
Victor Berg 
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Abbreviations 
EAWO   East Asian World Order  
 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
OPM  Okinawa Prefecture Magistrate   
 
ORT  Okinawa Reversion Treaty  
 
ROC  Republic of China  
 
PRC  Peoples Republic of China 
 
SFPT  San Fransisco Peace Treaty  
  
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 
 
UNECAFE  United Nations Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East 
 
USCAR No. 27 United States Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyus No. 27 
 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Origins of the dispute  
Situated in the East China Sea, roughly 300 km southwest of the Japanese 
prefecture Okinawa, 200 km northeast of Taiwan and 400 km east of 
Mainland China (see Supplement) lays an island group known in Japanese 
as Senkaku and in Chinese as Diaoyu (this island group will, for the sake of 
objectivity, be referred to as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands or the disputed 
islands).1 This island group consists of five small and volcanic islands and 
three barren rocks and altogether they measure a surface area of 6,3 sq. km 
with the largest island accounting for more than half. The islands sustain 
scarce vegetation and most experts assert that there is no fresh water to be 
found on any of the islands. Historically, the islands have been considered 
to be of little economic value and they have since ancient times been 
uninhabited, apart from a short period of time during the early 20th century. 2  
 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are situated on the edge of the same 
continental shelf as Taiwan and mainland Asia and are separated from the 
nearest undisputed Japanese islands by the 2270 meter deep Okinawa 
Trough which lays immediately to the east of the disputed islands. In 
comparison to the water depth of this trough, the water depth westward of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands fall short of 200 meters. Geologically, these 
islands and islets share very similar features, characterized by high peaks 
and steep cliffs. The largest of these islands is known as Diaoyu Yu in 
Chinese and as Uotsuri-shima in Japanese. The second largest island is 
known as Huangwei Yu (J: Kuba-shima) and the fifth largest is known as 
Chiwei Yu (J: Kubaseki-shima) and is located furthest to the northeast, 
rather isolated from the rest of the group. These three islands are of primary 
importance since they will be expressly mentioned in the Chinese historical 
records. The Chinese name for the island group derives from the name of 
the largest island in the group, which means fishing island or platform while 
the Japanese name emanates from the British term “Pinnacle Island”, used 
during the 19th century.3 
 
The first known reference to the disputed islands is from a famous Chinese 
geography book from 1221. However, through history these islands have 
often been considered too small to be delineated on most maps and they 
have mainly been used by Chinese seafarers as navigational aids and later as 
shelter for fishery vessels during heavy weather. Although the disputed 
islands have historically been considered to be of almost no economic value 
per se, this perception changed in 1968 when a report from UNECAFE4 
                                                
1 Suganuma, Unryu., Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations – 
Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, p. 11-13.  
2 Shaw, Han-yi., The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the 
Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan, p. 10-11. 
3 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p. 11-12 and Chiu, Hungdah., An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the 
T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), p 2-3.  
4 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. 
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suggested that large hydrocarbon reserves might be located in the vicinity of 
the islands.5 In the years following the publication of this report, the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC henceforth), the Republic of China (ROC 
henceforth) and Japan all claimed sovereignty over the islands. For the sake 
of objectivity it needs to be stressed that these claims also coincided with 
the reversion of the disputed islands to Japan from the US who had been 
administrating the islands since the end of the Second World War. Although 
more than 40 years have past since the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute 
arose, the conflict is still very much alive today and clashes between the 
claimants constantly re-erupt the territorial dispute, which has become one 
of the most politically and emotionally sensitive conflicts in Sino-Japanese 
relations since the end of the World War II.  
 
Since the reversion of the islands in 1972, Japan has maintained de facto 
control. This control is additionally strengthened by the mutual defense 
treaty between Japan and the US, since the latter has, on several occasions, 
reiterated that the said treaty covers the disputed islands, although their 
official position is that they remain neutral towards the underlying 
sovereignty issue.  
 
Although it is true that the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute originates from 
the UNECAFE report, the economical advantage of being able to exploit the 
natural resources in the seabed are far from the only reason why this dispute 
remains alive today. The main reason why tension keeps re-erupting is 
political and relates to nationalism and self-image among the people of 
Asia’s two biggest economies and most influential States. For the Chinese 
in particular, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute has become a symbol that 
reminds them of Imperial Japan’s previous military aggression and evasion 
of responsibility relating to this aggression. For the Japanese on the other 
hand, Chinese actions and assertions towards the islands reminds them of 
China’s growing importance and possible future dominance in the region. 
Nationalism on both sides continue to impede on any solution, primarily a 
joint exploration of the natural resources, as neither the Japanese nor the 
Chinese are willing to put aside the sovereignty issue to reap the possible 
economical benefits. It is important to keep in mind that this dispute not 
merely consists of a game on the highest governmental level, but is also 
deeply rooted in national identity among ordinary citizens. The involved 
governments therefore have to balance their foreign policy actions keeping 
in mind the domestic tensions. In fact, during each of the crises that have 
occurred since the 1970’s, the governments have tried to keep the dispute as 
low profile as possible in order to prevent a deterioration of the wider 
political relations. However, the said governments have also used the 
dispute as a tool for deviating attention away from domestic problems.6  
 
Another dimension, apart from the economic and nationalistic, as to why 
sovereignty over the islands has become important relates to their strategic 
location. The disputed islands both lay close to strategic sea lines of 
                                                
5 Shaw, Supra n.2, p 5.  
6 Ramos-Mrosovsky, Carlos., International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands, p. 918-922. 
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communication, for instance Japanese crude oil import from the Middle East 
pass through this area, and are important for military and security reasons.7 
An additional aspect that undoubtedly adds to the complexity of the conflict 
is the unresolved political situation of Taiwan. The official stance by both 
the ROC and the PRC is that they are the sole legitimate representatives of 
all Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The ROC, with 
government in Taipei, is in de facto control over Taiwan and the PRC, with 
government in Beijing, is in de facto control over Mainland China. Since the 
1970’s, a clear majority of all States recognizes Beijing as the legitimate 
government, which means that they don’t regard the ROC as a State under 
international law and as a consequence the government in Taipei cannot 
enter into legal contracts with these States. 
 
Lastly, the Senkaku/Diaoyu island conflict is also related to other 
unresolved territorial issues throughout Asia. Japan currently has a 
territorial dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories and with South 
Korea over the Lincourt rocks. PRC on the other hand is involved in a 
similar dispute in the South China Sea over three different island groups; the 
Spratlay Islands, the Scarborough shore and the Parcel islands. These 
unresolved issues are to some extent interconnected with the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute since both Japan and China appear to 
believe that by not showing sufficient strength in relation to one of these 
conflicts, they risk being perceived as weak in relation to the other.8     
1.2 Purpose of the paper  
The primary purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu island conflict focusing on which of the competing States 
has the better claim to sovereignty under international law. Although this 
paper will be written from a perspective similar to that of a court or tribunal, 
analyzing and evaluating the facts and arguments provided by the respective 
claimant States, it needs to be stressed that this paper doesn’t aim to provide 
a definitive answer to the sovereignty issue. The aim is instead to describe 
and analyze the critical legal issues that a court or tribunal would have to 
adjudicate, without necessarily taking a position on these issues. Based on 
the primary purpose, a secondary purpose of the paper is to analyze how this 
conflict, should it ever be adjudicated, could enrich and clarify the contents 
of international law. In a legal process before a court or tribunal, the 
adjudicating body would be presented with all available facts that the parties 
decide to present. This isn’t the case in this paper; the author is limited to 
publically available documentation, which has been translated into, or 
written in, English. Therefore it would be irresponsible to claim that such a 
                                                
7 See further regarding the strategic value of the disputed islands from a national security perspective, 
Kazumine, Akimoto., The Strategic Value of Territorial Islands from the Perspective of National 
Security.     
8 See further about how these issues are interconnected in Nasu, Hitoshi and Rothwell, Donald R.,  
Re-Evaluating the Role of International Law in Territorial and Maritime Disputes in East Asia, p. 55-
79. 
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complex dispute as this could be decisively adjudicated given these 
limitations.  
1.3 Methodology 
This paper has been written using the traditional legal sources such as 
legislative works, treaty law, case law and jurisprudence. Legislative works 
are merely relevant for maritime delimitation, which isn’t the focus area in 
this paper, and will therefore not be used to a large extent. As will be further 
developed under section 3.1, the scholars involved in this dispute are 
primarily either Chinese or Japanese and they tend to have a biased 
approach aimed to advance the cause of their respective States. These 
underlying motives affect both the linguistic translations and the legal 
interpretations and therefore one needs to be particularly careful in studying 
the jurisprudence. Since the author isn’t able to critically evaluate the 
presented translations, a caveat needs to be stressed regarding this linguistic 
limitation. This paper has strived to manage this inherent problem by 
including the work of both Chinese and Japanese scholars in order to 
present a balanced and objective picture. The most important translations 
are the ones relating to the Chinese imperial envoys conducted throughout 
the Ming and Qing dynasties. These translations are derived from Chinese 
historian Suganuma but also critiqued by Japanese legal scholar Ozaki.    
 
Regarding the methodology one additional aspects needs to be particularly 
stressed. Although this paper will be written from a de lege lata perspective, 
focusing on positive international law, it will also include a de lege ferenda, 
or critical, perspective. The reason behind this inclusion, which will be 
further developed under section 2.2 and 3.1, is that Chinese scholars have 
contended that since international law was completely unknown to East 
Asia until the mid 19th century, it isn’t entirely reasonable to evaluate 
whether China acquired sovereignty solely through the lens of international 
law. The author is of the opinion that this Chinese critique is reasonable 
especially since international law, as will be further developed under section 
2.2, has euro-centric roots and these rules could possibly create unjust 
results if they were applied without taking the regional political realities into 
account. Japanese legal scholar Ozaki has described an alternative 
framework, which in this paper will be labeled “ancient possession from 
time immemorial”, which will be described under section 3.1 and later used 
in the analysis. It needs to be stressed that this alternative framework cannot 
be described as constituting positive international law, including regional 
customary international law. However, the author finds it not entirely 
unreasonable, should this dispute ever be adjudicated, that the Chinese side 
would raise the argument that the conflict needs to be understood through a 
framework similar to this and therefore it is relevant to also include an 
analysis of whether China fulfills these requirements, parallel to the analysis 
under contemporary international law.  
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1.4 Delimitations  
The main delimitation has already been expressed, that this paper doesn’t 
aim to provide a definitive adjudication to the present dispute. Other 
delimitations are that this paper only focuses on the sovereignty issue and 
not on maritime delimitation or whether there are other possible solutions to 
the present dispute, such as a joint exploitation of the natural resources. 
Although this last issue is highly interesting, it is primarily political and 
hence outside the scope of this paper. Lastly, legal scholars have provided a 
comprehensive collection of historical data relating to the present dispute. 
However, since this paper is limited in scope, it is necessary to assess which 
historical data is most relevant and to expurgate the less relevant. Of 
primary interest to note in this regard is that the Decree of Empress 
Dowager Cixi hasn’t been included. The reason for this is that the 
authenticity of this imperial edict has been questioned and even 
distinguished Chinese scholars have admitted that there are several 
problematic components, which indicate that this document might have 
been forged.9 Among the other historical data that have been expurgated, are 
the imperial envoys of Li Dingyuan of 1801 and Qi Kun of 1809 and the 
Qing dynasty logbook, Zhinan Zhengfa.    
1.5 Outline 
The outline of this paper can be described as follows. After this introductory 
chapter follows a chapter that provides “background-information”, primarily 
focusing on describing relevant international law that is important to keep in 
mind throughout the paper. The following chapters 3-5 provide a 
chronological expose over the events taking place through history relating to 
the sovereignty issue. This chapter division aims to describe and analyze, in 
turn, the following enclasping legal issues; 
 
1. Were the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to be regarded as Terra Nullius and 
therefore available for occupation in 1895? (Chapter 3) 
2. Did Japan lawfully acquire sovereign title to the disputed islands and in 
such a case was it based on the mode of occupation or cession? (Chapter 4)  
3. Did the wartime declarations oblige Japan to return the disputed islands to 
China following the end of World War II? (Chapter 5)  
4. Did the eventful years following the oil discovery affect the sovereignty 
issue? (Chapter 5)  
 
                                                
9 See further on this matter in Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p. 104-106 and in Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 61f.  
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2 Background  
2.1 Stances by claimant States and the US 
2.1.1 The Japanese claim 
The Japanese official stance towards the disputed islands was first explained 
through a series of official statements issued by the Okinawa Prefecture 
during the early 1970’s. This was followed, on March 8, 1972, by an official 
statement from the Japanese Foreign Ministry entitled “The Basic View of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Senkaku Islands” (the Basic View 
henceforth). This section provides a description of the Japanese stance as 
expressed in the Basic View.10  
 
In the Basic View Japan claims that “in the light of historical facts and 
based upon international law” the disputed islands are undoubtedly Japanese 
territory and that there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be 
resolved. Japanese politicians have reiterated this last part ever since the 
Basic View was published. The third paragraph of the Basic View provides 
the legal foundation for the Japanese stance and reads,    
 
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made by the 
Government of Japan through the agencies of the Okinawa Prefecture and by way of 
other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands 
had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of Qing 
Dynasty China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a 
cabinet decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a marker on the islands to formally 
incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan.  
 
From the quoted passage it is evident that Japan claims that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were terra nullius (land without sovereign) when 
they were incorporated in 1895 and hence that Japan acquired sovereignty 
over the islands through occupation, one of the established modes of 
territorial acquisition. It is also apparent from this passage’s reference to the 
cabinet decision, that Japan aims to demonstrate that the incorporation 
process was legalized through governmental administrative procedures.   
 
The fourth paragraph of the Basic View further states that the disputed 
islands “were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, 
which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty China in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of 
1895”. This passage aims to refute the Chinese argument that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were historically and administratively 
“appertaining or belonging” to Taiwan and were therefore ceded to Japan 
pursuant to Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This Japanese argument 
is derived from the perception that the disputed islands were terra nullius 
and as such couldn’t have been islands “appertaining and belonging” to 
Taiwan. Additionally, since the Japanese process of incorporation was 
                                                
10 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p. 23-24 
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finalized through the cabinet decision on January 14, 1895, and the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki signed on April 17 the same year, Japan contends that the 
incorporation was an act completely separate from the treaty and the 
disputed islands can therefore not be regarded as an integral part of the 
aforementioned treaty. Moreover, since the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 
according to the Japanese perception, weren’t ceded pursuant to the said 
treaty, Japan consequently isn’t obliged to return the islands pursuant to the 
declarations signed after World War II, which aimed at reverting the 
territorial boundaries to where they were before the Japanese imperial 
aggression.      
 
Japan contends that the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT henceforth) 
should be regarded as the final and decisive document relating to the 
disputed island. This treaty has, in relation to the present dispute, two 
relevant Articles. Article 2 deals with which territories Japan has to 
renounce its rights to and Article 3 with which territories Japan has to place 
under temporary US administration. It is important to remember that these 
two Articles have very different legal implications since Article 3 doesn’t 
affect the sovereignty issue. Japan contends that the disputed islands aren’t 
an integral part of Article 2 since they weren’t expressly mentioned among 
these territories, but are an integral part of Article 3 since they are integral 
part of the phrase “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the 
Ryukyu and the Daito islands)”. 
 
The Basic View also addresses the issue of Chinese acquiescence towards 
Japanese control over the disputed islands from the conclusion of World 
War II until the 1970’s. Article 4 expresses that, the fact that China 
expressed objection towards the islands being under US administration 
pursuant to the SFPT, “clearly indicates that China did not consider the 
Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan.” The fact that the disputed islands were 
considered as an integral part of this phrase is evident from several 
subsequent documents issued by the US, primarily the USCAR 27 of 
December 27, 1953, which further provided coordinates regarding the 
geographical boundaries of US administration. Hence, Japan contends that 
there were several instances wherein China could’ve protested against the 
handling of the disputed islands during the period following the end of the 
war but she never did. Official protests, from both the PRC and the ROC, 
were first expressed after the publication of the ECAFE-report, which 
indicated the possibility of large petroleum resources in the area.  
2.1.2 The Chinese claim  
Although both the PRC and the ROC since the 1970’s have issued official 
statements displaying their respective stances, the position of these two 
claimants are fundamentally the same since they are based on shared 
historical facts. The stances by these respective governments only deviate in 
relation to events that occurred after 1949.  
 
Between the respective Chinese governments, the ROC was first to launch 
an official protest against Japanese sovereignty in February 1971 and the 
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PRC’s ditto came later, in December the same year. While the PRC’s 
official statement of December 1971 is sufficiently detailed, the ROC’s 
protest needs to be complemented. In September 1996, the ROC 
Government Information Office published the pamphlet “An objective 
Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Dispute” which presents a sufficiently 
comprehensive overview of the official claim by the ROC. Below follows a 
description of the common position held by these governments according to 
the 1971 official statement by the PRC and the 1996 pamphlet of the ROC.  
 
The foundation of the Chinese claim is that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
were Chinese territory prior to the Japanese “re-discovery” and 
incorporation process in 1885-1895 and therefore the disputed islands 
weren’t terra nullius and couldn’t be incorporated through the mode of 
occupation. The Chinese claim is supported by large quantities of historical 
records which demonstrate that the disputed islands were first discovered, 
named and used as navigational aids by ancient China as early as the 14th 
century. Large amounts of historical records and maps from China, the 
Ryukyu kingdom and Japan prove that, during a period of over 500 years 
prior to the Japanese re-discovery in 1885, the disputed islands were well-
recognized as Chinese territory by all the aforementioned countries. These 
documents demonstrate that the national boundary between China and the 
Ryukyu kingdom were situated along the compass route from Fuzhou 
(China) to Naha (Ryukyu) and located beyond Chiwei Yu (J:Kumeshiki-
shima), which is the most north-eastward island within the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
island group, but before reaching Kume-jima of the Ryukyu kingdom. The 
Chinese claim is further supported by the fact that the disputed islands were 
incorporated into the Chinese coastal defense system during the Ming 
Dynasty and remained an integral part of this system throughout the Qing 
Dynasty, during the Chinese struggle with Japanese pirates. Another fact 
that supports the Chinese claim is that the disputed islands were by the Qing 
government during the 18th century, administratively placed under the 
coastal defense system of Taiwan and that the Chinese naval forces 
therefore were patrolling around the area. 
 
The Chinese governments contend that these historical facts demonstrate 
that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were Chinese territory and that they also 
had such a connection to Taiwan that they have to be regarded as islands 
“appertaining and belonging” to Taiwan according to the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, which concluded the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895).  
Article 2 of the said treaty stipulated that China had to cede to Japan, 
Taiwan and her appertaining and belonging islands as a booty of war. As a 
consequence of this, the Chinese governments contend that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were acquired by Japan, through the mode of 
cession. The reason why it is important for China to claim that the disputed 
islands were acquired through cession is that the declarations following the 
end of the Second World War obliged Japan to revert and renounce 
territories it had acquired through its military aggression.  
 
In relation to the Japanese contention that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were 
incorporated through a series domestic legal procedures, conducted prior to 
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the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki, China regards these procedures as 
invalid or illegal. This stance is derived from the perception that the 
disputed islands were Chinese territory and not terra nullius and as such 
couldn’t be unilaterally incorporated by Japan without the consent of the 
legal titleholder. Scholars supporting the Chinese claim have further sought 
to demonstrate that the said incorporation procedures were intentionally 
carried out in secret and only made public 60 years later, in the 1950’s, and 
that China thus was denied information necessary in order to launch an 
official protest. These scholars have further contended that this secrecy, 
together with the correspondence among Japanese officials, clearly show 
that the Japanese officials in charge of the incorporation were 
knowledgeable about the Chinese perception of sovereignty of the islands 
and that this is crucial information which undermine the Japanese claim that 
the islands were terra nullius at the time.        
 
Although both Chinese governments claim that Japan was obliged to return 
the disputed islands to China following the end of the Second World War, 
they base their arguments on different facts since these two governments 
have different stances towards events that occurred after 1949. The legal 
stance by the ROC is that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands should’ve been 
returned to China according to four wartime documents; the Cairo 
declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945, the SFPT of 1951 
and the Treaty of Taipei of 1953. The legal position by the PRC on the other 
hand is that it refutes the legal validity of the SFPT and the Treaty of Taipei, 
and therefore the Cairo and Potsdam declarations are the only two pillars the 
PRC’s legal stance rests on. These documents, together with the official 
stances towards these documents, will be exhaustively dealt with under 
chapter 5. However, it deserves mentioning, since under 2.2.1 the Japanese 
argument relating to Chinese acquiescence towards the placement of the 
disputed islands under US administration, that PRC has always refuted the 
legality of the SFPT. The PRC therefore claims to have officially protested 
against how the islands were handled in the post-war period.  
2.1.3 The US’s approach to the diputed islands 
Before proceeding forward, a few words has to be mentioned regarding the 
US’s position towards the dispute. The reason why this is relevant is partly 
because the US has been directly involved in administering the islands 
between 1952 and 1972 but more importantly that both Japanese and the 
Chinese governments continue to invoke past US actions and rhetoric to 
strengthen their claims. Japan points to the US’s interpretation of the SFPT 
where the disputed islands weren’t considered to be included among the 
territories Japan had to renounce their claim to under Article 2, but were 
considered among the territories Japan had to place under US administration 
pursuant to Article 3. Furthermore, Japan points to the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty (ORT henceforth) of 1971 as evidence supporting the Japanese 
claim. The Chinese governments on the other hand points to several official 
statements by US officials that the US government takes no position 
towards the sovereignty issue. The SFPT granted the US administrative 
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rights and the ORT merely reverted those rights. Six months before the ORT 
came into effect on May 15, 1972, the US Secretary of State expressed the 
US’s position towards the disputed islands in the ORT as “This treaty does 
not affect the legal statues of those islands at all. Whatever the legal 
situation prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty 
comes into effect”.11 Similar statements, expressing that the US never held 
sovereignty over the islands and therefore were in no position to revert such 
rights, have been expressed by successive US administrations. The US’s 
position towards the ORT wasn’t received with enthusiasm by any of the 
claimants. Both Chinese governments protested against the US’s inclusion 
of the disputed islands under the treaty and Japan protested against the US’s 
stance, since it was officially neutral towards the sovereignty issue.12  
 
Lastly, it shall me mentioned that although the US remains officially neutral 
towards the sovereignty dispute, it is generally understood that the disputed 
islands are covered by the Treaty of Mutual Security between the US and 
Japan, of 1960. The legal implication of which is that the US are legally 
obliged to defend the Japanese de facto control should armed confrontation 
between China and Japan regarding the islands occur and subsequent US 
officials have also reiterated this stance.13  
2.2 A comparative perspective 
2.2.1 Introduction  
Section 2.2 aims to describe and contrast how modern international law 
emerged in Europe with the traditional East Asian World Order (EAWO 
henceforth) which dominated East Asia from immemorial times until 
modern Japan emerged through the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The reason 
why this comparison is relevant is that scholars supporting the Chinese 
claim have argued that it isn’t entirely sensible to strictly evaluate the 
present conflict under the lens of modern international law. Instead, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands conflict needs to be understood in a broader 
context, taking the political realties of the EAWO into consideration. The 
underlying concern this section deals with is therefore whether 
contemporary international law, which originated in Europe and developed 
in accordance with its economic and political realities, can appropriately 
adjudicate a territorial dispute among States that historically belong under 
the EAWO, which was based on fundamentally different principles.14 
Before proceeding further, one aspect of the Eritrea and Yemen Arbitration 
is relevant to mention since it highlights the inherent difficulties of applying 
contemporary international law in non-western parts of the world where this 
framework hasn’t traditionally governed international relations. The Award 
acknowledged that “a problem of the sheer anachronism of attempting to 
                                                
11 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 123.  
12 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 123-127.   
13 Manjiao, Chi .,The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over 
the Diaoyu Islands, p 176.  
14 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 64-67.  
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attribute to such a tribal, mountain and Muslim medieval society the modern 
Western concept of a sovereign title”.15 Although the Tribunal ruled that 
difficulties with the establishment of historical facts prevented it from 
accepting the claim of historic title based on a different legal framework 
than international law, it indicated a willingness to accept such claims if 
only the existence of such a claim could be sufficiently proven. Therefore it 
could be stated that this award facilitates for a more lenient approach to the 
legal necessities and eases the prerequisites regarding territorial acquisition 
in non-western parts of the world.  
2.2.2 The evolution of modern international law in 
Europe 
Scholars of the history of international law often depict the ratification of 
the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648), as the beginning of the development of modern 
international law.16 The Westphalian peace established a new paradigm in 
international relations based on a horizontal system wherein independent 
States exercised sovereign authority over their respective territories and 
freely conducted their mutual relations on the basis of equality and in 
accordance with their perceived self-interest.17 The most fundamental aspect 
of the Westphalian system is the concept of State sovereignty based on 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction and from this concept, other important legal 
consequences are derived such as the crucial importance of defining the 
territorial units, which belongs under each respective State’s sovereignty. 
Hence, the Westphalian system established rules relating to how to define 
the scope and character of territorial jurisdiction and how to adjudicate 
competing claims of territorial jurisdiction.18  
 
The Westphalian system continues to provide the backbone of contemporary 
international law but the State-centered structure that the Westphalian 
system provides has lost some of its significance during the 20th century. 
Although States continue to be the primary subjects of international law, 
they are not its only subjects. Today, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and even individuals contribute to the 
development of international law.19   
2.2.3 The traditional East Asian World Order 
The traditional EAWO was very different to the modern international law 
that developed following the Westphalian system. Westphalian principles 
such as national independence, sovereignty and equality weren’t recognized 
under the EAWO since they were futile to this system’s perception of 
civilization.20  
                                                
15 Eritrea and Yemen Arbitration, Award of 3 October 1996, at para 446.  
16 Fassbender, Bardo., Westphalia, Peace of (1948), at para 18-22.  
17 Grote, Rainer., Westphalian System, at para 1-7.   
18 Grote, Supra n. 17, at para 1-7.   
19 Wolfrum, Rütiger., International Law, at para 1  
20 Suganuma Supra n. 1, p. 101-103.  
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The EAWO was, contrary to modern international law, a strictly hierarchical 
system. The hegemonic power within this system was imperial China who 
instituted a framework, which governed its foreign relations that historians 
have characterized as an investiture-tributary relationship. Foreign nations 
who wished to establish contact with China were expected to formally 
recognize Chinese cultural and political superiority as well as the universal 
pre-eminence of the son of heaven (the Chinese emperor). Through 
conducting a ceremony of subordination, these nations became tributary 
States within the EAWO and the Chinese emperor granted their leader the 
title “king”, conducted re-current investiture missions to the kingdom and 
gave permission to trade with China. This hierarchical structure along with 
the Chinese hegemonic position affected Chinese international relations 
since they never had to rely on treaties or declarations to specify the rights 
and obligations of the respective parties. China institutionalized the EAWO 
and the tributary States had to abide if they wanted to maintain relations 
with the hegemon. This system also applied to boundary delimitations. The 
boundaries between China and its tributary States were sufficiently clear 
and customarily recognized and respected under the traditional EAWO 
without China having to declare sovereignty or erecting national markers to 
display authority or control.21 The East Asian world order hence deviated 
from the concept of State sovereignty based on exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. Unlike the theoretically equal European States, the hegemonic 
China never had to rely on a precise territorial division. 
 
Further, the concept of State territoriality or the conjunction between 
territory and sovereignty wasn’t recognized under the EAWO. China, as the 
hegemon of this system, demanded loyalty to the person of the Chinese 
Emperor, his representatives and the Confucian hierarchical system of 
relationships. Therefore, the Chinese emperors and their officials ruled men, 
not territorial space.22 Hence, the power of the Emperor went only as far as 
Emperor-observant people could dwell and little attention was paid to places 
lacking human habitation. Therefore it was arguably very difficult to 
establish sovereignty over uninhabited islands since this was unknown to 
the Confucian understanding of government control.  
2.2.4 The Westphalian system enters East Asia  
The Westphalian system spread throughout the world by European 
imperialism and colonialism and came into collision with the EAWO during 
the mid 19th century. Qing China was naturally reluctant to embrace this 
paradigm, since it would force her to give up the position within the 
millennia old system, which she had created and benefited from. Japan on 
the other hand adopted a different approach to this new paradigm, especially 
after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. A largely contributing factor to this 
revolution was the Japanese realization that it had become technologically 
and militarily inferior to the West. The revolutionary leaders therefore set 
                                                
21 Shaw, Supra n.2, p 64-69.  
22 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p 145.  
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out to strengthen Japan against the threat of Western colonial powers by 
establishing an enlightened rule with a combination of western technology 
and traditional East Asian values. It was through the Meiji Restoration that 
Japan emerged as a modern nation and although the revolution initially 
served to defend Japan against Western powers, the dramatic technological 
advancements it produced, gave Japan advantages over East- and South East 
Asian countries which it would later use during its imperialistic era.23  
 
The quasi Westernization that the Meiji Restoration brought about, also 
involved modern international law, which Japan was quick to adopt, 
contrary to China. Chinese scholars argue that the present conflict is a clear 
example of how Japan, upon learning international law, learned to use it as a 
tool to exploit the less formalistic, but nevertheless sufficiently defined 
boundaries, within the EAWO to advance its territorial boundaries during 
their imperialistic era, which aimed to redefine the EAWO and replace 
China as the hegemon.24 
2.3 Modes of territorial acquisition 
2.3.1 Introduction 
There is no general convention regarding how States acquire territory or 
how to assess the value of one State’s claim over another’s. These rules are 
solely governed by customary international law. The terminology 
surrounding territorial acquisition can be confusing because the phrases 
“sovereignty” and “ownership” are sometimes used interchangeably but can 
also denote different legal concepts. International law acknowledges that a 
territory can be under sovereignty of one State but under ownership of 
another and that both sovereignty and ownership can be transferred without 
the other. This paper will however only deal with sovereignty and in the 
case “ownership” is used, it is merely to make the language more varied. 
The phrase “acquisition of territory” is usually defined, as “the 
establishment of sovereignty over a given piece of land” and the phrase will 
be used according to this terminology in this paper. Another phrase that will 
be used is “title” which in this paper will refer to the fact(s) that creates the 
legal right to sovereignty.25 
 
International law has traditionally used the phrase “modes of acquiring 
territory” to connote the different means of acquiring territorial sovereignty 
and this phrase will also be used in this paper. Traditionally there are five 
modes of acquiring territory; occupation, prescription, cession, conquest and 
accretion. The last two modes are irrelevant for this paper and will not be 
further dealt with. Moreover, as will be described more thoroughly below, 
international case law of the 20th century have converged the modes of 
occupation and prescription giving them common prerequisites. Hence, 
contemporary international law has seen the emergence of a new mode of 
                                                
23 Kissinger, Henry., On China, p. 77-80.  
24 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p. 64-67. 
25 Kohen, Marcelo G and Hébié, Mamadou., Territory, Acquisition, at para 1-3.  
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territorial acquisition customarily referred to as “effective occupation”. 
However, since the present dispute stretches over a considerable time-span, 
it will nevertheless be relevant to distinguish between how these two modes 
evolved. Lastly, traditionally international law has organized the modes of 
territorial acquisition into two categories based on what kind of facts creates 
sovereignty; original and derivative titles. Occupation is the only original 
title, the others being derivative titles. This distinction has traditionally been 
relevant since the legitimacy of a derivative title will always depend on the 
legitimacy of the previous titleholders claim, while this isn’t the case with 
original titles.26 
2.3.2 Occupation 
The first mode of territorial acquisition to be discussed is occupation, which 
is highly relevant since all claimants in this dispute contend that their 
sovereignty is primarily based on this mode. The legal doctrine uses 
somewhat different phrases to denote this original mode of territorial 
acquisition; another oftentimes-used phrase is “discovery” but since this 
expression can appear rather misleading, this paper will use “occupation”. It 
needs to be stressed however, that this phrase refers to a peaceful territorial 
acquisition and shouldn’t be confused with “conquest” or “belligerent 
occupation”. Occupation will in this paper be defined as “appropriation of 
territory by one state which is not at the time subject to the sovereignty of 
any other state”.27 Below follows a basic chronological expose over how 
this mode of territorial acquisition evolved through time. The reason why it 
is important to provide a chronology relates to the concept of critical date 
and intertemporal law, which will be dealt with under section 2.4.  
 
Rules regarding how States acquire territory through occupation first appear 
during the very late 15th century. From the late 15th until the late 16th 
century, Papal Bulls played an important role in the territorial acquisition of 
Christian European colonial countries. In special cases during the late 15th 
century these Papal Bulls alone where considered sufficient to grant 
sovereignty. These Papal Bulls where however rare and only granted to the 
Iberian countries and therefore, it is inappropriate to make any analogies 
from this practice. The Papal Bulls remained important during the first half 
of the 16th century, although during this time they weren’t sufficient by 
themselves to establish sovereignty, they had to be accompanied by an 
actual discovery of the territory falling under the realm of the grant in order 
to establish sovereignty. The Papal Bulls started to lose their legal validity 
during the second half of the 16th century and especially Queen Elisabeth I 
contested the authority of the Pope and the validity of the Papal Bulls in 
1580. The Pope completely lost his legal authority after the Westphalian 
system was introduced in 1648.28 
 
                                                
26 Kohen and Hébié, Supra n. 25, at para 1-8.    
27 Ozaki, Shigeyoshi., Territorial Issues on the East China Sea A Japanese Position, p. 152.  
28 Kohen, Marcelo G and Hébié, Mamadou., Territory, Discovery, at para 1-7. 
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The legal prerequisites for the mode of occupation were debated among 
scholars during the 17th century. This debate particularly focused on whether 
territories, inhabited by indigenous populations, should be considered as 
terra nullius and therefore available for “occupation” by the Europeans. 
According to both Fransisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, occupation 
couldn’t be invoked under these circumstances since the indigenous 
population already possessed sovereignty and hence only derivative titles 
were possible in these circumstances. It is however difficult to deduce any 
consistent State practice from the 17th until the end of the 18th century. It 
appears that States regarded mere visual discovery in relation to their own 
discoveries to be a constitutive element establishing sovereignty but didn’t 
consider mere visual discovery to have such an element in relation to other 
States’ discoveries. 29   
 
Needless to say, State practice in relation to the prerequisites of occupation 
during this time appears to have been rather contradictory. Because of this, a 
conservative interpretation is reasonable and such an interpretation leads to 
the conclusion that mere visual discovery of for European countries 
previously unknown territories wasn’t enough to constitute a title. Visual 
apprehension only created on inchoate title, which needed to be coupled 
with some kind of formal acts within a reasonable time to establish 
sovereignty. Exactly what kind of formal acts could complete an inchoate 
title was never developed in customary international law. Conventional acts 
were for instance planting of flags or crosses on the territory or reading of a 
declaration upon disembarkation. To include the relevant territory in the 
State’s administrative records were also used and sometimes accepted as 
formal acts granting sovereignty.30    
   
The requirements regarding occupation increased during the 19th century 
when the concept of “effective occupation” emerged. It is impossible to 
pinpoint exactly when this concept was established in customary 
international law but this most likely happened during the mid 19th century 
and definitely before the African Conference in Berlin 1885.31 The 
prerequisites of “effective occupation” during the 19th century focused 
largely on taking physical possession of land by settlement or use of 
territory by other means and on the exclusion of other States.32  
 
Case law of the 20th century somewhat changed the prerequisites of 
effective occupation and decisively rejected the requirement that a State 
needed to take physical possession of a territory and shifted the emphasis to 
the manifestation of State functions. The legal position established by these 
early 20th century cases is still relevant today. Contemporary international 
law therefore defines effective occupation as “the actual, continuous and 
peaceful display of State functions in regard to the territory” and it demands 
both the will of the State to possess (animus occupandi) and effective 
possession (corpus occupandi). The “effective possession requirement” 
                                                
29 Kohen and Hébié, Supra n. 28, at para 2-7.  
30 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p 37.  
31 Kohen and Hébié, Supra n. 28, at para 1-7. 
32 Ozaki, Supra n. 27, p. 152-155.  
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relates to administrative, legislative and judicial functions and the extent of 
the effectiveness required depends on the territory in question, its size and 
location, whether it is inhabited or not and whether there are other States 
with competing claims. Minimal levels have been required in relation to 
small, remote and uninhabited territories.33 The “continuous requirement” 
depends on the same factors. Time-spans or interruptions can be permitted 
but the length of these depends on the aforementioned factors.34  
 
International law doesn’t provide a definite answer to the issue of which 
material acts can constitute a manifestation of State sovereignty but it is 
reasonable to assume that a wide range of acts may constitute such 
manifestations. Acts of legislation was the focus in the Eastern Greenland 
Case wherein the PCIJ stated that legislation “is one of the most striking 
forms of the exercise of sovereign power”.35 Acts of legislation was also the 
focus in the Case concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipandan. The Court awarded Malaysia sovereignty expressing that the acts 
of regulating turtle egg fishing, controlling the collection of turtle eggs and 
the establishment of a bird reserve must be seen as regulatory and 
administrative assertions of authority over territory.36 In the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos Case, the focus was instead on judicial and administrative acts.37 In 
the case between Qatar and Bahrain the court stated that although 
construction of lighthouses and other navigational aids do not constitute acts 
displaying State sovereignty per se, they can be considered as such acts 
depending on the circumstances and a more lenient approach was adopted in 
relation to small islands.38 Other acts that case law has regarded as a 
potentially constituting a display of State sovereignty depending on the 
circumstances are military activities, police surveillance and naval patrols.39  
 
Before proceeding forward it shall be stressed that “actual, continuous and 
peaceful display of State functions in regard to the territory” are the only 
requirements of effective occupation. International law doesn’t stipulate any 
additional rules regarding the actual incorporation. Animus occupandi can 
be either explicitly or implicitly expressed and international law therefore 
doesn’t specifically require notification to other countries. However, the 
effective occupation needs to be manifested in such a way that other States 
are in a position to launch a formal protest (this is relevant for the analysis 
under chapter 4).40   
                                                
33 Kohen and Hébié, Supra n. 28, at para 7.   
34 Ozaki, Supra 27, p. 152-155. 
35 The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Denmark v Norway (Eastern Greenland Case), Judgement 
of 5 September 1933 at para 48.  
36 Case concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipaden, Judgement of 17 December 
2002, at para 145. 
37 See further regarding this case under section 2.5.   
38 Case concerning maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 
Judgement of 1 July 1994, at para 197.  
39 For military activities and police surveillance se Rann of Kutch Arbitration, Award of 19 February 
1968 at para 558. For naval patrols see Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, middle 
rocks and south ledge, Judgement of 1 September 2003, at paras 240-43 wherein the court stated that 
since the naval patrols where only described in general terms they cannot be taken as proof of state 
authority.   
40 Ozaki, Supra n. 27, p. 166ff.  
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2.3.3 Acquisitive prescription  
The second mode of territorial acquisition to be discussed is acquisitive 
prescription (prescription henceforth), which is the acquisition of title 
through continuous and undistributed possession coupled with acquiescence 
from the affected State. However, as mentioned above, early 20th century 
case law has interconnected the traditional modes of occupation and 
prescription into the concept on “effective occupation”, which requires 
“actual, continuous and peaceful display of State functions in regard to the 
territory”. Hence, under contemporary international law, prescription cannot 
be regarded as an independent mode of territorial acquisition.41      
 
Traditionally, prescription has been defined as “the result of the peaceable 
exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject 
to the sovereignty of another”.42 In comparison to the traditional 
requirements for occupation, it is particularly relevant to stress the “very- 
long requirement”, which relates to the fact that the initial titleholder has to 
acquiesce. This means that the de facto control has to be conducted openly 
in order to allow a possible reaction from the affected State. Moreover, 
although prescription inherently requires a certain passage of time, no 
general rule regarding the length of time required can be established.43   
 
Before proceeding, it needs to be stressed that the existence of prescription 
as a mode of territorial acquisition has been debated ever since it first 
emerged in international law around the late Middle Ages or early modern 
times. Proponents of the concept argued that acquisitive prescription was 
necessariy since it created peace and stability among nations and that States 
that have maintained order and security within a territory, are reasonably 
more entitled to the territory than the former possessor who has neglected 
the territory. Opponents of the concept either criticized the applicability of 
the concept since it didn’t entail a fixed time limit or criticized the concept 
as unnecessary. Lastly, neither the PCIJ nor the ICJ has ever explicitly 
recognized prescription, although elements of the concept have been 
touched upon.44  
2.3.4 Cession  
The third mode of territorial acquisition to be discussed is cession, which is 
relevant to discuss since according to the Chinese stance, Japan ceded the 
disputed islands from China pursuant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. 
The cession mode is rather straightforward. It is a voluntary bilateral 
transaction wherein sovereignty is transferred between two sovereigns. 
Although international law defines cession as a “peaceful transfer” it is not 
                                                
41 Ozaki Supra n. 27, p. 152-155.  
42 Wouters, Jan and Verhoeven, Sten., Prescription, at para 3.      
43 Ozaki Supra n. 27, p. 1. 
44 See for instance Palmas Island Arbitration, Award of 4 April, at 839 or the Matter of the 
delimitation of a certain part of the maritime boundary between Norway and Sweden (Grisbadarna 
case), Award of October 23 1909, at para 161. 
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uncommon that the threat of forces surrounds the cession agreement, which 
oftentimes is conducted through a peace treaty following the end of a war.45  
2.4  Critical date and intertemporal law 
Critical date and intertemporal law are technical rules of general 
international law that play particularly important roles in territorial disputes 
since territorial claims imply a succession of events, occurring over a 
considerable timespan. The critical date concept aims to establish a cut-off 
date after which any subsequent actions undertaken by the parties become 
either evidentially inadmissible or substantively irrelevant.46 Hence, this 
concept aspires to prevent the parties from unilaterally improving their legal 
position after the dispute definitely has arisen.47 In the Pedra Branca/Pulau 
Batu Puteh Case, the Court remarked that the critical date serves to 
“distinguish… between those acts which should be taken into consideration 
for the purpose of establishing or ascertaining sovereignty and those acts 
occurring after such a date”.48 The same case also established the general 
rule for determining the critical date as “the date when the dispute 
crystalized”. A dispute “crystalizes” when the parties formally oppose each 
other’s claim, which in cases of territorial acquisition usually is the date 
when one side asserts sovereignty and the other protests against this for the 
first time.49 However, there are cases of territorial acquisition wherein a 
different critical date has been chosen and cases wherein the concept has not 
been elaborated on or otherwise dismissed as being of little value.50   
 
Intertemporal law concerns the issue of temporal applicability of legal 
norms and aims to determine which temporal rules should be applied in a 
particular case with events of legal significance taking place during a 
considerable timespan. This issue was briefly elaborated on in both the 
Guyana-Venezuela Boarder dispute from 1899 and in the Grisbadarna 
Award from 1909. However, the landmark case establishing what is today 
known as the intertemporal-principle was the famous Palmas Island 
Arbitration from 1928, adjudicated by Judge Huber. 51 In this Award, Huber 
developed what scholars later have described as the intertemporal principle. 
Based on the idea that “a distinction must be made between the creation of 
rights and the existence of rights”52, this principle has been explained as 
consisting of two branches. The first branch states “(A) judicial fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law 
in force at the time when the dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be 
                                                
45 Ramos-Mrosovsky, Supra n. 6, p 915.  
46 Whether the critical date concept should be regarded as an evidential rule, which deems actions 
undertaken after as inadmissible or as a substantive rule, which rules the actions, undertaken after as 
substantively irrelevant has been debated in the legal doctrine. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos case it 
was deemed as an evidential rule and the judgment has been criticized for this holding. See further, 
Lowe, Vaughan and Tzanakopoulos, Antonios., Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, at para 7-9.  
47 Nasu and Rothwell, Supra n. 8, p. 67f.  
48 See Case Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Supra 39, at para 32. 
49 Kohen and Hébié, Supra n. 25, at para 50-52.    
50 Nasu and Rothwell, Supra n. 8, p. 67f. 
51 Kotzur, Markus., Intertemporal Law, at para 6.  
52 Island of Palmas Arbitration, Supra n. 44, at para 845.  
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settled”.53 The second branch states that “The same principle which subjects 
the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, 
demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued 
manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of 
law”.54 
 
The first branch of Huber’s framework has been widely accepted by the 
legal doctrine. The second branch however, has received criticism and 
opponents have contended that it causes instability and insecurity and that it 
merely is an exception to the first branch.55     
 
As stated above, intertemporal law is a principle of general international law 
and is therefore also relevant outside the field of territorial acquisition. Of 
particular interest for this paper is the field of treaty interpretation. 
Linderfalk stresses that the ICJ, from 1994 and onwards has used the 
customary international law reflected in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of the Treaties (VCLT henceforth), as an interpretive 
framework to evaluate legal relationships, which were created prior to this 
framework became customary international law. The ICJ has therefore used 
the law in force when the legal proceedings were instituted and not the law 
in force when the legal relationship was established. Therefore, the author 
concludes, the ICJ has implicitly used the second branch of the 
intertemporal law also for the purpose of treaty interpretation.56 This method 
of using the customary international law reflected in Articles 31-33 of the 
VCLT retroactively through the second branch of intertemporal law will be 
used for the purpose of treaty interpretation in chapters 4 and 5 of this paper.    
2.5 Case law of territorial acquisition 
The section above described the modes of territorial acquisition that are 
relevant to the present dispute by, among other things, including case law. 
This section aims to describe three cases, which are particularly important 
since they laid the foundation regarding the legal prerequisites of 
contemporary “effective occupation”, which are still relevant today.   
  
The landmark case of territorial acquisition is the Island of Palmas 
Arbitration of 1928, which has been described above in relation to the 
intertemporal principle, which was established through this Award and 
therefore doesn’t need to be restated here. In this case the US and the 
Netherlands both claimed sovereignty over Palmas Island, a sparsely 
inhabited island located roughly 40 kilometers off the southwest coast of the 
Philippines. The main argument by the US was that Spain had acquired an 
original title to the Island through their discovery and colonization in the 
early 16th century and that this title had remained intact until 1898 when 
Spain agreed to cede the Philippines to the US, a cession that included 
                                                
53 Island of Palmas Arbitration, Supra n. 44, at para 845. 
54 Island of Palmas Arbitration, Supra n. 44, at para 845. 
55 Kotzur, Supra 51, at para 6.  
56 Linderfalk, Ulf., The Application of International Legal Norms Over Time: the Second Branch of 
Intertemporal Law, p 162-165. 
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sovereign title to the Island of Palmas. The Netherlands refuted the US 
claim based on two grounds. Firstly, that Spain never acquired sovereign 
title since the acts undertaken by Spain merely accounted to discovery but 
didn’t meet the requirements of occupation. Secondly, even if Spain had 
acquired sovereign title, this title had later been lost. Judge Huber 
adjudicated this Award by using the intertemporal principle and found that 
Spain had not been able to prove that she had exercised sovereignty in 
accordance with the law applicable at the critical date, which was 
determined to be the date of the cession agreement between the US and 
Spain, in 1898, since the law of 1898 required effective occupation. Because 
Huber settled the case based on the second branch of the intertemporal law, 
he never had to evaluate whether the acts undertaken by Spain was 
sufficient to grant it an original title during the early 16th century.  
 
The Clipperton Island Case concerned a dispute between Mexico and 
France over a small, uninhabited island situated in the Pacific Ocean 
roughly 1000 kilometers southwest of Mexico, which had been discovered 
and named by an Englishman in 1705. Mexico argued that Spain had 
acquired an original title several hundred years ago and that they had 
acquired a derivative title as the legal successor of Spain, which they had 
maintained ever since. France argued that they had acquired title in 1858 
when a French ship “re-discovered” and briefly disembarked on the island. 
The proclamation of French sovereignty was reported to the French 
consulate in Honolulu and published in a local Hawaiian newspaper. The 
dispute crystalized itself in 1897 but wasn’t adjudicated until 1931 after the 
parties agreed to let Emperor Victor Emmanuel III of Italy settle the dispute. 
The arbitrator rejected Mexico’s claim stating that “the proof of an historic 
right of Mexico’s is not supported by any manifestation of her sovereignty 
over the island, a sovereignty never exercised until the expedition of 
1897…”57 The arbitrator followed the holding of Island of Palmas case and, 
through the second branch of the intertemporal law, ruled that effective 
occupation is necessary to complete an inchoate title. The French discovery 
coupled with the publication was on the other hand deemed sufficient to 
meet the requirement of effective occupation and the fact that France hadn’t 
taken any further action to assert her sovereignty from 1859 to 1897 didn’t 
affect her sovereignty title. The main significance of this case lies in its 
contribution to the prerequisites of occupation and specifically how this 
concept should be applied to small and uninhabited islands. With reference 
to this, the arbitrator expressed the following,  
 
(I)f a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the 
first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute 
and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession 
must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.58  
 
The Minquiers and Ecrehos case concerns two groups of islets and rocks 
situated in the British Channel between the island of Jersey and the French 
                                                
57 Arbitral award on the subject of the difference relative to the sovereignty over Clipperton Island 
(Clipperton Island Case), Award of January 28, 1931, at para 393.  
58 Clipperton Island Case, Supra n. 57, at 394. 
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coast. Both the UK and France based their claims on historic titles dating 
back to 1066 and 933 respectively and presented extensive documentation 
to support their respective claims. The ICJ however found this 
documentation to be of little relevance and instead focused on the evidence 
from the 19th century relating to effective occupation. The ICJ determined 
sovereignty over each of the groups of islets and rocks in turn. The Ecrehos 
group was awarded to the UK primarily because the local (Jersey) 
authorities had exercised criminal jurisdiction, had registered huts, boats and 
real estate contracts and erected a customs house. Furthermore, the Ecrehos 
group was included under the administrative limits of Jersey. The ICJ also 
awarded the Minquiers to the UK stating similar facts focusing on the 
exercise of jurisdiction, local administration and legislation. The primary 
holding from this case is that the ICJ, in line with the reasoning in the Island 
of Palmas case, dismissed the legal relevance of the historical 
documentation in order to focus on the effective occupation. Moreover, the 
ICJ didn’t make any formal determination regarding critical date, a 
circumstance that it has received criticism for in the legal doctrine.  
2.6 Accessory maritime rights  
2.6.1 Introduction 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have previously been described as remote, 
small, uninhabited and throughout history been considered as economically 
almost worthless.  The reason why these islands in recent times have been 
desirable has to do with the fact that contemporary international law, 
particularly UNCLOS, to which the PRC and Japan are parties, has vested 
the disputed islands with immense value.59 The international law of the sea 
has divided the sea into different zones and regulates the breadth of these 
zones as well as the rights and obligations that these respective zones are 
associated with. The zones that a coastal State can exercise maritime 
jurisdiction over are the following; internal waters, territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf and high seas. 
This section will deal with these zones and the rights they are associated 
with. However, before describing the rules of maritime jurisdiction, the 
concept of “islands and rocks”, first needs to be discussed. 60   
2.6.2 Islands and rocks 
Although what constitutes an island might be self-evident in colloquial 
language, the legal prerequisites regarding islands under international law is 
a more complex issue. The reason why the island-definition needs to be 
carefully regulated is that islands can generate the same extensive maritime 
                                                
59 Manijiao, Supra n. 13, p. 172.  
60 Nelson, Dolliver., Maritime Jurisdiction, at para 1-2.  
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zones as land territories according to UNCLOS Article 121 (2), which also 
reflects customary international law.61 This Article reads,  
 
Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this convention applicable to other land territory  
 
Islands’ ability to grant its sovereign accessory maritime rights is dependent 
upon being considered an island under international law. These 
requirements are stipulated in UNCLOS Article 121 (1), which expresses 
that “An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, 
which is above water at high tide.” This island-definition has been regarded 
as customary international law at least since the 1960’s. The phrases 
“naturally formed area of land” and that islands have to be “above water at 
high tide” have been debated by scholars but aren’t relevant for the present 
dispute and will therefore not be further examined. 62     
 
To fully understand the island-definition it needs to be contrasted with the 
definition of rocks in Article 121 (3), which states “Rocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” This Article adds “ability to 
sustain human habitation or economic life” as a prerequisites to the island-
definition. This requirement is rather problematic especially since 
technological developments or economic changes might alter how 
international law perceives islands and rocks.63 
 
Whether the disputed islands are capable of sustaining human habitation or 
economic life is actually very doubtful. The largest of the islands, Diaoyu 
Yu (J: Uotsurijima) has a landmass of 4.3 sq. km and at best a very limited 
fresh water supply. Without constant supplies from the outside, it is hardly 
possible to establish a permanent abode here.64 However, since all claimants 
regard them as islands under international law and since maritime 
delimitation isn’t the focus area, this issue will not be further elaborated on.   
2.6.3 Baselines, internal waters and territorial sea 
Baselines are the starting-point in the division of zones since the breadth of 
most other zones is measured from the baseline. There are two kinds of 
baselines; normal and straight. Normal baselines are the general rule and 
they follow the natural configuration of the coast. Straight baselines are an 
exception that States can claim if they meet certain requirements and they 
are drawn completely on the basis of an artificial construction.65 Internal 
waters are, according to UNCLOS Article 8 “waters on the landward side of 
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between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Award of 8 
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62 Dipla, Haritini., Islands, at para 1-7.  
63 Dipla, Supra n. 62, at para 8.   
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the baseline” and the main difference between internal waters and territorial 
sea is that in the former, as a general rule, the right of innocent passage 
doesn’t apply.66 The territorial sea is located on the opposite side of the 
baseline from the internal waters and has, according to UNCLOS Article 3 a 
maximum breadth of 12 nautical miles. Coastal States have an extensive 
sovereignty within the territorial sea although it is subject to certain minor 
limitations, most notably the right to innocent and transit passage. 67    
2.6.4 Contigous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf  
Outside the territorial sea begins the Contiguous zone, which can extend 24 
nautical miles from the baseline. Coastal States are within this zone allowed 
to exercise the control, as well as punish infringement, necessary to “prevent 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea”, according to UNCLOS 
Article 33.  
   
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ henceforth) was introduced into the 
law of the sea through UNCLOS and is therefore relatively new. UNCLOS 
Article 55 stipulates that the maximum breadth of this area is 200 nautical 
miles. The aim of the EEZ regime is to ensure a balance between the rights 
of coastal States and the freedoms of other States. UNCLOS Article 56 (1) 
stipulates that this regime grants coastal States the following,  
 
Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non living, of the water 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds.  
 
Further, Articles 56 (2-3) somewhat limits the rights of the coastal State. 
Article 56 (2) states that a coastal State “in exercising its rights and 
performing its duties shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States” and article 52 (3) expresses that “the rights set out in this article with 
respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part 
VI”. Part VI deals with the continental shelf regime and an important 
implication of this reference is that the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines on the seabed and subsoil are largely governed by the regime of 
the continental shelf. Lastly, for clarification it shall be expressed that the 
EEZ-regime only grants the coastal State competencies related to resources 
located in the seabed and subsoil and doesn’t deal with the water above.68   
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3 The islands during ancient times 
3.1 Introduction 
The present chapter will describe and analyze the issue of whether ancient 
China, primarily the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasty (1644-
1912), can be said to have acquired sovereign title to the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands prior to the Japanese incorporation in 1895. As previously has been 
described, modern (and Euro-centric) international law was completely 
unknown in East Asia prior to the mid 19th century when it was introduced 
and accepted. Chinese scholars have therefore contended that this legal 
framework cannot appropriately adjudicate the issue of whether ancient 
China acquired sovereign title to the disputed islands. This issue needs to be 
understood in a broader context, taking the political realities of the EAWO 
into account. A more inclusive interpretation of historical facts, not merely 
evaluated through the lens of contemporary international law, can also find 
support from the Eritrea and Yemen Arbitration. This Award recognized the 
difficulties of applying Euro-centric ideas of sovereignty in non-western 
parts of the world and appears to have accepted the idea of a more lenient 
approach to different concepts of territorial acquisition should the existence 
of such a concept be sufficiently proven (see section 2.3). Japanese legal 
scholar Ozaki has described an alternative framework, which in this paper 
will be labeled “ancient possession from time immemorial”. Although this 
alternative framework cannot be described as constituting positive 
international law, the author finds it probable, should this dispute ever be 
adjudicated, that the Chinese side would raise the argument that the conflict 
needs to be understood through a framework similar to this and therefore it 
is relevant to also include an analysis of whether China fulfills these 
requirements, parallel to the analysis under contemporary international law. 
The framework presented by Ozaki centers around whether ancient China (i) 
considered the disputed islands as her own territory, (ii) treated them as such 
and (iii) if no other States have contended against such behavior. If all these 
requirements are met, ancient China should, according to this framework, be 
considered to have acquired the disputed islands without reference to any 
principle of international law of European origin such as occupation. In fact, 
the overwhelming part of the territory that now comprises Chinese territory 
has been established through this “ancient possession from time 
immemorial” notwithstanding the acceptance of international law.69  
 
Before beginning this discussion, a word of caution has to be expressed. 
Studying and evaluating the historical data provided by both sides is a very 
delicate task. Most scholars who have dedicated their time to studying this 
dispute are either Chinese or Japanese and they are seldom completely 
objective. Most scholars tend to twist the historical truth and interpret 
history to suit their interests and advance the cause of their respective 
States. The implication of this is that one needs to be careful, not only of 
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how these scholars legally interpret the historical data but also of how they 
linguistically translate the ancient Chinese Mandarin into English. Since 
the author is unable to critically evaluate these linguistic translations, the 
only feasible method is to emphasize when certain passages or phrases 
have been questioned or there are alternative translations. The work of 
Chinese historian Suganuma will largely base the translations provided in 
this chapter and the works by Taiwanese legal scholar Shaw and Japanese 
ditto Ozaki, will also be used to evaluate and contrast Suganuma’s 
translations and interpretations.  
 
Lastly, in order to fully understand the Chinese imperial envoys, a few 
words shall be expressed regarding the Black Water Trough and the 
ceremony conducted there. The Black Water Trough mentioned in the 
imperial envoys refers to what we today call the Okinawa Trough or 
Okinawa Trench. We know this because modern oceanographers have 
stressed that the water situated above the continental shelf of Mainland 
Asia isn’t in any place deeper than 200 meters (usually 130-170 meters) 
while the water above the adjacent continental shelf where Japan is 
situated reaches 2270 meters and it is the Okinawa Trough that divides the 
two. This trough isn’t merely detectable through modern technology, it 
could also be visually detected through a change of water color, from blue 
to pitch black. Therefore, Chinese scholars point to the fact that this trough 
has historically been regarded as a natural boundary between China and 
the Ryukyu Kingdom.70 This trough is situated northeast of Chiwei islands 
(the island within the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands situated furthest to the 
northeast) and its waters were believed to lodge a sea-god (a saint-king 
yellow-dragon white fish) according to both Chines folklore and official 
documents. In order to pay respect to this sea-god and to ensure safe 
passage through the trench, the Chinese envoys had to perform a certain 
ceremonial ritual called “haishenji” (ritual to the sea-god) or “gougouji” 
(trench-crossing ritual) where they prayed to the sea-god and offered him 
sheep and pigs.71    
3.2 The islands during Ming dynasty  
3.2.1 Discovery and naming of the islands 
The first known reference to the Diaoyu islands appear in Wang Xiangzhi’s 
geography book Yudi Jisheng (History of Famous Geographical Locations 
in China), from 1221. It needs to be expressed however, that the location of 
the Diaoyu islands in Yudi Jisheng is not exactly the same as the location of 
the islands being discussed in this paper. Even though the location isn’t 
completely accurate, the book is relevant to discuss since it highlights the 
provenance of the names of the respective islands and provides an 
explanation as to why the islands became famous in ancient China. Yudi 
Jisheng expresses that the names of the respective islands within the island 
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group where taken from famous sites in the Chinese landscape. The name 
“Diaoyu Tai”72 represents a combination of “Diaoyu”, meaning fishing trip 
and “Tai”, meaning fishing steps. According to Yudi Jisheng, the name 
“Diaoyu Tai” were derived from a story of Chinese folklore where a 
fisherman caught carps that fell into these fishing steps and then climbed to 
the sky as dragons. This folklore became widely know throughout China 
and as a consequence, the Diaoyu islands became a famous site.73 Ozaki 
provides a different reason behind the naming of the islands. This scholar 
claims that it was the Ryukyuans who first named the islands and later told 
the Chinese who explicitly recorded them with Chinese characters. Ozaki 
claims that this explanation is the most reasonable considering that the 
Rykyuans traveled much more frequently to China than vice versa.74   
 
Yudi Jisheng has been largely ignored by both Chinese and Western 
scholars, which most likely has to do with the fact that the book, at least in 
its entirety, was lost for a long period of time. Suganuma expresses that the 
book was most likely lost during, or shortly after, 1227 and reappeared 
between 1772 and 1801 when another geographer, Qian Daxin, learned of 
its existence and included it in his work. Suganuma further expresses that 
according to the Chinese tradition of naming islands after Chinese 
landscape, this had to be recognized by the government. The author 
concludes that the Diaoyu islands where officially recognized and named 
during the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279) whose government most 
likely sent an exhibition between 1221-1227 to investigate the islands. The 
officials from the later dynasties, primarily the Ming and Qing, continued to 
use these names. Unfortunately it’s impossible, from available 
documentation, to verify exactly when and who first discovered the islands 
and when and by whom they were first officially named and recognized. 
Most scholars however seems to believe that they were named and officially 
recognized prior to the Ming dynasty.75    
3.2.2 Investiture missions to the Ryukyu  
The Ryukyu kingdom76 was a relatively small an independent kingdom 
which, from its capital of Naha, ruled primarily the Ryukyu Islands but 
throughout its history also parts of the Okinawa, Anami and Sakishima 
islands. The Kingdom was located south of Japan, northeast of Taiwan and 
East of Mainland China.77 The Ryukyuans had long resisted Chinese 
superiority and had virtually no contact with the outside world but after the 
establishment of the Ming Dynasty in 1368, China started sending imperial 
envoys to the Ryukyu to demand that they pay tribute to China. As a result 
of this, the Ryukyu kingdom became a tributary State to China and this 
tributary relationship was maintained throughout the Ming and Qing 
dynasties for about five hundred years. This tributary relationship 
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consisted of frequent visits to China by the Ryukyuans, the Ryukyu 
kingdom dispatched over 384 missions to China throughout this period, 
while China rarely dispatched such missions, only 16 missions during the 
Ming Dynasty and another 8 during the Qing Dynasty. These imperial 
investiture missions where called “cefeng” and its commanders where 
titled “Tianshi”. The Ryukyuans sent envoys to pay tribute to the imperial 
court while China sent envoys every time the installation of a new king 
occurred and the heir had to pledge loyalty and await China’s consent.78  
 
Upon returning from their missions the “Tianshi’s” provided the imperial 
court with written reports, entitled “Shi Liuqiu Lu” (The Record of the 
Mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom), containing navigational information, 
which was later used by subsequent envoys. All these documents were 
stored in the government archives but records of the first ten missions were 
destroyed due to a fire in the Fujian archives. Therefore, although the first 
envoy embarked in 1372, the mission of Chen Khan in 1534 is the first 
mission with available documentation.79 Academics supporting the 
Chinese claim have placed great emphasis on these reports, since they 
contend that they not only demonstrates that the islands were first 
discovered and used by the Chinese as navigational aids, but more 
importantly, that they contain passages indicating that the islands were 
regarded as Chinese territory, not only by China but also the Ryukyu 
Kingdom.80  
 
This particular tributary relationship between China and the Ryukyu 
kingdom materialized in such a way that Ryukyu had to adopt Chinese 
language, Confucianism and folk music and had to pay monetary tributes 
to China. In exchange however, the Ryukyu Kingdom became, with 
China’s blessing, a trading hub and an important channel for various other 
kingdoms. The relationship between imperial China and the Ryukyu 
kingdom was strictly hierarchical but it was nevertheless a mutually 
beneficial and peaceful relationship. There exist no documents indicating 
that there were any territorial disputes between the kingdoms nor did 
Ryukyu ever protest the Chinese perception that the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands belonged to China.81  
3.2.2.1 Chen Khan’s mission in 1534 
Because the fire in the Fujian archives destroyed all documentation, Chen 
Khan had to rely on information provided by local people to prepare for 
his voyage and on the Ryukyuans to inform him of the navigational route. 
The customary way to travel from China to Ryukyu was the so-called 
compass route, which started in Fuzhou (China) and ended in Naha 
(capital of Ryukyu) and was so called because it required the envoys to 
reset their compasses in a certain way as they passed by each island, or 
other navigational aid, so as to reach the next one.82   
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Although Kahn was accompanied by Ryukyuan sailors and despite his 
efforts to gather information in preparation of his trip, he lost his way 
along the compass route and therefore they never passed the crucial 
“guojiaojie” (international boundary) between China and the Ryukyu. 
When Khan saw the mountain Rebi Shan he enquired the Ryukyuans on-
board his ship about their current location and was surprised to learn that 
they had already reached Ryukyu territory. The Ryukyuans further 
explained that if they continued further east, they would eventually pass 
the “guojiaojie” between the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan.83  
 
After returning to Beijing, Khan wrote a book describing his mission and 
presented it to the Ming Emperor. The book consists of five parts, the 
second part being the most relevant for the status of the Diaoyu islands. 
Here Khan provides a detailed description of his voyage. After passing 
Taiwan on the ninth day he writes the following:  
 
A brisk southerly wind on the tenth day of the voyage propelled the ship forward. 
We sailed passed Pingjia Shan {Pengjia Mountain}, then Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu 
Islan}, Huangmao Yu {Huangwei Island} and Chi Yu {Chiwei Island}, using only 
one day to cover a distance which have normally required three days. The Liuqiu 
boats lagged far behind due to their smaller sails. Gumi Shan {Gumi Mountain84}, 
{which therefore, belongs to the Liuqiuans}, naishu Liuqiu zhe, appeared on the 
horizon on the evening on the eleventh day, with ecstatic Liuqiuan envoys singing 
and dancing out of joy over at last seeing their home…”.85 
 
Ryukyu officials participating in this voyage have recorded taking the 
same route as the one provided by Khan, so the validity of this mission has 
been independently confirmed. Khan’s Shi Liuqiu Lu provides a number 
of interesting features. Firstly, the usage of the phrase “guojiaojie” 
(international boundary) when the mission reached Rebi Shan, referring to 
the boundary between Japan and the Ryukyu, clearly indicates that both 
Ryukyuan and Chinese officials had an understanding of approximately 
where these international boundaries were located. Secondly, both the 
Ryukyu and the Chinese officials used the Chinese names of Diaoyu, 
Huangwei and Chiwei Island and described them in the correct order from 
west to east. It is relevant to mention that Khan’s cefeng was the 12th and 
that the Ryukyuans already had dispatched over 100 of their missions to 
China. Hence, the fact that both Ryukyuan and Chinese officials referred 
to them by name and in correct order clearly indicates that this was a 
mutual understanding and customary practice. Thirdly, both Ryukyuan and 
Chinese officials noted and described that Gumi Mountain was part of 
Ryukyu territory. Gumi Mountain is located east of Chiwei Island (the 
island located furthest to the north east of the Diaoyu islands) and 
approximately 40 nautical miles from the center of the Ryukyu kingdom. 
This fact therefore provides a hint that somewhere west of Gumi Mountain 
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lays a sufficiently established international boundary between China and 
the Ryukyu kingdom.86  
 
Many Chinese scholars have interpreted this passage to mean that both the 
Ryukyuans and the Chinese regarded all islands along the compass route 
prior to Gumi Mountain (Kume Hill) as Chinese territory.87 Ozaki 
however, is of a different opinion and expresses that although it is evident 
from this passage that Kume Hill was considered Ryukyuan, the passage 
never expresses that the islands along the compass route prior to Kume 
Hill were considered as Chinese territory. It was only after Khan arrived at 
Kume Hill that he learnt that he was within the territory of Ryukyu and he 
wasn’t aware of when the Chinese territory had ended. Ozaki further 
expresses that the happiness of the Ryukyuan sailors has nothing to do 
with passing an international boundary, they were merely happy to see 
home.88 The said scholar concludes that the Chinese legal interpretation is 
strained; Khan’s statement needs to be read literally.89   
3.2.2.2 Guy Rulin’s mission in 1561 
Khan’s mission was followed by Guy Rulin’s who was dispatched in 1561. 
Rulin utilized the same route as Khan had previously taken and writes the 
following after having passed Taiwan:  
 
…we passed Huangmao {Huangwei Island}. On the first of the fifth month, 
vessels passed Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu Island}. On the third, we passed Chi Yu 
{Chiwei Islan}. Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu defang shan ye {This is Chiwei Island, where 
there is a boundary (jie) with the Liuqiu Kingdom}. One more day with the wind, 
we can reach Gumi Shan (Gumi Mountain).90   
 
The vice-chief envoy of this Chinese imperial investiture recorded a 
similar account as the one provided by Rulin. Of particular interest is that 
he used the exact same sentence; “Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu defang shan ye 
(This is Chiwei Island, where there is a boundary with the Liuqiu 
Kingdom)”, in relation to the moment when he passed Chiwei Islands.91     
 
Two features from Rulin’s cefeng are particularly interesting. Firstly, the 
envoy reversed the order of the islands stating that he first passed 
Huangwei Island, and later Diaoyu Island and Chiwei Island. Traveling 
from eastward from Fuzhou to Naha, he should’ve reached Diaoyu Island 
before Huangwei Island. A possible explanation for this is that these two 
islands are located relatively close to each other and it is therefore likely 
that Rulin mistook himself or didn’t pay enough attention to the correct 
order. Secondly, Rulin makes a clear reference to Chiwei Island as the 
location of the boundary between China and the Ryukyu kingdom, a 
statement that Khan never expressed. Chiwei Island is the north-eastern 
boundary of the Diaoyu islands and is also geographically rather isolated 
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from the rest of the island group. It is also a tiny islet with a steep cliff and 
its appearance together with its unique geographical location makes it 
easily identifiable. Hence, the fact that the Chiwei Island wasn’t confused 
with any of the other islands is logical. 92   
 
Rulin’s investiture mission also performed the ceremonial trench crossing 
ritual previously described and he wrote that after having conducted this 
ritual, the wind suddenly started to blow and he was able to pass into the 
2000-meter depth. In this passage where he describes the trench crossing 
from the Diaoyu Islands into Ryukyu kingdom he uses the word “jie” 
(boundary), which indicates the perception that this trench crossing 
coincided with the international boundary between China and the Ryukyu 
kingdom located just beyond Chiwei Island. Suganuma interprets Rulin’s 
description of the trench and the trench crossing ritual together with the 
fact that this was the 13th investiture mission and that the Ryukyuans 
already had dispatched over a hundred missions to China along the 
compass route to be indications of a mutual understanding between the 
Chinese and the Ryukyuans that the trench coincided with the international 
boundary between these kingdoms.93  
 
Other Chinese legal scholars have also pointed to the above passage as an 
important argument that Chiwei Island was considered as the Chinese 
frontier, separating Chinese territory from Ryukyu.94 Ozaki on the other 
hand contends that Rulin’s documents only reconfirms the findings of 
Chen Khan, namely that beyond Chiwei Yu lays Ryukyu territory.95 The 
scholar states that there’s ample room for interpretation but the literal 
meaning is only that Chiwei Yu marks the boundary with Ryukyu, without 
any reference to where Chinese territory ends.96  
3.2.2.3 Xiao Chongye’s mission in 1579 
The 14th imperial investiture mission from China to the Ryukyu kingdom 
took place in 1579 when Xiao Chongye embarked on his journey. The 
envoy however lost its way to the Ryukyu kingdom and the heir to the 
Ryukyu throne had to dispatch a crew to retrieve the Chinese officials at 
Yebi Shan. Chongye’s Shi Liuqiu Lu is somewhat different to the ones 
provided by previous envoys. The most important difference is that 
Chongye, for the first time, provided navigational maps over each of the 
islands that he used as navigational aids along the compass route from 
Fuzhou to Naha. He described the landscape of these islands as well as the 
sailing time between them. Chongye was clearly aware that his work was 
going to be used by later envoys, which is why he was so descriptive. 
Chongye’s work indicate that navigators during this time depended heavily 
on the prevailing winds and the estimate of time to travel a certain distance 
and relied on detailed instructions of when and how to reset the compass 
when they reached a particular island in order to reach the next one. 
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Diaoyu, Huangwei and Chiwei Island were all included as navigational 
aids along the compass route with maps detailing their landscape.97   
 
In relation to the issue of the location of the boundary between the Ryukyu 
and China, Chongye stated the following as he was looking for the Yebi 
Mountain; “On the first of the sixth month, before vessels passed the Yebi 
Mountain…from this compass route, it took two days for us to ruguo 
(enter the kingdom)”. This passage is interesting since it reveals the fact 
there existed an established maritime boundary around the Yebi Mountain. 
Suganuma suggests that the reason why Chongye (using the phrase rugou) 
placed the boundary near Yebi Mountain was that he actually meant Gumi 
Mountain and mistakenly referred to it as Yebi Mountain after the envoy 
had lost its way to the Ryukyu Kingdom. Suganuma further contends that 
this practice of referring to the boundary as being situated around Yebi 
Mountain, also affected later envoys that continued to make the same 
somewhat incorrect reference.98  
3.2.2.4 Xia Ziyang’s mission in 1606 
Xia Ziyang headed the 15th cefeng in 1606. With relevance to the Diaoyu 
islands he recorded the following;  
 
…In the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, we passed Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu Island}. 
The next day, we sailed past Huangwei Yu {Huangwei Islands}. At night, the sea 
became rough and the ships shook terribly. Day after day, we sailed through an 
area of shenheise {dark blue color} water as if zhougou {turbid trench} water or 
dianse {dark blue color}. Alas! It is just like what is recorded in the Shilu Buyi 
{The Addendum of the record on the mission to the Liuqiu}, “quyou cangshui ru 
heisjui {(they) entered the black water from the blue water}!” On the twenty-ninth, 
when we saw the head of the Gumi Mountain, the Liuqiuans were extremely 
happy as if they were at home…”99   
 
What Ziyang expressed regarding his voyage back to China is also of 
relevance. During the journey back the cefeng was faced with heavy rain 
and the ship developed a leak and when they saw a passing ship they 
shouted, “There is a ship! Therefore, the distance to China is not too far. 
Passing from heishui (blackwater) and entering cangshui (blue water), 
Zhonguo zhi jie {we have crossed the boarder with China}”.100  
 
Like Chongye, Ziyang also drew navigational maps over the compass 
route and the Ryukyu kingdom. Ziyang’s book however, provided a more 
detailed description of the Fuzhou-Naha route. Like Chongye’s work, 
Ziyang also provided maps over the respective islands within the Diaoyu 
island group. Three features are of particular interest regarding the 
Ziyang’s book. Firstly, after having passed Huangwei Island, Ziyang 
observed an area of dark black color water day after day and he expressly 
recollected a quotation from the Shilu Buyi that the water color changed 
from dark blue to black, a fact that he verified. Secondly, during his return 
journey, he referred to the instance when his ship passed from the black 
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water into the blue as “we have crossed the boarder with China”. Thirdly, 
he expressed that this change of watercolor appeared at the same time as 
the ship began to cross into the 2000-meter trench, the same location as 
Rulin previously had expressed the international boundary between China 
and Ryukyu to lie. The quoted passage by Ziyang raises the question of 
why Ziyang didn’t mention Chiwei Island on his route to the Ryukyu 
kingdom. Suganuma suggests that he possibly had the names mixed up and 
meant Chiwei Island instead of the Huangwei Island.101     
 
Ozaki contends that the voyage of Ziyang provides a strong argument 
against Chinese ownership. He argues that the happiness expressed by the 
Ryukyuans on the way the Ryukyu and the happiness expressed by the 
Chinese on the way back, is related to the belief that the islands were 
inhabited by Ryukyuan (in the case of Mt. Nan-ji Shan) and Chinese (in 
the case of Wen Zhou) people. Hence, Ryukyuan sovereignty extended to 
islands inhabited by Ryukyuan people and Chinese sovereignty extended 
to islands inhabited by Chinese. Since the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were 
uninhabited, they cannot have been regarded as either Chinese or 
Ryukyuan and were therefore terra nullius.102   
3.2.3 The Shunfeng Xiangsong logbook of 1403 
Shunfeng Xiangsong (May Fair Winds Accompany You) was the main 
navigational guidebook during the Ming Dynasty and dealt with many 
navigational routes. It was published in 1403 by an unknown author (or 
authors) and is by many scholars considered as the earliest certain 
reference of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.103 This guidebook provided 
information on how navigators should navigate by using the compass and 
reading the stars and therefore provided information not only of navigation 
but also of geography. Furthermore, the book provided detailed 
descriptions of relevant ports, including the depth of surrounding waters 
and submerged reefs and which ports could be used as a refuge in case of 
bad weather. Shunfeng Xiangsong expressed the following in relation to 
the Diaoyu Yu (Diaoyu island); “berths with a depth of 15 tuo (a tou = 6 
inches) on Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu Island} are good for refuling wood and 
drinking water”104. Suganuma suggests that this passage indicates that the 
Diaoyu Island was a major refuge as well as a port for taking on drinking 
water and wood for voyagers during the early modern era.105   
 
Navigation during the early modern period was a difficult task and the 
navigators had to rely on a variety of tools. Understanding seasons, 
weather fluctuations and currents of the sea was crucial and Shunfeng 
Xiangsong provided such fundamental information necessary for 
navigating the sea. The imperial Chinese investiture missions utilized this 
information, which was one of the reasons why all cefengs departed from 
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Fuzhou in May and June and returned in October because the weather 
conditions was favorable. With reference to the issue of sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu Islands, Shunfeng Xiangsong is relevant primarily since it 
clearly indicates that the islands were not merely used as navigational aids, 
they were also used as ports of refuge during heavy weather and as 
refueling stations. This further also indicates that the authors of this 
logbook actually disembarked on the islands or at least that somebody else 
whose information that they trusted, did so.106    
 
Ozaki, however critiques the accuracy of the date of publication claiming 
that it contains references to events in Manila and Nagasaki that took place 
during the 15760-70’ and therefore the book was most likely compiled in 
the 1570’s.107 
3.2.4 Defense manuals 
Imperial China had a sea defense system since immemorial times but it was 
only during the early Ming Dynasty (around 1388) that they established a 
sea defense system covering its east and southeast coast. The reason behind 
this establishment was that Japanese pirates had plagued the Chinese east 
coast, and its adjacent islands. This defense system was later improved in 
1435 when the emperor established the Jiubian (the Nine Border Defense 
Commands) defense system.108 Chinese scholars contend that the inclusion 
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands into the Chinese defense system, as well as 
into the defense manuals and the local gazetteers, are proof that Imperial 
China not only regarded the islands as Chinese territory but also that they 
exercised State authority over the islands through effective control.109  
 
The Chines struggle with the Japanese pirates were intense during the 
1500s and the pirates raided many Chinese coastal provinces as well as 
islands situated in the East China Sea. During this time, Hu Zongxian, a 
famous Chinese commander, was appointed governor-general and 
responsible for handling the situation. He, in turn, appointed Zheng 
Ruozeng, a specialist in military art and geography, to be his military 
advisor. During his time as military advisor Zheng Ruozeng was able to 
continue the work of his magnum opus, Chouhai Tubian, since his position 
allowed him access not only to captured Japanese pirates but also to the 
Ming Government archives including its otherwise confidential reports. 
Zheng Ruozeng finished Chouhai Tubian in 1561 and it became a 
landmark work in Chinese geographic studies mainly because the Chinese 
geographers and military strategist had prior to this not focused on the 
coastal regions. The Chouhai Tubian is a comprehensive work and has 
been praised by both Chinese and Japanese historical geographers.110 
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The Chouhai Tubian depicted how the Ming government structured its 
coastal defense system including certain islands in the East China Sea. The 
disputed islands where among these islands and were included in the 
Fujian garrison defense system. Diaoyu Island was placed under the 
jurisdiction of Luoyuan County and Huangwei Island and Chiwei Island 
were placed under the jurisdiction of Ningde County.111 
 
Chouhai Tubian consists of seven parts and the second part deals with the 
history of Sino-Japanese relationships. In this section Ruozeng provides 
another interesting feature, namely that the compass route used to travel 
from Fuzhou to the Ryukyu kingdom, also could be used as a first leg in 
the journey from China to Japan. Hence, the Diaoyu islands were not only 
important navigational aids for Chinese imperial envoys en route to 
Ryukyu but were also used when travelling between China and Japan.112  
 
Chouhai Tubian consists of one overall map of China and 72 more detailed 
maps. In the overall map Taiwan wasn’t included nor were the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.113 The disputed island were however included in 
the more detailed maps, namely maps 7 and 8. Japanese legal scholar 
Ozaki has criticized both the accuracy of Chouhai Tubian and the legal 
significance of this work claimed by Chinese scholars. Firstly, he contends 
that Chouhai Tubian is not to be regarded as a work depicting what 
constituted Chinese territories. This work merely provides navigational 
information over the area that Imperial China needed to closely watch in 
order to properly defend Mainland China, since this was an area 
commonly plagued by Japanese pirates.114 Secondly, Ozaki criticizes the 
maps 7 and 8 and the legal significance given to these maps by advocates 
for the Chinese claim. The scholar claims that these two maps contain 
geographical errors since Diaoyu Yu and Huangwei Yu are placed in the 
wrong order and he argues that the reason behind this isn’t merely that the 
author got the order of the names wrong but that he was actually referring 
to a different island group, namely Mianhu Yu, which is located much 
closer to Taiwan.115 Ozaki also criticizes Japanese scholar Inoue, who is an 
advocate for the Chinese claim, who contends that maps 7 and 8 provides 
solid evidence that the disputed islands were Chinese territory at the time. 
According to Ozaki, maps 7 and 8 are completely irrelevant for the 
sovereignty issue since these merely focuses on defense strategy.116 Lastly, 
Ozaki argues that Chouhai Tubian doesn’t provide any proof that the naval 
power of Ming China extended into the waters around the disputed islands. 
This work, or any other documentation, doesn’t mention any naval 
deployments and therefore one cannot say that the disputed islands were 
incorporated into China’s coastal defense, although they were depicted in 
the area that needed to be closely watched.117  
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Regarding Ozaki’s last claim, that the disputed islands cannot be regarded 
as included in Chinas coastal defense, Taiwanese legal scholar Shaw is of 
a different opinion. He argues that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were 
integrated in the coastal defense already during the Ming Dynasty and 
refers to a treatise on military preparations published by Mao Yuanyi in 
1621 in which the disputed islands were listed under the section “Atlas of 
the islands and shores of the coastal region of Fujian”. Shaw further 
contends that the disputed islands remained under China’s maritime 
defense system well into Qing Dynasty and as time went by the military 
strategic ties to Taiwan increased. Shaw particularly points to a historical 
document entitled “Records of An Inspection Tour of Taiwan” written by 
the imperial inspector Huang Shujing during his survey of Taiwan in 1722 
as further evidence that the disputed islands were included in the Chinese 
naval defense system. Shaw also claims that this work proves that Chinese 
naval forces disembarked on the disputed islands since the following 
passage was expressed in the section entitled military preparation,  
 
In the north of the ocean behind the mountain (i.e., Taiwan) there lies a mountain 
named Diaoyutai where ten or more ships can be anchored.118 
 
Another important author for Chinese geography and military strategy was 
Zheng Shungong who had spent a lot of time in Japan researching 
Japanese geographical documents and Japanese pirates. He used this 
information, together with other Chinese information about Japan, to write 
Riben Yijian (A mirror of Japan) in 1565, which focuses on Japan and its 
surrounding territories such as the Ryukyu kingdom. Riben Yijian is 
relevant to the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands since it 
provides a map over the disputed islands as well as a passage regarding the 
compass route from China to Japan, which reads:  
 
I discovered this route from the person who accompanied Chen Khan when he 
used to the Liuqiu Kingdom…Penghu is located in the sea of Quanzhou Sub-
prefecture, about 160 li (one li =0,317 miles)…and Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu island} is 
xiaodong xiaoyu ye {part of Taiwan territories}. Passing a small islet…with south 
wind…at 4 geng (a geng=18,642 miles) reached Huangma Yu {Huangwei Island} 
and Chikan Yu {Chiwei Island}.119   
 
Of primary relevance from this section is the expression xiaodong xiaoyu 
ye which Suganuma, and most other scholars, has been translated to mean 
that the Diaoyu islands are part of Taiwan’s territories.120 Chinese scholars 
generally put a lot of emphasis on this quote claiming that it is indisputable 
evidence that the disputed islands historically were perceived to belong to 
Taiwan (this is particularly relevant for the Chinese claim concerning 
interpretation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, see section 4.3).121  
 
Ozaki makes a different translation of this phrase and concludes, after a 
lengthy discussion, that “Xiaodong” in this case doesn’t refer to Taiwan, 
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as generally understood, but to the waters surrounding Taiwan. Therefore 
he expresses that a more correct translation of Diaoyu Island is “xiaodong 
xiaoyu ye” would be that Diaoyu island is situated in the waters of Taiwan, 
not that it is part of Taiwan territory or that it belongs to Taiwan. The 
scholar furthermore contends that Taiwan was annexed by China in 1684 
and Chinese immigration of Taiwan had not begun by the mid 16th century 
when Riben Yijian was written. This is an undisputable fact but Ozaki 
takes it further and argues that if Taiwan wasn’t Chinese territory during 
the Ming Dynasty, nor could the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have been. The 
scholar further argues that why would China care about whether the 
disputed islands geographically belonged to Taiwan if Taiwan wasn’t part 
of China? The only reasonable explanation to the phrase “xiaodong xiaoyu 
ye” is therefore that it merely provided additional navigational 
information, completely unrelated to the sovereignty issue.122  
3.2.5 Analysis  
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate whether China acquired 
sovereignty during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). However, as stated in the 
introductory chapter, the aim isn’t to provide a definitive answer, but rather 
to elaborate on the strength of such an argument. The first issue this analysis 
needs to deal with is which framework should this issue be analyzed against. 
One possible framework is the international law concept of “occupation”, 
which was applicable in Europe during this time. The international law of 
the 15th and 16th centuries were, at least partly, governed by papal bulls and 
this institution has to be regarded as completely irrelevant to the present 
analysis. Even if the papal bulls are taken out of the analysis, the 
requirements of occupation prevailing during this time haven’t been 
sufficiently established. The US argued in the Island of Palmas case that 
Spain’s mere discovery was sufficient to establish title while the 
Netherlands refuted this claim contesting that discovery wasn’t enough. 
This issue however was never adjudicated since judge Huber determined the 
case based on Spain’s lacking effective occupation at the critical date of 
1898. Therefore, if an international court or arbitrational tribunal in the 
future would have to deal with the issue of whether Ming China had 
acquired sovereignty according the international law of the 15th, 16th and 
17th century, they would first have to determine exactly what the 
requirements of occupation were.  
 
Another possible framework to evaluate whether Ming China had acquired 
sovereignty would be to disregard the international law requirements of 
occupation and instead focus on the political realities of the EAWO. 
Through an understanding of these realties it would then be possible to 
determine whether China’s relationship to the disputed islands could be 
characterized as an “ancient possession from time immemorial”. Fulfilling 
this notion would require China to prove that she had (i) considered the 
disputed islands as her own territory, (ii) treated them as such and (iii) that 
no other States have contended against such behavior. The reason why it is 
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relevant to introduce this alternative framework is that international law was 
completely unknown to Ming China and hence, requiring China to conduct 
symbolic rituals recognized in Europe as displaying intent to occupy such as 
erecting a cross on the territory or reading a declaration upon 
disembarkation, wouldn’t be entirely reasonable.  
 
Having expressed that this alternative framework could be a reasonable tool 
in adjudicating whether Ming China had acquired sovereignty, a few words 
needs to be repeated regarding the EAWO. The EAWO was a system more 
similar to the system prevailing in Europe during pre-modern times wherein 
law wasn’t necessarily separated from moral or religion. The EAWO was a 
strictly hierarchical system with China as the hegemon and she dictated the 
framework of international relations. National independence, sovereignty 
and equality had no place in this system and although China didn’t have to 
rely on treaties or declarations, the parties’ respective obligations were 
sufficiently clear. Moreover, the concept of State territoriality was alien to 
Ming China since the Chinese Emperor and the Chinese officials ruled men, 
not territorial space. Therefore, the power of the Emperor went only as far 
as Emperor-observant people could dwell and little attention was paid to 
places lacking human habitation. Hence it was impossible for Ming China to 
establish sovereignty over uninhabited islands in the sense of (euro-centric) 
international law since such control, was unknown to the Confucian 
understanding of government control.   
 
With the description of these two alternative frameworks in mind, the 
analysis now turns to the issue of whether the actions undertaken by Ming 
China could be said to have met the requirements of either “occupation” or  
“ancient possession from time immemorial”. Before proceeding with this 
analysis it needs to be stressed that during the Ming dynasty, Taiwan was 
undoubtedly not part of China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are located 
northeast of Taiwan and hence further away from Mainland China.  
 
The first issue to address is whether ancient China first discovered and 
named the disputed islands. Chinese scholars contend that this was the case, 
referring to Yudi Jisheng of 1221, the Shunfeng Xiangsong logbook and the 
Chinese folklore tale. Others have claimed that it was the Rykyuans who 
first discovered and named the islands and later told the Chinese who were 
only the first to record the names in official documents. The Ryukyuans 
didn’t have a written language at the time and therefore there is no available 
Ryukyuan documentation proving a discovery or naming of the islands and 
no available Chinese documentation indicate that the islands were actually 
discovered and named by the Ryukyuans. Because of the lack of written 
Ryukyuan documentation, it will most likely be impossible to prove that 
they first discovered and named the islands. Whether China will be able to 
prove that they first discovered and named the islands, doesn’t appear to be 
an equally impossible task. Although no available official documents prove 
who first discovered them and when the Imperial Court first recognized and 
named them, most scholars seem to agree that they were officially 
recognized by China before the Ming Dynasty was established and it isn’t 
entirely unreasonable that China will be able to provide sufficient support 
 44 
for this claim. If China manages to prove being first to discover and 
officially naming and recognizing the islands this might be considered 
enough to establish that China acquired sovereignty during the Ming 
dynasty but this would be dependent on a court or tribunal using 
international law and determining that mere visual discovery was sufficient 
to establish sovereign title. 
 
The second issue to address is whether it can be deduced from the four 
imperial envoys dispatched during Ming China, together with the Shunfeng 
Xiangsong logbook and the defense manuals, that China acquired sovereign 
title under international law or “ancient possession since time immemorial” 
under the EAWO. From Khan’s envoy it is evident that there existed 
mutually recognized international boundaries (“guojiaojie”) between China, 
Ryukyu and Japan. It is also evident that the Rykyuans told Khan, upon 
inquiry, that Gumi Mountain was Ryukyuan territory. Khan’s Shilu 
certainly also provides a hint that somewhere west of Gumi Mountain along 
the compass route was Chinese territory, but his documentation read 
independently, doesn’t provide any information regarding the sovereignty 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  
 
The Shilu of Rulin contains more relevant information. Literally what this 
envoy expresses is that beyond Chiwei Island lays a boundary (jie) with the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. One reasonable interpretation of this boundary reference, 
advanced by the Chinese side, is that it refers to the boundary between 
China and Ryukyu. Another explanation, advanced by Ozaki among others, 
is that Rulin merely expresses that beyond Chiwei Island lays Ryukyu 
territory. In other words, the fact that the boundary with Ryukyu territory 
lays beyond Chiwei Island doesn’t necessarily mean that the territory west 
of this boundary is Chinese territory. Ozaki’s argument is that there could 
have existed islands that were regarded as terra nullius between China and 
Ryukyu since Rulin’s Shilu doesn’t mention Chinese territories or that 
China and Ryukyu were regarded as neighbors.   
 
The Shilu of Chongye is probably the least interesting and relevant of the 
four Ming envoys described in this paper. The credibility of this Shilu is low 
primarily because Chongye placed the maritime boundary at Yebi Mountain 
and not as customary at Gumi Mountain. Regardless of whether Chongye 
made an honest mistake and got the names of these two mountains mixed up 
or whether he perceived the boundary to be located at Yebi Mountain, his 
Shilu doesn’t provide any directly relevant information.  
 
The last cefeng during the Ming Dynasty one headed by Ziyang and of 
primary significance from this envoy is the journey back to China wherein 
the Shilu expresses, upon entering the Black Water Trench, “we have passed 
the boarder with China”. Out of the four Ming cefengs this is the only 
explicit reference to Chinese territory. It is important to note that this 
passage was expressed when the watercolor changed and the ship entered 
the Black Water Trench. Moreover, Ziyang’s Shilu (describing passing the 
boarder into China as they observed the change of watercolor) read together 
with Rulin’s ditto (expressing that an international boundary with Ryukyu 
 45 
was located where the water changed color) provides a strong argument that 
China regarded the disputed islands as her territory. A reasonable 
interpretation of reading these two works in conjunction would lead to the 
conclusion that China and the Ryukyu kingdom regarded themselves as 
immediate neighbors and that the Black Water Trench was regarded as the 
international boundary between China and Ryukyu. This perception would 
in prolongation indicate that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were regarded as 
Chinese territory since they are located west of the Black Water Trench. It 
has to be stressed however that this interpretation appears rather “China 
friendly”. None of the described envoys expressly state anything in relation 
to sovereignty over the disputed islands and only Ziyang’s envoy mentions 
the Chinese maritime boarder.  
 
Shunfeng Xiangsong, the Ming Dynasty logbook, is interesting since it 
mentions that the disputed islands are good for refueling wood and drinking 
water, which undeniably indicates that Chinese seafarers disembarked on 
the islands and at least during some point in time used the islands for these 
purposes and therefore not merely as navigational aids. This work however, 
doesn’t expressly state that China discovered and named the disputed island 
or that China regarded them as part of their territory and treated them as 
such. However, China could certainly make the argument that the inclusion 
of the disputed islands into this official logbook has legal significance and 
implicitly means that they regarded the islands as her territory and treated 
them as such since Chinese seafarers obviously disembarked on the islands 
prior to the publication of the logbook and most likely also after.   
  
The defense manual Chouhai Tubian, depicted the Chinese coastal defense 
system during a time when China was struggling with Japanese pirates. It 
had a general map over China and 72 more detailed maps. The disputed 
island, along with Taiwan, weren’t included in the general map but they 
were depicted in maps 7 and 8. Chouhai Tubian illustrated the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as included in the Fujian garrison defense system. 
The legal significance of the inclusion of the disputed islands into the 
Chinese coastal defense has been debated among scholars. The Japanese 
side has contended that this work doesn’t aim to depict what constituted 
Chinese territories; it merely provides navigational information for the 
Chinese navy. Further, it was important for the Chinese to have a detailed 
description of the area north of Taiwan since this was an area frequently 
visited by Japanese pirates. Chinese scholars on the other hand have 
contended that Chouhai Tubian is proof, not only that Ming China regarded 
the disputed islands as Chinese territory, but also that Ming China treated 
them as such. This last point has also been refuted by Japanese scholars who 
argue that no evidence exists of any naval deployments and therefore, the 
naval power of Ming China cannot be said to have extended into these 
waters. Chouhai Tubian is probably the strongest independent argument that 
Ming China both regarded and treated the disputed islands as her territory 
and this work also lends strength to the argument that China not merely 
discovered the islands but also conducted such activities necessary to meet 
the requirements of “occupation” under international law.  
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Another work that has received a lot of attention in the debate is Riben 
Yijian. The main contribution of this work to the present dispute is the 
passage Diaoyu Yu is “xiaodong xiaoyu ye” which by most scholars have 
been translated to mean that Diaoyu Island “belongs to Taiwan” or “is part 
of Taiwan territory”. Japanese scholar Ozaki has however refuted this 
translation claiming that a more appropriate translation would be that 
Diaoyu Island is situated in the waters of Taiwan. Regardless of which 
translation is more correct, Riben Yijian has no relevance for the issue this 
analysis aims to evaluate, namely whether Ming China acquired sovereignty 
to the disputed islands, since Taiwan undoubtedly wasn’t under Chinese 
sovereignty during the Ming Dynasty. While on the topic of Riben Yijian, it 
needs to be mentioned that this work, read together with Chouhai Tubian, 
creates some confusion. While the former portrays the disputed islands as 
belonging to Taiwan, the latter depicts them as under the Fujian Garrison 
defense system. These works were both written during the 1560’s and no 
available documentation has expressed that the disputed islands went 
through an administrative change during this time. This confusion however 
shouldn’t be stretched too far. Later, during the Qing dynasty, Taiwan was 
often depicted as a prefecture within the Fujian province and it seems 
reasonable that Riben Yijian referred to a geographical belonging rather 
than a military strategic, as the case was with Chouhai Tubian.    
 
In conclusion, the issue of whether Ming China acquired sovereignty to the 
disputed islands could either be dealt with according to the international law 
framework or a different framework where the political realities of the 
EAWO are taken into account. Should the issue be adjudicated only through 
the lens of international law, the court or tribunal first has to address 
whether mere discovery was sufficient to confer sovereign title during this 
time. If mere discovery is deemed sufficient, China appears to have a strong 
case since, although the exact date of discovery and date of official 
recognition cannot be established, there exists no evidence to prove that 
China wasn’t first to discover and officially recognize them. If mere 
discovery isn’t deemed sufficient, China’s claim under international law 
drastically weakens. Chouhai Tubian appears to be the only document that 
indicates that the Chinese discovery was coupled with a formal act, in this 
case inclusion in the military defense system. Since it doesn’t appear to exist 
sufficient proof that the disputed islands were actually included in maritime 
patrol routes during Ming China, the Chinese claim under international law 
additionally weakens. Should the framework of “ancient possession from 
time immemorial” be used, the sovereignty issue will revolve around 
whether Ming China considered the disputed islands as her territory and 
treated them as such. Applying this framework will nevertheless be a 
complex task and it will revolve around an interpretation of the envoys of 
Chen Khan, Guy Rulin and Xia Ziyang together with Chouhai Tubian and 
Shunfeng Xiangsong. It appears that with a China friendly interpretation of 
these documents, it is possible to conclude that China regarded the islands 
as part of its territory and, primarily based on Chouhai Tubian, also treated 
them as such. However, from a literal interpretation of these cefengs, it is 
difficult to argue that they show that China even regarded the islands as her 
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territory. Only one envoy actually mentions the Chinese maritime boundary 
and it appears to be a strained interpretation of historical facts to argue that 
it was an established perception that China regarded the territory west of 
Gumi Mountain as part of China. Moreover, the legal significance of 
Chouhai Tubian is difficult to evaluate. The fact that the disputed islands 
were included in the Fujian Garrison provides a strong argument that China 
regarded the island as Chinese and used them as such but it is also possible 
to interpret this work as not depicting what constituted Chinese territories 
but merely provided military strategic information. A similar reasoning is 
relevant for Shunfeng Xiangsong; it is doubtful whether this work expresses 
anything in relation to Chinese sovereignty. 
3.3 The islands during the Qing dynasty  
3.3.1 Investiture missions to the Ryukyu  
The Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Qing Dynasty in the middle of 
the 17th century (officially in 1662), but the civil war that eventually led to 
this regime change lasted for decades, leaving China in social disorder. 
Imperial Japan took advantage of this situation and subdued the Ryukyu 
kingdom into becoming a tributary State in 1609. From thereon and lasting 
until modern Japan in late 19th century invaded Ryukyu, the kingdom paid 
tribute to two emperors. This is a major change of circumstances to keep in 
mind when discussing the relationship between Qing China and Ryukyu. 
That being said, the relationship between China and Ryukyu remained 
largely unchanged. Many of the customs that had been developed during 
the Ming Dynasty were maintained during the Qing Dynasty. The Ryukyu 
kingdom was however faced with great economic burdens as a 
consequence of the Japanese invasion and Japan gradually increased its 
political influence over the Ryukyu kingdom during the Qing dynasty.123 
Chinese investiture missions to Ryukyu continued throughout the Qing 
dynasty and similar to the Ming Dynasty these cefengs also recorded their 
journeys and provided the imperial court with Shilus. These books became 
more accurate and more comprehensive, with time.124   
3.3.1.1 Zhang Xueli’s mission in 1663 
The first envoy of Qing China to Ryukyu was dispatched in 1663, only one 
year after the Ming Empire was officially overthrown, and headed by 
Zhang Xueli. The documentation provided by this mission however 
contains no information regarding passing any islands or mountains along 
the compass route from China to the Ryukyu kingdom. The reason for this 
is that Xueli and his envoy lost its way. When the envoy realized they had 
drifted away to Beishan Island, a recognized boundary between Japan and 
the Ryukyu kingdom, they were overjoyed. Prior to this Xueli observed 
the following;  
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The color of the water began to change from blue to dark blue. Hey! We entered 
the “ocean”, shouted the captain. There is a white water line crossing between 
south and north. “Here, Therefore, is jiezhongwai {the boundary between China 
and foreign country},” stated the captain.125  
 
The fact that it is uncertain whether the above passage is a description of 
the area surrounding the Diaoyu islands is certainly damaging to the 
credibility of Xueli’s records. Ozaki for instance expresses that the area 
described by Xueli must be located much closer to Mainland China, just 
past the Taiwan Strait.126 Regardless of this uncertainty, the passage 
nevertheless provides important information. Although the envoy doesn’t 
mention any islands or mountains, the description expresses that there 
existed a link between the changing watercolor and the international 
boundary between China and the Ryukyu kingdom. Hence, even if Xueli 
wasn’t able to find the disputed islands, he was looking for the trench 
surrounding them and expressing his perception that the changing 
watercolor equated the international boundary.127   
 
It is of relevance to note that Xueli was appointed as chief envoy in 1654, 
nine years prior to his actual departure. The reason for this delay was the 
on-going civil war in China. The envoy dispatched only one year after the 
Ming Dynasty had been officially ousted because it was considered a 
crucial task since the Ryukyuans had requested it for a long time. The 
Qing government had however not fully organized the national archives 
and hence Xueli had less navigational guides at his disposal, which is 
probably a largely contributing factor as to why he drifted further away 
from the compass route than his predecessors. Still he did equate the 
changing watercolor with the international boundary, which indicates that 
this might have been an established practice.128   
3.3.1.2 Wang Ji’s mission in 1683 
The next imperial mission was dispatched in June 1683 and headed by 
Wang Ji and his envoy dispatched the same month as China sent a large 
fleet to western Taiwan, seeking to annex the island. China officially 
annexed western Taiwan in 1684 and from then on gradually also 
incorporated the eastern part.129 Ji was on his cefeng accompanied by 
Ryukyuan officials since the previous envoy had lost its way. Because of the 
navigational help provided by the Ryukyuans, it only took Ji three days to 
reach Naha, which was much faster than any previous envoy. In his report to 
the Qing court, Ji expresses the following;  
 
According to navigation maps we should see Xiaoliuqiu, Jilong Yu and Huaping Yu 
after passing Dongsha Shan. However, we observed Pengjia Shan {Pengjia 
Mountain}, but no other mountain in the early morning of the twenty-fourth. After 
the ships passed Diaoyu Yu {Diaoyu Island}, we sailed so fast that the ships streaked 
across the sky. On the twenty-fifth, we were supposed to see Huangwei Yu before 
Chi Yu. For some unknown reason, we arrived at Chiwei Yu {Chewei Island} 
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without passing by Huangwei Yu {Huangwei Island}. In the evening, the ships went 
through the jiao or guo {trench} (to celebrate the haishenji {ritual to the sea god} or 
gougouji {trench-crossing ritual}. Along with rice live pigs and sheep were 
sacrificed to the sea god. What does jiao mean? Asked Wang Ji. “This means that 
there is a zhongwai zhi jie {the boundary between China and foreign country},“ 
replied the captain. How do you distinguish the jie {boundary}?” asked Wang again. 
“I believe the jie is located here. But this does not mean that everyone can guess this 
location. Nor is my belief irresponsible, “replied the captain…130  
 
The most significant feature of Ji’s records is that his description of the 
trench and international boarder crossing is more detailed than the one 
provided by previous envoys, such as Khan, Rulin and Ziyang who also 
recorded having passed the same trench. Of particular relevance is the 
awareness the captain shows about the location and implication of the 
“jiao”. Firstly, Ji’s report reveals that the conversation between Ji and the 
captain took place when the ships had passed Chiwei Island and entered the 
Okinawa trench, which we know today is an accurate description. Secondly, 
Ji specifically asks the captain what “jiao” meant in this circumstance and 
was told it meant the boundary between China and foreign country. This 
clearly indicates that this was the established understanding among the 
seafaring Chinese and Ryukyuans at the time. Thirdly, the captain also 
articulates how the boundary is distinguished, expressing that not everyone 
can point out the exact location, it demands experience of traveling this 
route but that he with a reasonable confidence can locate the boundary.131  
 
Shaw expresses that Ji’s clear description that the Black Water Trough 
equated the boundary between China and foreign country, makes it possibly 
the strongest case, among the envoys, in favor of the Chinese claim.132 
Ozaki however is of a different opinion and he is critical of both the 
translation and the Chinese legal interpretation of Ji’s records, claiming that 
it’s too far-fetched. Firstly, he refutes the above translation “the boundary 
between China and foreign country” and claims that it should instead be 
understood as “the boundary between inner and outer” and that it doesn’t 
refer to a boundary in a legal sense. Secondly, this boundary passage isn’t 
expressed by Ji himself but by a fellow traveler and Ji merely wrote it down 
without adding any personal comments. Therefore Ozaki contends, this 
cannot be attributed to Ji nor to Qing China and further, it cannot be 
regarded as intent to occupy. Lastly, Ji’s boundary reference failed to catch 
on by later envoys, which is additional proof that China didn’t have intent to 
occupy, according to Ozaki.133   
3.3.1.3 Xu Baoguang’s mission in 1719 
The next imperial mission was conducted in 1709 and headed by Xu 
Bauguang who punctiliously described the voyage from China to Ryukyu. 
In his Shilu, the voyage along the compass route to Ryukyu was described 
as follows;  
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On the twenty-fourth, two big islets were visible…passing Jilong Shan, we did not 
see other islets, such as Huaping and Pengjia…On the twenty-seventh, after 
traveling 2 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles), we should have sighted Diaoyu Tai, 
Huangwei, and Chiwei Island, but we did not see any of these islands…On the 
twenty-eighth, “this is not Gumi; it must be Yebi Mountain, which is located in 
northwest of our kingdom,” stated the Liuqiuan minister.134  
 
The above passage doesn’t provide any useful information regarding were 
the Chinese and Ryukyuan officials perceived the international boundary 
to lie. Even though Bauguang was accompanied by Ryukyuans who 
provided navigational directions, they missed many navigational aids, such 
as the Diaoyu islands. Bauguang’s Shilu however, also contains a 
reference to Shinan Kogi (Broad Interpretations of navigation Guide) 
written by the famous Ryukyuan geographer Tei Junsoku. The compass 
route between Fuzhou and Naha is in the relevant sections of this work 
described as follows: 
 
After traveling 10 geng (a geng = 18,642 miles), ships pass Jilongtou (Jilong 
Island)…then Huaping Yu, and Pengjia Shan. After sailing past 10 geng, vessels 
pass Diaoyu Tai (Diaoyu Island)… traveling 4 geng, and reach Huangwei Yu 
(Huangwei Island). After traveling 10 geng, ships pass Chewei Yu (Chiwei 
Island)…After sailing past 6 geng, vessels will arrive at Gumi Shan, where Liuqiu 
xinanfang jieshang zhenshan (is located the southwest boundary between the 
Liuqiu Kingdom and China). Heading Machi…ships finally reach Naha Ko (Naha 
Port) of the Liuqiu…135  
 
The most interesting feature about Bauguang’s usage of this quotation is 
the wording immediately after the name Gumi Mountain, namely; “is 
located the southwest boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China”. 
Previous envoys had expressed that Ryukyuan territories ended with Gumi 
Mountain but Bauguang’s quote clearly states that China and Ryukyu were 
immediate neighbors, in other words there could not have been any terra 
nullius islands located between China and Ryukyu and since the Diaoyu 
islands were located west Gumi Mountain, beyond Ryukyuan territories 
they have to have been perceived as Chinese territory. 
 
Ozaki refutes this legal interpretation. Firstly, he states that the translation 
is incorrect; the passage relating to Gume Mountain should instead be 
translated as “a guardian island, which stands as a southwestern boundary 
of Ryukyu”.136 He further states that this translation only reconfirms the 
findings of previous envoys such as Khan and Rulin without explicitly 
dealing with sovereignty of the disputed islands.137 Additionally, the 
scholar also expresses that the Chinese are misinterpreting Bauguang who 
was influenced by Ryukyuan feng shui scholars. His reference to 
southwestern boundary doesn’t refer to an area “above the border”, as one 
might assume in a modern legal-oriented reading. Instead, “above” refers 
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to the mountain needed to protect the capital according to feng shui 
teachings, not a legal demarcation of boundaries.138   
 
When reading this passage in Bauguang’s Shilu it should also be kept in 
mind that the person whom he was quoting, was a famous Ryukyuan 
geographer. Hence, for the first time a truly Ryukyuan perspective is 
added. It should be stressed however that doubts regarding the accuracy of 
the author of this quote has been raised. It has been expressed that the 
original Shinan Kogi didn’t contain such a passage and that this passage 
must have been written by Tei Junsoku but in the Shilu of Bauguang. 
Suganuma suggests that it doesn’t really matter whether it was Bauguang 
or Tei Junsoku who wrote this cited passage since it nevertheless provides 
a mutual understanding between the Chinese and Ryukyuan officials about 
the location of the international boundary.139  
 
In addition to a detailed navigational guide, Bauguang’s Shilu also 
included a comprehensive chart over the Ryukyu kingdom. In this map he 
depicted the Ryukyu kingdom as comprising of 36 islands, with none of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands included.140       
3.3.1.4 Zhou Huang’s mission in 1756 
Xu Bauguang’s mission was followed by the fourth cefeng under the Qing 
Dynasty and was headed by Zhou Huang’s in 1756. This envoy enriched 
the Chinese understanding of the Ryukyu kingdom with important 
historical, political, social and cultural knowledge and provided Qing 
China with the names of the Ryukyu Kingdoms’ major cities. 
Additionally, Huang’s Shilu contained maps of the compass route and 
described the journey to and from the Ryukyu Kingdom. The most 
relevant section of this description reads as follows,  
 
{the Ryukyu Kingdom} is surrounded by sea. To the west of its surrounding sea is 
the black water trough, which delimits Fujian Waters. To set sail from Fujian to 
reach the Ryukyu, one must advance through the blue waters and then cross the 
black waters.141 
 
When it comes to the description of Huang’s own journey, the most 
relevant part describes reaching Diaoyu Island during the day and 
celebrated the “guogouji” (trench-crossing ritual) during the night. On the 
way back to China he celebrated the “guogouji” again, this time as he just 
had passed Gumi Mountain.142  
 
Taiwanese legal scholar Shaw interprets the block quote above to 
demonstrate that the Black Water Trough served as the natural boundary 
that divided Ryukyu territory from Chinese and since the disputed islands 
are located westward of the trough, they were clearly within Chinese 
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territory.143 Suganuma takes a similar stance and contends that although 
Huang’s work doesn’t provide any new information regarding the 
ownership it is nevertheless important since it further strengthens the 
Chinese argument that there existed a recognized international boundary 
west of Gumi Mountain and east of the Diaoyu islands.144 Ozaki however, 
refutes that Huang’s work has any relevance for the sovereignty over the 
disputed islands. He particularly criticizes Chinese scholars who argue that 
the Black Water Trough should be regarded as the international boundary 
and expresses that this interpretation is exaggerated and that he misreads 
the poetic rhetoric expressed by Huang.145   
3.3.1.5 Zhao Xin’s mission in 1866 
Zhou Huang’s mission was followed by Li Dingyuan’s in 1801 and later by 
Qi Kun’s in 1809. Out of the Qing Dynasty envoys, these two are the least 
relevant to discuss since, although they reiterated what previous envoys had 
expressed, provided no new information relating to the status of the disputed 
islands, and will therefore not be presented in this paper. After these 
cefengs, the next envoy dispatched in 1839 and headed by Lin Hongnian. 
The documentation from this envoy has however been lost but certain 
sections are mentioned in Zhao Xin’s Shilu from his imperial investiture of 
1866, which was the last cefeng of imperial China. Both these missions will 
be dealt with under this heading. Before discussing these missions, it needs 
to be stressed that Japan attacked the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1864 and began 
setting up the Okinawa Prefecture and incorporating the Ryukyu kingdom. 
Hence, the Japanese influence over the Ryukyu kingdom increased 
drastically during this period.146  
 
The following passage comes from Xin’s Shilu but refers to Hongnian’s 
mission of 1839 and what he expressed regarding his journey along the 
compass route,    
 
On the sixth, our ships passed Diaoyu Shan {Diaoyu Island}… heading Jiuchang 
Dao (J: Kuba Shima) {Huangwei Island}…. In the morning of the seventh, our 
vessels sailed past Jiuchang Chidao (J:Kuba Sekijima) {Chiwei Island}. On the 
ninth, ships entered Naha Port147  
 
A similar passage is also provided in the section that deals with Xin’s own 
voyage and reads as follows,  
 
On the eleventh, we passed Diaoyu Shan… heading toward Jiuchang Dao (J: Kuba 
Jima) {Huangwei Island}…. On the twelfth, our vessel sailed past Jiuchang Chidao 
(J:Kuba Sekijima) {Chiwei Island}… and entered Naha Port on the twenty-first.148  
 
The most interesting feature of these quoted passages is the appearance of 
Japanese words such as “shan”. Suganuma suggests that the reason why Xin 
somewhat changed the names of the islands has to do with the fact that his 
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records were compiled by Guo Boyin in 1882 and by that time the Ryukyu 
kingdom had already been completely annexed by Japan. Suganuma further 
suggests that since China and the EAWO was beginning to fall apart due to 
the arrival of western colonialism, China had started to give up its 
hegemonic position and abandoning its tributary States in order to focus on 
the events taking place in Mainland China and hence, Xin wasn’t given 
sufficient time to prepare. As a consequence of the lacking preparations, the 
envoy had to ask the escorting Ryukyuans about the names of the islands 
and they simply answered with names influenced by Japanese.149 
 
While Suganuma only interprets the increased usage of Japanese names as a 
natural consequence of increased Japanese influence and gives it no legal 
significance, Ozaki makes a different interpretation. He argues that the 
Chinese usage of Japanese names is undisputable proof that China didn’t 
consider the islands as part of Chinese territory and that China had no 
intention to annex them.150 
3.3.2 Local Gazetteers or Annals 
Local Gazetteers (sometimes also referred to as annals) were written 
throughout the Chinese provinces especially during the Qing Dynasty. 
Generally speaking they were official records covering a broad variety of 
matters primarily focusing on the regional history and geography of the 
provinces. Such gazetteers were also written for Fujian Province and its 
subsidiary, Taiwan Prefecture. Shaw claims that a number of these 
Gazetteers contain descriptions that indicate the usage of the disputed 
islands by the Chinese naval forces. The author particularly points to 
“Revised Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture” from 1747, “Subsequent Revision 
of the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture” from 1764, “Records of Taiwan” and 
“Subsequent Revision of the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture” from 1764 
and Revised Gazetteer of Taiwan County from 1752. Additionally Shaw 
points to “Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province” by Chen Shouqi form 
1871, which, he claims, went further than previous Gazetteers and indicated 
the precise administrative division to which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
belonged and placed the disputed islands under the department that is today 
called Yilan County. Advocates for the Chinese side claim that these 
gazetteers demonstrates not only that China regarded the disputed islands as 
Chinese territory but also that they are evidence of Chinese effective control 
and exclusive usage.151 
 
Ozaki on the other hand, has contended that there are Gazetteers from Qing 
China wherein the disputed islands aren’t depicted. The Japanese scholar 
particularly points to the 1684 Fujian Tongzhi, which was compiled by the 
Qing Court but doesn’t mention the disputed islands and the 1871 
“Chongzuan Fujian tongzhi”, claiming that the same holds true for this 
work. This last part is interesting since the 1871 “Chongzuan Fujian 
                                                
149 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p. 81-84.  
150 Ozaki, Supra n. 126, p. 28-29.   
151 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p. 57-59.  
 54 
tongzhi” is the same work as the “Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province” 
from 1871. Hence, Shaw and Ozaki seem to be in direct disagreement 
regarding whether the disputed islands were depicted in this work. Ozaki 
further claims that, in the first five annals of Taiwan (1696-1764) Keelung is 
indicated as the northern limit of Taiwan which means that not even 
Pengjia, Huaping and Minhua are portrayed as being Chinese territory, 
although they are located much closer to both Taiwan and Mainland China 
than the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and these islands were also used as 
navigational aids along the compass route.152   
 
The fact that Shaw and Ozaki are in disagreement regarding the Gazetteer 
from 1871 is interesting but the author isn’t able to investigate this matter 
further and the issue will therefore not be developed further. Given that the 
rest of the claims put forward by Shaw and Ozaki are factually true and not 
merely interpretations to suit their respective interests, it appears as though 
some of these Gazetteers included the disputed islands, and some didn’t. 
Therefor it is most likely impossible to deduce an established perception or 
practice regarding whether Qing China regarded the disputed islands as their 
own territory and treated them as such, merely from these Gazetteers and 
Annals. It would be far-fetched to claim that the fact that they weren’t 
included in every Gazetteer indicates that China didn’t regard the islands as 
Chinese but it would be equally far-fetched to claim that the fact that they 
were included in some Gazetteers means that it was an established 
perception that China regarded the islands as Chinese. Therefore, this issue 
will not be further elaborated upon.   
3.3.3 Chinese academic research  
There are three Chinese academic works worth mentioning under this 
section. The first was written by Pan Xiang who was a researcher, and later 
a professor, at the Chinese Imperial College who mainly taught Chinese 
philosophy to Ryukyuan bureaucrats. In 1764, he completed Liuqiu Ruxue 
Jianwen Lu (Eyewitness Account of the Liuqiuans Studying at the Imperial 
College), which was based on an extensive and comprehensive research of 
both Chinese and Ryukyuan archives. This work provides thorough 
historical and geographical information about the Ryukyu Kingdom as well 
as on the compass route Fuzhou-Naha. This study provides the following 
passage relating to the meaning of the “heishuigou” between China and the 
Ryukyu Kingdom,  
 
Heishuigou {black-water trench} is the Haijie {marine boundary} between Fujian 
and the Liuqiu Kingdom. From Fujian to Liuqiu, ships must pass through the 
Heishui {black-water), which has often been called cangming {dark blue water in 
the East Sea} since ancient times. Also it is called dongming {Eastern Deep}…. 
Nevertheless, heishuiguo is Zhongwai Jieshui {the boundary water between China 
and foreign country}. Before crossing this gou, people must celebrate the 
festival.153   
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Since this book was written using both Chinese and Ryukyuan sources it has 
to be considered an authoritative source, which expresses both the Chinese 
and the Ryukyuan perceptions. Suganuma advocates that this passage 
“undeniably confirms that there was an international boundary between 
China and the Liuqiu, which was distinguished by the heishugou, located 
between Chiwei Island and the Gumi Mountain”.154   
 
The second Chinese academic book is Taihaishi Chalu (Record on the 
mission to Taiwan), written by Huang Shujing in the 1720’s. This work is 
regarded as the best early description of Taiwan, but it also provides some 
information regarding the Diaoyu islands. The military section of this book 
describes two relevant features. Firstly, that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands had 
a position within Taiwan’s maritime patrol route.155 Secondly, it expresses 
that “There is a shan whose name is Diaoyu Tai {Diaoyu Island} in the 
north, and it can hold ten huge ships”.156 Ozaki is critical of the legal 
relevance attributed to Taihaishi Chalu by Chinese scholars. He contends 
that eastern Taiwan wasn’t even under China’s control when this work was 
written and hence the argument that the disputed islands, which are located 
further northeast, should’ve been Chinese is very suspect. Ozaki further 
expresses that Huang Shujing never even travelled to eastern Taiwan nor to 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, he only quoted other travellers in order to 
impress his readers and therefore the passage about ten large ships being 
able to anchor there is a ridiculous claim without facts behind it.157    
 
The third academic book is Huangchao Zhongwai Yitong yu Tu 
(Geographical Atlas of China and foreign Countries in the Qing Dynasty), 
from 1862. This work clearly marked with Chinese names all places up until 
Gumi Mountain, only then did the map also incorporate Japanese names.158 
Suganuma suggests that this means that all islands prior to the Gumi 
Mountain along the Fuzhou-Naha compass route belonged to China and the 
islands located beyond this point belonged to Ryukyu. The author further 
expresses that this atlas also depicts the disputed islands as part of the 
Chinese coastal defense system.159 Ozaki makes a different interpretation 
and states that the inclusion of the disputed islands in this map is irrelevant 
for the issue of whether they were Chinese territory since the fact that they 
were described with Chinese characters proves nothing in this regard.160 
3.3.4 Non-Chinese documents 
There exists a few non-Chinese works that relate to the status of the 
disputed islands but since this paper is limited in scope, the author has 
chosen only to include one such document since it is most relevant. Hayashi 
Shihei was a famous Japanese geographer who published Sangoku Tsuran 
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Zusetsu (An illustrated Account of the Countries) in 1785. This work is one 
of the earliest recordings of the disputed islands in Japanese literature and it 
became a very important geographical book also outside Japan. With 
reference to the disputed islands, this work is relevant since it contains an 
analysis of the Ryukyu Kingdom, depicting it as a kingdom constituting of 
36 islands with none of the disputed islands included. 161 Further, Sangoku 
Tsuran Zusetsu contained maps using latitude and longitude and the author 
used a four pigment coloring method to indicate to which country different 
territories belonged. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were colored red, 
indicating Chinese ownership. Some Japanese scholars have refuted the 
importance of this work by contending that Shihei ”mechanically” colored 
the disputed islands red since he used Chinese imperial records. Chinese 
scholars on the other hand content that this circumstance further 
demonstrates the authoritativeness of these records.162 Suganuma suggests 
that this Japanese work “reassured and reconfirmed” the Chinese ownership 
of the disputed islands.163 Shaw expresses that supporters of the Chinese 
claim have frequently invoked this work as evidence that the disputed 
islands were well recognized as Chinese territory also by the Japanese.164    
3.3.5 Analysis 
The analysis of whether China acquired sovereignty during the Ming 
Dynasty was initiated by a discussion regarding which framework this issue 
should be evaluated against. A similar discussion is also relevant concerning 
Qing China but the situation during this era is somewhat different in relation 
to Qing China. The reason for this is that international law was introduced 
and accepted in East Asia during the mid 19th century and therefore, 
applying this framework is more reasonable during the Qing era. That being 
said, it should be kept in mind that Qing China and East Asia were still 
fundamentally influenced by the EAWO throughout the 19th century and 
therefore, a just and reasonable adjudication would need to take the political 
realities of this system into account and therefore, an analysis focusing on 
whether Qing China fulfills the requirements of “ancient possession since 
time immemorial”, which focuses on whether Qing China had (i) considered 
the disputed islands as her own territory, (ii) treated them as such and (iii) 
that no other States have contended against such behavior, is still relevant. 
Another aspect, which deserves mentioning is that, the prerequisites of 
occupation are sufficiently clear during the late Qing dynasty. The concept 
of effective occupation, focusing on taking physical possession of land and 
exclusion of others, was established as customary international law around 
the mid-19th century and was definitely established before the Berlin 
African Conference of 1885.  
 
Before beginning the analysis of whether Qing China acquired sovereignty 
over the islands, the Taiwan situation needs to be emphasized. Twenty years 
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after the Qing Dynasty was officially established, China began annexing 
Taiwan and soon acquired control over the western part. After this, Qing 
China gradually incorporated also the eastern part of Taiwan but it took 
China several decades to completely annex Taiwan. What the incorporation 
of Taiwan means regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
is subject to scholarly debate. Taiwanese scholar Shaw has contended that 
Qing China automatically acquired sovereignty over the disputed islands 
following the complete annexation of Taiwan. This argument is based on 
the idea that the disputed islands were considered as belonging to Taiwan. 
The only source confirming this perception is Riben Yijian and its passage 
that Diaoyu Island is “xiaodong xiaoyu ye” (part of Taiwan territories). 
Japanese scholar Ozaki has criticized both this translation and the argument 
made by Shaw claiming that only if it is “unequivocally established” that 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were geographical adjuncts of Taiwan, would 
Shaw’s argument have any bearing.165 Ozaki’s contention on this matter 
appears reasonable, it is far-fetched to argue that just because China 
acquired Taiwan, they also acquired the disputed islands. Another 
circumstance that needs to be stressed is that the issue of whether Qing 
China acquired sovereignty over the disputed islands prior to the Japanese 
incorporation in 1895, needs to be evaluated through an accumulation of the 
acts undertaken by China from time immemorial until 1895. Therefor the 
analysis conducted in relation to Ming China is relevant also under this 
section and the circumstances that strengthen the Chinese claim of 
sovereignty should be added to this analysis.  
 
The first imperial envoy of Qing China was Zhang Xueli who disembarked 
just after the Ming Dynasty had been officially overthrown and twenty years 
before China began to annex Taiwan. The cefeng lost its way and didn’t 
report passing any of the customary navigational aids such as the Diaoyu 
islands but the Shilu expresses, as the envoy enters the area of changing 
watercolor, that they must be at “the boundary between China and foreign 
country”. The fact that Xueli’s location is uncertain indisputably impedes on 
the legal significance that can be deduced from it. However, if Xueli’s Shilu 
is read together with Rulin’s and Ziyang’s, it provides a strong case that it 
was an established perception that the change of watercolor equated a 
recognized international boundary between Ryukyu and China.      
 
Wang Ji’s mission was dispatched the same months as China began 
annexing Taiwan. In his Shilu Ji reports that after passing Chiwei Island 
they passed through the “jiao” (trench) and celebrated the trench-crossing 
ritual. Upon crossing the trench he inquired to the captain what “jiao” meant 
and was told it was “the boundary between China and foreign country”. 
Upon being further inquired about how he could distinguish the “jie” 
(boundary), the captain replied that he believed it was here, not everyone 
could guess the location but his belief wasn’t irresponsible. Out of the 
cefengs analyzed so far, Ji’s provides the strongest independent argument in 
favor of the Chinese claim. Ji correctly describes the location of the trench 
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beyond Chiwei Island and the captain expresses that the trench equates the 
boundary between China and Ryukyu and that he, through his experience of 
travelling this route, could locate the boundary with reasonable accuracy. 
The only limiting feature of Ji’s description is that it is the captain who 
informs Ji about these matters, which it indicates that this maritime 
boundary was recognized by the seafarers rather than by Chinese officials.   
 
Xu Baoguang’s Shilu contains two elements; a description of his own 
voyage and a reference to the Ryukyuan work Shinan Kogi. The records 
from his own journey provides no relevant information regarding the status 
of the disputed islands but his reference to Shinan Kogi reveals that at Gumi 
Mountain “is located the southwest boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom 
and China”. This passage implies that China and Ryukyu were immediate 
neighbors and that the disputed islands were perceived as Chinese territory. 
The fact that doubts have been raised regarding whether Baoguang was 
actually quoting Shinan Kogi or whether the Ryukyuan author of this work 
was actually writing in Baoguang’s Shilu certainly creates some uncertainty. 
However, this shouldn’t be stretched too far since it expresses a mutual 
understanding between Chinese and Ryukyuan officials.  
 
Similar to the documentation provided by Baoguang, Zhou Huang’s Shilu 
contained one section about his own journey and one general section, 
among others dealing with the compass route. In the section dealing with his 
own journey Huang describes performing the trench-crossing ritual both on 
the way to Ryukyu (as they had passed Diaoyu Island) and on the way back 
to China (as they had passed Gumi Mountain). Read independently this 
passage doesn’t provide any relevant information regarding sovereignty but 
read in the light if previous envoys which had equated entering the Black 
Water Trench and visually recognizing the change of watercolor with the 
international boundary between China and Ryukyu, Huang’s work 
additionally strengthens the Chinese claim. The general section is arguably 
more interesting and relevant since it explicitly states, “To the west of its 
{Ryukyu} surrounding sea is the black water trough which delimits Fujian 
Waters” which undoubtedly indicates that the disputed islands were 
regarded as Chinese territory.    
 
Zhao Xin’s Shilu, which also contains information about Lin Hongnian’s 
voyages three decades earlier, contains no information relevant to the 
sovereignty issue. However, it is interesting to note that the appearance of 
Japanese names and language in this Shilu. The reason behind this is 
undoubtedly the increased Japanese influence over the Ryukyu kingdom. 
The issue of whether any legal significance regarding the status of the 
disputed islands can be deduced from the appearance of Japanese names is 
debatable. It is possible to argue that Qing China weren’t so knowledgeable 
about the islands and perhaps that they didn’t regard them as part of Chinese 
territory or that they didn’t treat them as such. However, it also seems 
reasonable not to draw any far-fetched conclusions from only one Shilu.  
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The academic research by Pan Xiang from 1764 provides arguable the 
clearest description in favor of the Chinese claim. This work explicitly 
states that the Black Water Trench is the maritime boundary between China 
and Ryukyu and that ships passing this trench must celebrate the trench-
crossing ritual. This work undeniably strengthens the Chinese argument that 
China regarded the disputed islands as her territory. The academic work by 
Huang Shujing from 1720 is also a strong case in china’s favor. Firstly, this 
work portrays the disputed islands as being located within the maritime 
patrol route of Taiwan and secondly it expresses that Diaoyu Island ”can 
hold ten huge ships”. Of particular interest from Huang Shujing’s work is 
that it strengthens the argument that China, not only regarded the disputed 
islands as her territory but also treated the islands as her territory, a 
circumstance that is undeniably difficult to deduce from the imperial envoys 
which doesn’t focus on how China treated the islands. The last academic 
work described in this paper is the “Geographical Atlas of China and 
foreign Countries in the Qing Dynasty” from 1862. This work portrays the 
islands along the compass route from China to Ryukyu up until Gumi 
Mountain with only Chinese characters and the island in the Ryukyu 
kingdom with both Chinese and Japanese characters. It is difficult to deduce 
any legal significance from this work. As Ozaki points out, the fact that the 
islands were described with Chinese characters doesn’t prove anything in 
relation to the sovereignty issue. A stronger case for Chinese ownership is 
the work by Japanese geographer Hayashi Shihei who drew maps over the 
East China Sea and used a four pigment coloring method to indicate to 
which country different territories belonged. The author colored the 
disputed islands red which means Chinese ownership. This work is 
particularly interesting since it indicates that also Japan perceived the 
islands as being under Chinese territory. The works by Pan Xiang and 
Huang Shujing provide very strong arguments that China not only regarded 
the disputed islands as her territory but also that she treated them as such. 
The issue therefore arises; how much weight should be given to these 
academic works? Clearly, they cannot be regarded as an expression of the 
official stance by the Qing government and they cannot be regarded as 
having the same weight as the official Gazetteers or the imperially endorsed 
cefengs. However, particularly the precision of Pan Xiang’s work lends it a 
lot of credibility, especially if it is read in conjunction with the Shilus. 
 
Analyzing Qing China’s relationship to the disputed islands through the 
alternative framework of “ancient possession since time immemorial”, it is 
quite obvious that China fulfills the first requirement of regarding the 
islands as her territory. This conclusion is primarily based on an 
accumulation of the imperial envoys conducted throughout the Ming and 
Qing dynasties but also supported by other documents such Pan Xiang’s 
academic work, which appears to, as Suganuma suggests, “undeniably 
confirms that there was an international boundary between China and the 
Liuqiu, which was distinguished by the heishugou, located between Chiwei 
Island and the Gumi Mountain”. Whether China also fulfills the second 
requirement is less certain. If the disputed islands had been undeniably 
included in a clear majority of the local Gazetteers, this would have been a 
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very strong case in China’s favor. However, since it wasn’t an established 
practice to include the islands in these official documents, it is impossible to 
determine merely from the inclusion or non-inclusion, whether China 
treated the islands as her territory. The strongest cases portraying that China 
treated the disputed islands as her territory is the Ming dynasty defense 
manual, Chouhai Tubian, which included the disputed islands under the 
Fujian Garrison defense system and the academic work, Taihaishi Chalu 
which described the disputed islands as being situated within Taiwan’s 
maritime patrol route. The legal significance that can be attributed to these 
works is however debatable since there doesn’t seem to exist any 
documentation proving that China actually patrolled the area around the 
disputed islands.  
 
The issue of whether China treated the disputed islands as her own territory 
also needs to be understood in the light of the particular features of the 
disputed islands themselves. Throughout the analyzed period, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have always been uninhabited and there is no 
evidence of any person ever disembarking on the islands, although this can 
be implied from a few works. One such documentation is the Taihaishi 
Chalu, which mentions that Diaoyu Island can hold ten huge ships and 
another is Shunfeng Xiangsong, which expresses that “berths with a depth 
of 15 tuo (a tou = 6 inches) on Diaoyu Island are good for refuling wood 
and drinking water”. Moreover, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are small and 
remotely located. Keeping these particular features in mind, how could 
imperial China have treated the islands as her territory? The islands were 
rocky and inhospitable and considered to be of almost no economic value. 
Certainly, if China wanted to manifest that she treated the disputed islands 
as her territory she could’ve established a practice of including them in the 
local Gazetteers and perhaps disembarked on the islands or conduct surveys. 
However, apart from these acts, China arguably did all that reasonably 
could’ve been expected. They included the islands into the coastal defense 
system, used them as navigational aids and academic scholars depicted them 
as undeniably part of Chinese territories. Further, China never had to rely on 
formal treaties with their tributary States for the purpose of maritime 
delimitation and this particular boundary between China and Ryukyu was 
regarded as sufficiently clear under the EAWO. The Ryukyu kingdom never 
laid claim to the disputed islands and there exists no documentation 
indicating that China and Ryukyu ever had a maritime disagreement. 
Additionally, under the Confucian understanding of government control, 
which served as the fundament for the EAWO, the power of the Chinese 
Emperor went only as far as Emperor-observant people could dwell and 
ancient China paid little attention to places lacking human habitation. The 
Westphalian concept of territorial sovereignty was alien since the Chinese 
emperors ruled men, not territorial space. Keeping these political realties in 
mind, it is not surprising that China throughout the Ming and Qing dynasties 
didn’t pay much attention to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands but it is 
nevertheless sufficiently clear that they regarded these islands as part of 
their territory, particularly throughout the Qing dynasty.  
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The international law framework applicable from the mid 19th century was 
the concept of “effective occupation”. The mode of occupation had 
undergone a lengthy evolution from the 16th century, where arguably mere 
discovery was sufficient to acquire sovereign title, to the concept of 
effective occupation, with requirements that demanded more of the State 
seeking to acquire territory. Effective occupation demanded both the will of 
the State to possess (animus occupandi) and effective possession (corpus 
occupandi). The effective possession requirement focused primarily on 
taking physical possession of land by settlement or use of territory by other 
means and on the exclusion of other States. If Qing China’s relationship to 
the disputed islands were to be evaluated merely against this framework, 
without taking the political realities of the EAWO into consideration, China 
undoubtedly has a weak case. The main weakness of the Chinese claim 
relates to China’s lacking fulfillment of the corpus occupandi-requirement. 
There exists no evidence that imperial China ever disembarked on the 
islands and China only used the islands as navigational aids, similar to 
beacons of today. Further, no available documentation prove that China 
excluded other States from the territories primarily since it isn’t evident 
from Chouhai Tubian that China regarded the islands as her territory and 
would have defended them in the event of a foreign invasion. China’s claim 
under international law is weak even if the holdings of the Clipperton Island 
Case are taken into account. This case eased the prerequisites of occupation 
in relation to completely uninhabited territories, but even such territories 
needs to be “at the absolute and undisputed disposition” of the occupying 
State, according to the case. It is highly doubtful that China could be 
regarded as having been in such disposition based on the available 
documentation.  
 
The last issue is whether the Chinese acts in relation to the islands could be 
regarded as a sufficient proof of Chinese animus occupandi under 
international law. It has to be expressed that although an accumulation of 
the imperial envoys arguably show that China regarded the disputed islands 
as her territory, this isn’t the same as showing intent to occupy under 
international law. The strongest argument in favor of a Chinese intent to 
occupy is most likely Chouhai Tubian and the inclusion of the disputed 
islands in a few local gazetteers. The author is of the opinion that it doesn’t 
appear entirely unreasonable that the Chinese acts could be regarded as 
sufficient to prove animus occupandi but based on the documentation 
presented in this paper, it appears more plausible that an adjudicating body 
wouldn’t deem the Chinese actions as sufficient to prove animus occupandi.  
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4 Japanese incorporation and the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki 
4.1 Background to the re-discovery 
As previously mentioned, from 1609 until the Japanese complete 
annexation in 1879, the Ryukyu kingdom was a tributary State to both 
China and Japan. However, during the latter half of the 19th century, 
Japanese influence over the Ryukyu kingdom increased drastically. 
Japan’s gradual overtaking of Ryukyu culminated during the 1870’s with 
the Botan tribe incident. This incident occurred when a relatively large 
number of Ryukyuan citizens had drifted off to Taiwan during a sea 
voyage and were upon reaching Taiwan, killed by Taiwanese aboriginals 
of the Botan tribe. The Japanese used this incident to gain acceptance from 
the Ryukyuans and later compelled Ryukyu to break ties with Qing China. 
During this time of Japanese invasion and occupation, the Ryukyu 
kingdom sent requests for military assistance to China but the Middle 
kingdom was weakened by internal disorder and unable to assist the 
Ryukyuans at the time. The Japanese annexation of Ryukyu meant that 
China lost its contact with the Ryukyuans and as a consequence, the 
records of activities around the disputed islands came to a standstill.166      
4.2 The Japanese incorporation 
Koga Tatsushiro was a Japanese entrepreneur who “re-discovered” both the 
Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands in 1884 during a journey seeking to collect 
guano, albatross feathers and tortoise shells. Koga’s discovery attracted the 
attention of the Okinawa Prefecture Magistrate (OPM henceforth) as well as 
the Meiji government. The following section presents the official Japanese 
documents that dealt with the process of incorporation. These documents 
consists of confidential letters among Japanese officials but also of the 
Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 and Imperial Decree No. 13 of March 
5, 1896. Some scholars supporting the Chinese claim contend that these 
letters and documents constitute the strongest argument in favor of the 
Chinese stance since they reveal three features. Firstly, that the disputed 
islands were, by the highest level of Japanese officials, recognized as 
Chinese territory, which led to a ten-year postponement of the process of 
incorporation. Secondly, that the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 
which concluded the process of incorporation, was passed in total secrecy in 
order to avoid a Chinese protest against the incorporation. Lastly, that the 
said Cabinet Decision wasn’t taken as a result of conducting repeated 
surveys on the islands (as stated in the basic view), but was only approved 
because of the imminent Chinese defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war 
(1894-95).167    
                                                
166 Lin, Man-houng., The Ryukyus and Taiwan in the East Asian seas: A Longue Durée Perspective.   
167 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 70.  
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The first letter dealing with the Japanese incorporation process was dated 
September 22, 1885 and sent by the OPM to the Home Minister of the Meiji 
government. The letter was entitled “Petition Regarding Investigations at 
Kumesekishimia and Two Outer Islands” and contained a formal request 
that the disputed islands be placed under the jurisdiction of the Okinawa 
Prefecture and also requested additional instructions regarding the 
placement of national markers on the islands. Without quoting this letter in 
its entirety, three interesting aspects of it should be stressed.168 Firstly, the 
letter was not a petition as its header suggests, but rather a report regarding 
the investigation progress of the islands. Secondly, these investigations, 
undertaken by the OPM, wasn’t initiated by the them, they were conducted 
due to “secret orders” from the home minister. Thirdly, the letter expressed 
the following; 
 
…the possibility must not be ignored that they are the same islands recorded as 
Diaoyutai, Huangwei-yu, and Chiwei-yu in the Zhongshan Mission records. If they 
truly are the same islands, then it is obviously the case that the details of the 
islands have already been well-known to Qing envoy ships dispatched to crown the 
former Zhongshan Wang, and already given fixed (Chinese) names and used as 
navigational aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands. It is therefore worrisome 
regarding whether it would be appropriate to place national markers on the islands 
immediately after our investigation.169  
 
From the above passage it is clear that the Japanese officials were aware that 
China had already named and used the disputed islands as navigational aids 
and therefore, it was suggested that it might be inappropriate to place 
national markers on them since this might create a conflict with China. 
Supporters of the Chinese claim have contended that this method of 
incorporation was chosen by the Japanese government to create an 
impression that the process was initiated by the local authorities and thereby 
decreasing the suspicions that the incorporation was motivated by military 
and strategic intentions.170  
 
After receiving this letter, the Home Minister decided to proceed with the 
process of incorporation by writing a letter to the Grad Council of State for 
approval but the Home Minister first sent this letter dated October 9, 1895171 
to the Foreign Minister inquiring his opinion on the matter. In its most 
relevant section, the letter reads as follows,  
 
Although the above mentioned islands are the same as those found in the Zhongshan 
Mission Records, they were only used to pinpoint direction during navigation, and 
there are no traces of evidence that the islands belong to China. Also, with respect to 
the names of the islands, it is merely a matter of difference of nomendenture 
between them (China) and us (Japan). Therefore upon completion of Okinawa 
Prefecture’s investigations of the said islands located in the vicinity of islands 
Kume, Miyako, and Yaeyama under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture, it is 
believed that there is no obstruction to placing national markers. I urgently request 
that this matter be decided.172 
                                                
168 The letter is quoted in its entirety in Shaw, Supra n. 2, p. 71.  
169 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 72. 
170 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 72-73.  
171 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p. 97. 
172 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 74. 
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The Home Ministers perception that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands ties to 
China weren’t close enough to grant it sovereign title wasn’t necessarily 
shared by the Foreign Minister who responded in a letter dated October 
21173 to the Home Minister, which in its most relevant section reads, 
 
The aforementioned islands are close to the border of China, and it has been found 
through surveys that the area of the islands is much smaller the previously 
surveyed island, Daito-jima; and in particular, China has already given names to 
the islands. Most recently Chinese newspapers have been reporting rumors of our 
government’s intention of occupying certain islands owned by China located next 
to Taiwan, demonstrating suspicion toward our country and consistently urging 
the Qing government to be aware of this matter. In such a time, if we were to 
publically place national markers on the islands, this must necessarily invite 
China’s suspicion toward us. Currently we should limit ourselves to investigate 
the islands, understanding the formations of the harbors, seeing whether or not 
there exists possibilities to develop the island’s land and resources, which all 
should be made into detailed reports. In regard to the matter of placing national 
markers and developing the islands, it should await a more appropriate time. 
(Emphasis added).174   
 
From this letter it is obvious that the Foreign Minister was well aware about 
the relationship between China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is 
why he advocated that the matter required caution. Supporters of the 
Chinese claim have taken this even further stating that the Foreign Minister 
was aware that the islands were regarded to be under Chinese sovereignty 
and this is why he not only advocated restraint and that the matter should 
“await a more appropriate time”. Chinese scholars also claim that the only 
conceivable reason behind the Foreign Ministers suggestion to keep the 
matter confidential was to prevent legal objections from China.   
 
In a chronological order, the next relevant letter to discuss was dated 
November 24 and sent by the OPM to the Home Minister as a follow up of 
the letter dated September 22 and reads as follows 
 
In regard to the matter under my jurisdiction concerning the uninhabited islands, I 
hereby submit as an attachment paper of the mission to investigate the said islands 
previously ordered upon me. In regard to the construction of national markers, as I 
already noted to you in my previous letter of inquiry, since this matter is not 
unrelated to China, if problems do indeed arise, I would be in grave repentance for 
my responsibility. As I am uncertain on how to handle this matter, I await for your 
most urgent instructions. (Emphasis added).175    
 
The above passage clearly shows that the OPM shared a similar view as the 
Foreign Minister regarding the Chinese interest in the islands. It is likely 
that this letter, together with the letter from the Foreign Minister persuaded 
the Home Ministers to change his view. In a letter to the Foreign Minister, 
dated November 30, he writes the following,  
 
                                                
173 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p. 97. 
174 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 75. 
175 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 77. 
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Based on the reasons given in your (previous) letter of inquiry, please 
acknowledge that construction (of the national markers) shall currently not be 
undertaken.176  
 
The Foreign Minister gave his approval to for this decision to be sent to the 
OPM in a letter dated December 4. Supporters of the Chinese claim regard 
the above provided series of letters, especially the one dated October 21, as 
evidence that the Japanese officials were knowledgeable about Chinese 
ownership of the islands. Further, the Foreign Minister’s expression that it 
“should await a more appropriate time” is a clear indication that the process 
of incorporation wasn’t abandoned. Pending the arrival of a more 
appropriate time, the Japanese decided to keep the matter secret to avoid 
Chinese suspicion and therefore all these letters were classified.177      
 
This letter from the Foreign Minister was the last in the series of letters that 
took place during 1885 and which resulted in the decision to forego national 
markers. After this eventful year, the Japanese lied low for a while. This 
more opportune occasion had obviously not arrived in the early 1890’s since 
the OPM sent one incorporation request in 1890 and 1893, in order to 
regulate fishing and other related activities around the island, but these 
petitions were both rejected by the Home Ministry.178   
 
The Japanese stance regarding the erection of national markers started to 
change during the later half of 1894. From an internal document of the 
Home Ministry sent to the Home Minister, dated April 14, 1894, two 
features are evident. Firstly, that no new information regarding the islands’ 
status had been acquired by the Home Ministry, despite the fact that 
investigations had been ongoing for almost a decade, according to the 
official Japanese stance. Secondly, that the political circumstances had not 
matured enough to change the governments policy to erect national markers. 
The reason why Japan hadn’t acquired any new information becomes 
apparent when studying a letter from the OPM to the Home Ministry, dated 
May 12 which clearly expresses that no investigations, regarding 
determining the status of the disputed islands, were carried out after 1885 by 
any agencies under the Okinawa Prefecture.179 This clearly contradicts the 
official Japanese position as expressed in its Basic View (see 2.2.1).    
 
From the above passage it is clear that by May 12, the awaited “appropriate 
time” to incorporate the islands hadn’t materialized. The Japanese Cabinet 
Decision that formally incorporated the islands occurred on January 14, 
1895. Therefore, some major event must have occurred between these two 
dates that convinced Japan that the “appropriate time” had finally arrived. 
Chinese scholars contend that this moment started to emerge as a result of 
the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), which officially broke out on August 
                                                
176 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 78. 
177 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 77-78. 
178 Suganuma, Supra n. 1, p. 97-98. 
179 Shaw, Supra n. 2, p 80-84.  
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1, 1894, over control of the Korean peninsula.180 The Japanese forces proved 
victorious in battle after battle on both land and sea and by the end of 
November, both Japan and China were convinced of Japanese victory, and 
China proposed a peace settlement on November 22. Japan had however 
already begun drafting a different peace treaty and rejected this proposal. In 
an internal letter of the Home Ministry addressed to the Home Minister dated 
December 15 the author requested the Home Ministers opinion regarding 
erecting national markers on the island, expressing that “the situation today 
is greatly different to the situation back then”181, referring to the letter dated 
April 14. This letter clearly reveals that by December 15, 1894, almost a 
decade after the matter was first discussed, Japan had finally begun to alter 
its position regarding erecting national markers. Shaw contends that what the 
phrase “the situation today is greatly different to the situation back then” 
refers to a power shift between China and Japan. China had historically been 
the hegemon within the EAWO but with the Meiji restoration in Japan and 
Japan’s imminent victory in the first Sino-Japanese war, which had become 
apparent already in October-November, Japan had gained the confidence it 
needed to challenge the Chinese position and China was no longer in a 
position to legally challenge the Japanese incorporation even if they would 
have detected the secret Japanese incorporation. Other Chinese scholars also 
contend that this power shift and the weakened China was the event that 
Japan had been waiting for. One such scholar expressed “there simply was 
nothing on or around the islands during the last year (between May and 
December 1894) which could not have been discovered during the previous 
nine years to help determine the status of the islands.”182 It should also be 
stressed in this context that although Japan was well aware that China 
considered the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as Chinese, there are no documents 
indicating that the sovereignty issue was discussed with China.183  
 
The next step in the process of incorporation was a letter sent by the Home 
Minister to the Foreign Minister, dated December 27, 1894, requesting his 
opinion about submitting a request to the cabinet meeting regarding 
construction of national markers on the islands “considering the fact that the 
situation today has changed relevant to the situation back then.”184 The 
Foreign Minister replied in a letter dated January 11, 1895, that he had no 
objection.185  
 
Finally, on the Japanese Cabinet Meeting of January 14, 1895, the Cabinet 
approved the Home Ministers request to incorporate the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands under the Okinawa Prefecture by adopting a resolution, which was 
one week later, on January 21, approved by the Prime Minister.186  
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The Japanese side has always regarded the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 
1895, together with the Prime Minister’s approval, as the legal basis for its 
claim. Chinese scholars however, have criticized this stance mainly since the 
whole incorporation process, which took place during over a decade, was 
conducted in total secrecy. These scholars further contend that the reason for 
this confidentiality was that the Japanese officials were knowledgeable that 
the islands had long been regarded as Chinese territory. This argument is 
further strengthened by two other facts. Firstly, that the Cabinet Decision 
wasn’t publically disclosed until March 1952. Secondly, that national 
markers weren’t actually erected on the islands due to the Cabinet Decision. 
They were first erected on May 10, 1969 in response to the modern 
controversy following the oil discovery. For these reasons, Chinese scholars 
claim that China was deprived of the opportunity to lodge a formal protest.187  
 
Another document relating to the incorporation process is the Imperial 
Decree No. 13 of March 5, 1896. This degree was issued a year after the 
Japanese government decided to erect national markers on the disputed 
island and introduced a new organization and formation of the Okinawa 
Prefecture by dividing the Prefecture into five different Counties and listing 
all islands appertaining under each County. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
however, weren’t enumerated or mentioned anywhere in this document. 
Suganuma therefore suggests that this imperial edict is irrelevant in relation 
to the sovereignty issue.188 Shaw agrees with Suganuma’s claim and further 
contends that since the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands geographically formed its 
own island group, had the Imperial Decree intended to include them, it 
would have listed them. The same author further argues that the decree, 
contrary to the Japanese stance, proves that the disputed islands were never 
publically proclaimed as Japanese territory in any official declarations.189  
 
According to the author, Shaw makes a reasonable argument. The fact that 
the disputed islands weren’t mentioned in the Imperial Decree, which was 
issued a year after the Japanese government decided to erect national 
markers, certainly raises doubts about Japanese honesty and fair dealing. 
One possible way to interpret the omission of the disputed islands in this 
decree is that Japan, regardless of the Cabinet Decision, didn’t consider the 
islands to be Japanese territory. A second interpretation is that Japan simply 
forgot to include the islands in the decree. A third, and arguably most likely, 
interpretation is that Japan chose the omit the islands because if they had 
enumerated them and made the decree public, China would eventually find 
out and would be in a position to legally challenge the Japanese sovereignty.  
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4.3 The Treaty of Shimonoseki 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Having described the Japanese process of incorporation, we now turn to a 
partly simultaneous event, the end of the first Sino-Japanese war and 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It needs to be recalled that China had 
already by November 22, 1894, proposed a peace settlement, which Japan 
had rejected. The imminent Japanese victory gave them a very powerful 
negotiation position vis-à-vis a heavily struggling China and this allowed 
Japan to impose harsh peace conditions, primarily forcing China to pay large 
indemnities and to cede the strategically important territories of Taiwan, the 
Pescadores islands and the Liaodong peninsula. The treaty of Shimonoseki 
was signed on April 17, 1895 and the Article relevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands is Article 2, which in its relevant section reads,  
 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, 
together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property thereon:  
 
b) The island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said island of Formosa.” 
 
c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th 
degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Obviously, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands aren’t expressly mentioned in this 
Article nor does the wording provide much information regarding whether 
the islands were meant to be included. Therefore, this Article has been 
subject to many debates. The Chinese side argues that the islands were 
Chinese territory prior to the conclusion of this treaty and that they were an 
integral part of the treaty since they were considered as “appertaining or 
belonging” to Taiwan. Therefore, the Chinese side contends, Japan acquired 
sovereignty through the mode of cession, not through the mode of 
occupation. The Chinese side refutes the legal validity of the Japanese 
incorporation process since Japan cannot unilaterally alter the status of 
Chinese territory. The Japanese side on the other hand, refutes that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were in integral part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
since they were not considered as “appertaining or belonging” to Taiwan. 
Hence, the Japanese side claims that they didn’t acquire the islands through 
the mode of cession but through the mode of occupation. Therefore, the 
treaty of Shimonoseki is completely irrelevant to the sovereignty issue.  
 
Before continuing the presentation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it should 
be stressed for clarification, that the reason why it is important for China to 
claim that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were acquired through the mode of 
cession and conversely for Japan to claim that they were acquired through 
the mode of occupation, is that the post World War II agreements stipulated 
that Japan should revert all territory it had acquired by force throughout its 
imperialistic era (see further section 5.1).  
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The issue of whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are an integral part of the 
treaty of Shimonoseki centers on whether they were considered as 
“appertaining or belonging” to Taiwan. According to the Oxford dictionary, 
“appertaining” means ”belong as a possession or right”, therefore, it might 
be concluded that the parties somewhat unnecessary used two synonyms in 
the same phrase.190 The following description will hence only focus on the 
phrase “belonging”. The relevant phrase evidently refers to a set of islands 
but doesn’t specify which and no map was accompanied to delimit the 
boundaries of Taiwan and it is not known whether the drafters consulted any 
maps at all.191 Since the meaning of this passage is ambiguous, the meaning 
has to be evaluated through a framework of treaty interpretation.  
 
The first question to be dealt with in this regard concerns which interpretive 
framework should be utilized. As previously described (see 2.5), the ICJ has 
used the customary international law reflected in Articles 31-33 of the 
VCLT, as an interpretive framework to evaluate legal relationships, which 
were created prior to this framework became customary international law. 
The ICJ has therefore implicitly used the second branch of the intertemporal 
law for the purpose of treaty interpretation. This method will also be used 
under this section. Article 31 (1) of the VCLT reads as follows;  
 
A treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.  
4.3.2 Textual interpretation; ordinary meaning 
Utilizing the framework provided by Article 31 (1), the first step is to 
evaluate the ordinary meaning of all islands “belonging” to Taiwan and 
specifically whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were regarded as such. The 
meaning of “belonging” logically refers to some kind of connection or 
relationship without specifying which. Hence a variety of sources needs 
investigated. Chinese scholars have argued that the following relationships 
existed between Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; (i) historical and 
administrative, (ii) geographical and geological, and (iii) social and 
economic. These relationships will be dealt with separately.  
 
From a historical and administrative perspective, there are two sources that 
point to the existence of such a relationship (Riben Yijian will be dealt with 
under social relationship). The first is the academic work; Taihaishi Chalu 
(Record on the mission to Taiwan) from the 1720’s. The military section of 
this work describes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as having a position within 
Taiwan’s maritime patrol route. The second is the Qing Dynasty gazetteer 
“Recomplied General Annals of Fujian” from 1871 written by Chen Shouqi, 
which specifically listed the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands under what is today 
called Yilan County (north-eastern Taiwan).192  
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192 Lee, Supra n. 159, p 50-51. See also Lee and Ming, Supra n. 183, p 7. 
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The next relationship to evaluate is the geographical and geological. A case 
relevant to mention in this regard is the Kasikili/Sendude case of 1999, 
wherein the ICJ expressed that “(i)n order to illuminate the meaning of 
words, there is nothing that prevents the Court from taking into account the 
present-day scientific knowledge”.193 This indicates that it would be 
possible to use the continental shelf concept, which emanates from the mid 
20th century, retroactively to interpret the meaning of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. However, Denk has expressed, referring to the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Judgment, that “the rights of States over these areas are 
limited to sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and 
exploiting the natural resources. It is obvious that the sovereign rights 
enjoyed by coastal States do not, and in fact cannot, provide them with other 
rights, i.e., sovereignty even over the superjacent sea of these areas, let 
alone islands situated there”.194 Denk’s argument is reasonable but although 
it isn’t viable to use the contemporary continental shelf concept to deduce 
the meaning of a treaty signed 50 years before this concept was introduced, 
this particular continental shelf might be used in a different way. Present-
day scientific knowledge reveals that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are 
located on the same continental shelf as Taiwan and separated from Japan, 
including Okinawa (historically Ryukyu). The edge of this continental shelf 
is marked by what is today known as the Okinawa trough, which forms a 
sudden topographical change with a significantly increased sea depth 
reaching over 2300 meters.195 This topographical change was visible and 
recognized by the Chinese imperial envoys as well as the Ryukyuan 
seafarers, which indicates that this particular edge of the continental shelf 
might have been regarded as the natural geographical boundary delimiting 
China from Ryukyu. Therefore, the argument that the disputed islands were 
regarded as belonging to Taiwan based on a natural boundary located 
northeast of the said islands is reasonable.   
 
Another possible argument relating to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
geographical appurtenance to Taiwan concerns the geographical distance 
between the disputed islands and the respective claimant State. The disputed 
islands are located approximately 170 km from Taiwan and 400 km from 
both Mainland China and Okinawa. Hence, the islands are relatively much 
closer to Taiwan. The strength of such an argument is however questionable 
since although they are relatively closer to Taiwan, it is not the same thing 
as saying that they “belonging” to Taiwan in accordance with the meaning 
of the treaty. Additionally, The strength of this argument is further limited 
by the Island of Palmas Arbitration, which expressed that ”it is impossible 
to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that 
islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the 
mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma”.196  
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The last relationship to evaluate is the social and economic. Of primary 
interest is Riben Yijian of 1565, which expresses that Diaoyu Island is 
“xiaodong xiaoyu ye” (part of Taiwan territories).197  This passage is 
interesting since Riben Yijian was an authoritative work that was written 
during the Ming dynasty, over hundred years prior to the Chinese 
annexation of Taiwan. Why would this work proclaim the disputed islands 
to belong to Taiwan in these situations if it wasn’t a socially constructed 
perception? Lastly, from an economical perspective, the islands and their 
surrounding waters were used by Taiwanese and Chinese as a fishing 
ground, as shelter during heavy weather and as a source for collecting herbs 
throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries. It needs to be stressed in this 
regard however that all these expeditions were privately run and it doesn’t 
exist any proof that the Chinese government ever endorsed them.198  
4.3.3 Contextual interpretation; object and purpose 
The next step according to the interpretative framework provided by Article 
31 of the VCLT, is to conduct a contextual interpretation of the treaty 
focusing on its object and purpose. Undoubtedly, the object and purpose of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki was a cession of territories to Japan. The 
Japanese territorial claims throughout its imperialistic era were vast and 
Japan was well aware of the importance of acquiring strategically important 
territories. During the late 19th century they particularly acquired strategic 
important territories such as the Liaodong region and the Korean Peninsula 
in the northwest. Japan was also aware of the strategic importance of being 
in control of the East China Sea and in particular, of being in control of 
Taiwan. Keeping these Japanese aims in mind is important to understand the 
political realities behind the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
 
An interesting argument raised by Japanese scholars, concerns how Article 
2 (c) relates to Article 2 (b) and the phrase “appertaining and belonging”. 
Japanese scholars have contended that since Article 2 (c) provides a separate 
treatment of the Pescadores (Penghu) group, this means that this island 
group wasn’t considered as belonging to Taiwan and since the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are located much further away from Taiwan, they 
couldn’t possibly have been regarded as belonging to Taiwan. Lee however, 
critiques this argument based on two reasons. Firstly, by referring to the 
case Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, he claims that 
distance is not a major determining factor since the ICJ in this case awarded 
Singapore Pedra Branca although this island was geographically closer to 
Malaysia. Secondly, he expresses that the Pescadores islands were 
strategically more important than the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and that Japan 
therefore demanded a separate treatment of the former.199   
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While discussing how Article 2 (c) can be used to shed some light on the 
phrase “appertaining and belonging” in Article 2 (b), two other interesting 
features shall be mentioned. Firstly, the fact that Article 2 (c) denominates 
the exact coordinates of the Pescadores islands, implies that the contracting 
parties had a clear understanding of what constituted Chinese territories. 
Secondly, in comparing section 2 (b) with 2 (c) it is striking that only the 
latter denominates the exact coordinates while the first only mentions 
Taiwan along with its appertaining and belonging islands. One explanation 
as to why the island belonging to Taiwan didn’t need to be exactly specified 
while the Pescadores island group needed to be, is that the contracting 
parties had, or possibly thought they had, a clear understanding of which 
islands were included. Another explanation is that the contracting parties, or 
at least Japan who dominated the negotiations, purposely chose to omit 
specifying the area exactly, which is an argument made by some Chinese 
scholars. The argument continues that Japan chose to omit the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands because they intended to incorporate the islands 
through the discovery-occupation mode. Keeping in mind the Japanese 
incorporation process and specifically the uncertainty the Japanese officials 
showed about actually incorporating the islands and to wait for a more 
opportune time together with the fact that the actual decisions to incorporate 
the islands weren’t made public until after the Second World War, it seems 
likely that Japan didn’t want the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to be an integral 
part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
4.3.4 The subsequent conduct of the parties  
VCLT Article 31 (3) stipulates that ”any subsequent practice” by the parties 
may be taken into account in order to determine the meaning of the treaty 
language. The subsequent practice of China with regard to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands consisted of complete silence. From 1885, when 
the Chinese newspapers reported of alarming Japanese activities around the 
islands, until the early 1970’s, no evidence exists, that the disputed islands 
where ever discussed in official documents or in the media. There are at 
least two possible explanations for this silence. The first is that the islands 
were completely forgotten. They were small, remote, uninhabited and 
almost entirely economically worthless and since China went through a very 
tumultuous period with a devastating civil war, the World War II and a 
cultural revolution, they might have focused on dealing with these more 
important events. The second reason, which is favored by many Chinese 
scholars, is that since the islands, according to the Chinese stance, were 
ceded to Japan pursuant to the treaty of Shimonoseki, China was merely 
fulfilling the maxim of pacta sunt servanda vis-à-vis Japan. Hence, the 
Chinese side argues that Chinese subsequent practice further strengthens the 
argument that the disputed islands were an integral part of the treaty of 
Shimonoseki. This argument rests on the notion that if the disputed islands 
weren’t ceded pursuant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, but incorporated as 
Japan claims, China would’ve protested. Hence, the lack of Chinese protest 
is evidence that the disputed islands were ceded.200  
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The subsequent practice of Japan can be described as follows. Koga, the 
Japanese businessman who “re-discovered” the disputed islands in 1885 
was, in September 1896, lent four of the islands for 30 years without rent. 
Koga devoted himself to developing the islands and invested large sums in 
building houses, wharves, reservoirs and drainage and sanitary facilities so 
that his employees could make a decent living on the islands. At its peak in 
1909, there were 148 people living on the islands. Koga died in 1918 and 
his son Zenji took over the business. In 1926, after the expiration of the 
initial loan, the Japanese government extended the loan but started requiring 
rent. In 1932, after selling the islands to the Koga family, the Japanese 
government changed the land status from State to privately owned. Koga 
continued to conduct business on the islands until the emergence of World 
War II. Later, during the US administration of the disputed islands, the US 
signed a leasing contract with the Koga family in order to use the islands for 
military purposes.201 Japanese scholars, frequently use these Japanese 
subsequent acts to make an argument that Japanese State authority extended 
to the disputed islands and that this authority was manifested through land 
administrative acts such as instituting a loan to Koga and later selling the 
islands to the Koga family.202  
4.4 Analysis  
The first section of this chapter dealt with previously classified letters 
between Japanese officials relating to the incorporation process. The 
information described in this section has primarily been collected from the 
work of Taiwanese scholar Shaw. It needs to be stressed that no Japanese 
scholar has provided any critique of this section and therefore there is a risk 
that this section might be rather biased in favor of the Chinese perception. If 
Japanese scholars had enriched the section with alternative translations, 
more historical data and different legal interpretations, the section would 
have been more balanced. That being said, Shaw’s work has to be regarded 
as a good attempt at objectivity and there’s no reason to mistrust its fairness.  
 
The official Chinese stance towards the Japanese incorporation process is to 
refute its validity. The Chinese claim to have held sovereign title to the 
islands until the signing of Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, and 
since the Japanese incorporation was concluded in January 1895, it is 
invalid since Japan cannot unilaterally alter the status of Chinese territory. 
The Chinese argumentation is certainly logical and reasonable. One State 
cannot unilaterally incorporate another State’s territory. Even though the 
argumentation is logical, the strength of this claim depends on whether 
China held sovereign title prior to January 1895 or whether the islands were 
terra nullius. This discussion has been provided under chapter 3 and will not 
be further analyzed under this section.  
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Chinese scholars have also critiqued the Japanese process of incorporation 
itself, contending that it reveals three features. Firstly, that the disputed 
islands were recognized as Chinese territory, by the highest level of 
Japanese officials. Secondly, that the Cabinet Decision of January 14 was 
passed in total secrecy in order to avoid a Chinese protest. Lastly, that the 
said Cabinet Decision wasn’t taken as a result of repeated surveys on the 
islands, as stated in the Basic View, but was approved because of the 
imminent Chinese defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war, which created the 
“appropriate time” Japan had been waiting for.    
 
From reading the internal Japanese correspondence it appears as if the 
Chinese scholars have solid reason for their critique. It appears as though at 
least the Foreign Minister and the OPM were well aware that China 
regarded the disputed islands as her territory and they also managed to 
convince the Home Minister to adopted a more restrained approach to 
erecting national markers and let it await a more opportune time. Although 
it isn’t apparent that the Japanese officials recognized Chinese sovereignty, 
it has to be concluded that they at least suspected that if Japan would’ve 
conducted the process of incorporation in public, this might have caused an 
official protest from China. Moreover, it appears evident that the reason 
why the Foreign Minister advocated restraint and that the matter should 
“await a more appropriate time” had nothing to do with any ongoing 
investigations regarding the status of the islands, as stated in the Basic View 
and claimed by Japanese scholars. On the contrary, the letter from the OPM 
to the Home Minister dated 12 May, 1894, clearly expresses that no 
investigations hade been carried out after 1885. Additionally, since the 
“appropriate time” obviously hadn’t materialized by 12 May 1894 but had 
materialized by December 15, according to a letter expressing that “the 
situation today is greatly different to the situation back then”, some event 
must have occurred that altered the Japanese perception on the matter. The 
only reasonable conclusion is that this event was the imminent Japanese 
victory in the Sino-Japanese war together with the weakened Chinese 
Empire.  
 
Three additional aspects further strengthen the Chinese contention that the 
process of incorporation was conducted in complete secrecy with the aim of 
avoiding Chinese protests. Firstly, the fact that the Cabinet Decision wasn’t 
publically disclosed until March 1952, contrary to the usual Japanese 
procedure of publically disclosing cabinet decisions. Secondly, the fact that 
national markers weren’t erected on the islands following the cabinet 
decision, but were first erected in 1969. Thirdly, The fact that Imperial 
Decree No 13 didn’t enumerate the disputed islands, although this decree 
was issued one year after the official decision to incorporate the islands.  
 
Even if the Chinese contention that Japan were knowledgeable that China 
regarded the disputed islands as her territory, and therefore deceitfully 
incorporated the islands into Japanese territory, during a time when China 
was weakened by European and Japanese colonialism, are taken as facts, the 
question remains, what is the legal significance of this? International law of 
 75 
the time undoubtedly didn’t prohibit one State from acquiring territory 
through conquest and international law didn’t recognize a rule prohibiting 
one State from acquiring territory through deceitful or dishonest behaviour. 
Therefore, Chinese scholars seems to have a weak case in arguing that the 
Japanese process of incorporation, as deceitful as it may be, is relevant 
under international law. Having stated this, two aspects needs to be 
emphasized. Firstly, the Japanese correspondence, particularly the letters 
from the Foreign Minister and the OPM, indicates that Japan perhaps even 
regarded the disputed islands as Chinese territory. Therefore, should the 
present conflict be evaluated against a framework such as the “ancient 
possession since time immemorial”, which focuses on whether China and its 
immediate neighbours regarded the islands as Chinese, this Japanese 
perception strengthens the Chinese claim.  
 
Secondly, although the fact that Japan deceitfully incorporated the islands 
might not be relevant in itself, the fact that the incorporation was conducted 
in secrecy might have relevance since it impacts China’s ability to protest 
against the incorporation. The concept of effective occupation requires both 
animus and corpus occupandi and both these requirements needs to be 
clearly expressed. Regarding the animus occupandi, this can be expressed 
either explicitly or implicitly. International law doesn’t require States to 
notify other States of their intent to annex, but if this isn’t done, the animus 
occupandi needs to be sufficiently expressed in other ways so that other 
States can learn about the intention to occupy in order to launch a protest. 
This might be China’s best argument. China could claim that the secrecy of 
the Japanese incorporation affected China’s ability to protest. The cabinet 
decision wasn’t publically disclosed until March 1952 and by that time the 
disputed islands were placed under US trusteeship according to the SFPT, a 
treaty at least the PRC has rejected in its entirety. Hence China never had the 
ability to protest and therefore Japan never acquired sovereignty since its 
animus occupandi wasn’t fulfilled according to international law. The 
strength of this argument is however limited since international law doesn’t 
require notifications to other States. The fact that the Cabinet Decision 
wasn’t publically disclosed until March 1952 doesn’t independently dismiss 
the Japanese contention that their animus occupandi was sufficiently 
expressed from 1895 and onwards. Additionally, what has been analyzed 
regarding the Japanese subsequent acts following the Cabinet Decision from 
1896 and onwards, that they displayed State authority over the disputed 
islands through land administrative acts, strengthens the argument that 
Japan had animus occupandi and that it was sufficiently expressed.  
 
A few words also need to be expressed about the relevance of Chinese 
silence in relation to the Japanese incorporation and Koga’s subsequent 
development of the islands. Japanese scholars make the argument that had 
China truly regarded the island as her territory, they would have protested to 
Japan the fact that Koga was developing the islands and having people 
living there. This practice took place from 1896 until the outbreak of WWII, 
which is a considerable period of time in these circumstances. Although 
China wasn’t officially notified of the Japanese intentions from 1895 until 
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1952, they had sufficient time to become aware of Koga’s development and 
protesting the fact that Japan was allowing it to happen. The problem with 
this argumentation is that according to the Chinese stance, the islands were 
lawfully Japanese following the Treaty of Shimonoseki until the end of the 
Second World War. The fact that Koga was developing the islands and 
Japan allowing it to happen is therefore nothing China could have protested 
against. Therefore, the fact that China didn’t protest during the period 1895-
1945 ought not damage the Chinese claim.  
 
For clarification it needs to be stressed again that the discussion provided 
here has focused on the Japanese incorporation procedures itself and 
independently of whether the disputed islands were Chinese prior to 1895. 
Should an adjudicating body find that the islands were Chinese prior to the 
incorporation, the annexation becomes legally invalid for the reasons 
stipulated in the second paragraph of this analysis.    
 
The second section of this chapter dealt with interpretation of the treaty of 
Shimonoseki and specifically the issue of whether the phrase “all islands 
appertaining or belonging to Formosa (Taiwan)” includes the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Through the second branch of the intertemporal 
principle, the customary international law reflected in art 31-33 was chosen 
as an interpretive framework. The first step in this framework was to 
conduct a textual analysis of the ordinary meaning of the relevant phrase. 
Both Taihaishi Chalu from the 1720s and “Recomplied General Annals of 
Fujian” from 1871 provide some support of a connection between the 
disputed islands and Taiwan. This connection however shouldn’t be 
stretched too far. Taihaishi Chalu is merely the work by one scholar and 
“Recomplied General Annals of Fujian” is only one gazetteer out of many 
produced during the Qing Dynasty. The same has to be stated regarding 
Riben Yijian and its famous phrase Diaoyu Island is “xiaodong xiaoyu ye” 
(part of Taiwan territories). These works can hardly by themselves or in 
accumulation be said to have established a perception that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands belonged to Taiwan. The strongest argument that 
the disputed islands were regarded as belonging to Taiwan appears to be, 
not the continental shelf concept itself, since this cannot be used 
retroactively, but the fact that a topographical change was visible and 
recognized by the Chinese and Ryukyuan seafarers indicating that this 
particular edge of the continental shelf was regarded as the natural 
geographical boundary between China from Ryukyu. This circumstance 
however doesn’t shed any light over the issue of whether the disputed 
islands belonged to Taiwan, although it might support the perception that 
the disputed islands were regarded as being situated within Chinese 
territories. Lastly, the fact that the disputed islands are located 
comparatively closer to Taiwan than to any other major island or country 
cannot be taken as sufficient evidence that these islands belonged to Taiwan 
in the meaning is the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
 
Regarding the contextual analysis, the author is of the opinion that the 
argument put forward by the Japanese scholars concerning interpreting 
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Article 2 (b) in the light of Article 2 (c) appears reasonable. The fact that the 
Pescadores group was awarded with a separate treatment in Article 2 (c) 
indicates that this island group wasn’t regarded as “belonging” to Taiwan 
since, if this would’ve been the case, a separate treatment would have been 
unnecessary. Therefore, since the disputed islands are located even further 
away from Taiwan, Article 2 (c) weakens the argument that these islands 
were regarded as belonging to Taiwan. The first leg of Lee’s critique of the 
Japanese argument is far-fetched. The fact that the ICJ awarded Singapore 
Pedra Branca, although it was geographically closer to Malaysia, was a 
completely different situation. This case was dealing with sovereignty and 
in these situations international law provides the framework of effective 
occupation which prevails over the issue of which State is located 
geographically closer. The second leg of Lee’s critique is more reasonable. 
It is realistic to assume that the main reason why the Pescadores group was 
awarded a special treatment is due to their strategic importance together 
with the fact that this island group consists of many islands that are located 
far from each other. This also helps explain why this island group needed to 
be denominated with exact coordinates. In conclusion, although the second 
leg of Lee’s critique reasonably explains why the Pescadores were awarded 
a special treatment, the author is of the opinion that a contextual analysis 
indicates that the disputed islands weren’t regarded as belonging to Taiwan.  
 
Regarding analyzing of the subsequent conduct of the parties in order to 
deduce the meaning of the treaty, it has to be concluded that such an 
analysis provides no information regarding whether the disputed islands 
“belonged” to Taiwan It is evident that Japan started treating the disputed 
islands as her territory shortly after the incorporation, although in secrecy. It 
is also evident that the Chinese subsequent conduct consisted of complete 
silence. From 1885 to the early 1970’s there is no evidence of the island 
being discussed in media or official documents from either side of the 
Taiwan Strait. These facts however, cannot prove whether the islands 
“belonged” to Taiwan according to the treaty. China and Japan are in 
agreement that Japan lawfully acquired sovereignty to the disputed islands 
during the very late 19th century, but they disagree regarding which mode of 
territorial acquisition the sovereign title was acquired through.  
 
Before concluding the interpretative analysis, a case relevant to mention is 
the Pulau Litigian and Pulau Sipidian Case which might provide a possible 
analogy or at least shed some light on the phrase “appertaining or 
belonging”, since a similar wording were used in this case. The wording that 
was being discussed in this case was “the islets belonging thereto”. With 
reference to this wording, the court expressed that “…this can only be 
interpreted as referring to the small islands lying in the immediate vicinity 
of the three islands which are mentioned by name, and not to the islands 
which are located at a distance of more then 40 nautical miles away”.203 
Although one needs to be careful with making an analogy between these 
two cases because of the particular circumstances, the author is of the 
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opinion that it expresses a reasonable point. The phrases “belonging thereto” 
or “appertaining or belonging” are similar and realistically have to refer to 
islands located in the immediate vicinity, at least as a general rule. 
Reasonable exceptions to this general rule could for instance be if the 
remotely located territory were inhabited and these inhabitants have social 
and cultural links to the territory to which they “belong”.   
 
To conclude the interpretative analysis, neither the textual or the contextual 
analysis nor the subsequent conduct of the parties can be regarded as 
sufficient proof that the disputed islands were or weren’t regarded as 
“belonging” to Taiwan according to the treaty, although the contextual 
analysis indicates, according to the author, that they weren’t. Additionally, 
the Pulau Litigian and Pulau Sipidian Case provides a reasonable 
assessment of the phrase “belonging” which might shed some light on how 
a similar phrase might be understood in the present dispute.   
 79 
5 Wartime declarations,  oil discovery 
and reversion 
5.1 Introduction 
The phrase ”Wartime declarations” refers here to the documents signed 
during and soon after World War II had ended, namely; the Cairo 
declaration, the Potsdam declaration, the document of Japanese surrender 
signed in Tokyo bay, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Treaty of 
Taipei. These documents aimed at reverting the Japanese territories to where 
they were prior to the Japanese imperialistic era in the late 19th century. 
Section 5.2 will provide a general introduction to these Wartime 
declarations and section 5.3 will provide a deeper analysis of the stances by 
the claimant States towards these declarations. The reason for this 
disposition is that these Wartime declarations have to be understood as an 
integrated whole, and therefore they first need to be briefly described. After 
this, section 5.4 will describe the eventful years following the oil discovery, 
focusing on the changed attitude towards legitimate Chinese government 
and the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. However, prior to this, it’s 
necessary to portray the political landscape that emerged after the end of the 
World War II since this is essential to understand the Wartime and reversion 
declarations.  
 
Regarding the political landscape that emerged in the East Asia after the war, 
two aspects are of particular importance. Firstly, during the early phase of the 
post World War II period, US leadership in the pacific region was 
increasingly challenged by the USSR and its communist block and the 
superordinate aim of the US administration became to limit the spread of 
communism in Asia. Hence, these tensions triggered the US to develop a 
containment policy where they were relying on its newfound allies in Japan 
and the ROC. This meant that the US had to respect the political views of the 
Tokyo and Taipei governments, sometimes to the detriment of the 
government in Beijing. The second aspect concerns which government was 
to be regarded as the legitimate government of the Chinese people. After the 
fall of the Qing Dynasty, a modern and non-imperial Chinese State emerged 
in 1912 led by a nationalistic party, which created a State called the ROC. 
However, a communist movement inside China emerged soon after which in 
1927 led to a civil war between the communists and nationalists. This civil 
war came to a standstill during the Japanese invasion and both sides 
cooperated to fight the Japanese invasion. After the Japanese surrender 
however, the Chinese civil war rekindled with the nationalist forces, which 
previously had been superior, heavily weakened and forced to withdraw to 
Taiwan in order to regroup. The nationalists set up a government in Taipei 
and kept referring to themselves as the ROC claiming the continued 
existence of the ROC as the sole legitimate Chinese government. The 
withdrawal of the nationalist forces ended the Chinese civil war, although the 
underlying conflict is very much still alive today. Meanwhile in Mainland 
China, the victorious Chinese Communist Party established the PRC in 
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October 1, 1949, declaring it to be the successor State of the ROC and 
therefore the legitimate government of the Chinese people (including 
Taiwan). The fact that both governments claimed to be the legitimate rulers 
of China created a problem for the Allies and the emerging UN. Since the US 
was focused on containing the spread of communism, they were reluctant to 
recognize the legitimacy of the PRC and therefore chose to recognize the 
ROC up until 1978. The United Kingdom on the other hand took a different 
stance, choosing to recognize the PRC in January 1950. The main reason 
behind the UK’s stance were most likely related to the fact that they had 
colonies in China and needed to recognize the PRC in order to maintain 
diplomatic relations. The differences in political approaches between the US 
and the UK were detrimental since the victorious Allies couldn’t conduct 
negotiations in a unified manner and since the two Chinese governments 
didn’t recognize each other, the only viable option was to conduct separate 
negotiations.  
5.2 The Wartime declarations 
From an Asian perspective, the Second World War was initiated by the 
second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945). The Japanese military was greatly 
successful and by 1939, they had occupied almost the entire Chinese east 
coast as well as the Chinese islands in the South China Sea. The Japanese 
military success continued for another few years until the US entered the 
war, after which the Japanese imperial power began to decline.204 
 
On New Year’s Day 1942, roughly twenty countries, among which the big 
four (the US, Great Britain, the USSR and the ROC), came together to sign 
a declaration (the New Year’s Day agreement henceforth), which later 
became the basis for the modern United Nations. Through this declaration, 
the signatories pledged to cooperate with each other and not to make 
separate armistices with the enemies.205 Later, the big four, apart from the 
USSR, assembled in Cairo on November 27, 1943, to discuss the future of 
the territories that imperial Japan had seized. The leaders came to an 
agreement known as the Cairo Declaration, which reads the following in 
the second sentence of the second paragraph;   
 
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped off all the islands of the Pacific 
which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War 
in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of 
China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by 
violence and greed. 
 
The Cairo Declaration was agreed upon in the midst of the on-going war. 
One and a half years later, the war in Europe was over and the war in the 
Pacific was about the reach its conclusion, the same leaders convened 
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again to sign the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which in its 
relevant Article 8 reads as follows,    
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty 
shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and 
such minor islands as we determine. (Emphasis added) 
 
The Potsdam declaration proclaims which islands the Japanese territory 
shall consist of and speaks “such minor islands as we determine”. These 
islands were later determined in a document entitled SCAPIN-677206, dated 
January 2, 1946, which didn’t enumerate the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
among these “minor islands”. However, since the Allies were anticipating 
a final territorial settlement, they inserted a caveat to this document stating 
that “nothing in this directive shall be constructed as an indication of allied 
policy relating to the ultimate determination of minor islands referred to in 
Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration”.207  
 
After the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in early August 1945, 
Japan declared their unconditional surrender to the Allies on August 15, 
1945. The instrument of Japanese surrender was signed in Tokyo Bay on 
September 2 and reads, “We, … hereby accept the provisions set forth in 
the declaration … issued at Potsdam”, according to its first sentence.  
 
As can be implied from the wording of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations 
together with the instrument of Japanese surrender, these were only interim 
arrangements meant to be finally settled by the Allies at a later and more 
appropriate time. The final peace settlement between the Allies and Japan 
was agreed upon through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, which 
went into effect on April 28, 1952. In relation to this treaty, it is important 
to note that neither of the ROC, PRC or USSR were parties. The ROC and 
the PRC were never invited to the negotiations because of disagreement 
among the Allies regarding which was the legitimate Chinese government. 
The USSR however, participated in the negotiations but eventually refused 
to sign it (for reasons that are irrelevant for this paper). The SFPT states the 
following in relation to Japanese reversion of territories:  
 
Art. 2 (b): 
Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores  
Art. 3  
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to 
place under its trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering 
authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu 
and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin 
Island, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. 
Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United 
States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, 
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, 
including their territorial waters. 
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A few features of this treaty are interesting to emphasize. Firstly, Article 2 
(b) doesn’t use the phrase “revert to” but instead uses the phrase “Japan 
renounces all rights, title and claim”. The reason behind this wording is the 
disagreement among the Allies regarding which was the legitimate Chinese 
government. Secondly, compared to the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the 
Cairo and the Potsdam declarations, Article 2 (b) of the SFPT is much 
more limited in its territorial scope. This Article only mentions Formosa 
(Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) and not their “appertaining and 
belonging”208 islands, or “other territories which she has taken with 
violence and greed”209. Even though it appears rather clear that Article 2 
(b) doesn’t include the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Lee and Ming 
nevertheless makes an argument that the wording is more ambiguous than 
it appears. These scholars contend that it is possible that the disputed 
islands were meant to be an integral part of the phrase “Formosa” (Taiwan) 
and as a consequence, the SFPT doesn’t provide a clear answer regarding 
the disposition if the disputed islands and therefore, Article 2 (b) needs to 
be subject to interpretation through the VCLT framework. The authors 
further contend that within this framework, drafts may be used as a 
supplemental means for interpretation. The first draft of the SFPT, dated 
March 19, 1947, defined the Japanese territorial limits as ”those existing on 
January 1, 1894, subject to the modification set forth in art 2, 3…”.210 Had 
this wording become the actual treaty language, the disputed islands 
should’ve been reverted to China pursuant to this treaty, since the treaty of 
Shimonoseki was signed after the stipulated date, according to Lee and 
Ming. Japanese scholars have contested this argument based on two 
grounds. Firstly, that this draft in question is irrelevant since the wording 
of art 2 (b) of the SFPT isn’t ambiguous, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
aren’t an integral part. Secondly, this draft also contains a clause, which 
deals with the reversion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and provides a list of 
islands adjacent to Taiwan. This list doesn’t include the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands and therefore, even if this draft had survived the re-drafting 
process, the treaty wouldn’t have obliged Japan to return the islands.211  
 
Thirdly, it’s important to emphasize that Article 3 has different legal 
implications than Article 2 (b). While Article 2 (b) enumerates the 
territories Japan has to renounce its claims to, Article 3 only obliges Japan 
to accept the US as the trustee of the islands enumerated hereunder. Hence, 
the legal implications of Article 3 weren’t for Japan to permanently lose 
any underlying rights to these territories, but for the US to become a 
temporary administrator, without this affecting any possible underlying 
rights.  
 
Before proceeding further, Article 3 of the SFPT needs a more thorough 
discussion. This Article authorized the US, within stipulated boundaries, to 
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propose to the UN, the area it should become administrator of. This 
proposal, which was adopted by the UN, was issued on December 25, 1953 
and entitled USCAR No. 27212 and it included the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 
Although the PRC’s official stance (see further the section below) is that 
they refute the validity of the SFPT, some Chinese scholars have 
nevertheless put forward some arguments relating to the interpretation of 
this treaty as well as what the actual motives behind the treaty was. Firstly, 
in relation to Article 3 of the SFPT, Lee and Ming have argued that the 
phrase “Nansei Shoto” is actually more ambiguous than it first appears 
since two different meanings can be attached to this phrase; one 
geographical or historical and one administrative. Lee and Ming expresses, 
through a reference to Taira Koji, that the geographical or historical term 
“Nansei Shoto” refers to the following groups of islands; Tokhara, Amami, 
Okinawa and Yaeyama, which excludes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. On 
the other hand, from an administrative perspective, the disputed islands 
were incorporated into the Okinawa Prefecture as a part of Nansei Shoto, 
but this was only done during the very late 19th century, and hence the 
inclusion of the disputed islands under Nansei Shoto wasn’t an established 
practice. Lee and Ming’s argument concludes that the ordinary meaning of 
“Nansei Shoto” ought to refer to the geographical or historical usage of the 
phrase. The legal implication of Lee and Ming’s argument would be that 
the US wasn’t allowed to place the disputed islands under its 
administration since it violates Article 3 and hence USCAR No. 27 would 
be invalid.213 Manjiao takes a different position on the matter and 
concludes that the disputed islands are geographically located within 
“Nansei Shoto south of 29 degree north latitude”, and therefore the US 
was allowed to include the disputed islands under its trusteeship and 
therefore USCAR No. 27 is legally valid.214   
 
As explained above, due to the political landscape that emerged after the 
end of World War II, it became a necessity for Japan to sign two separate 
treaties in order to formally conclude the war. Apart from the SFPT, which 
is a multilateral treaty between Japan and the Allies, Japan also had to sign 
a bilateral treaty with the ROC. This treaty is know as the Treaty of Taipei, 
and was signed on April 28, 1952, and took effect on August 5. This treaty 
largely corresponds with the SFPT and with reference to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands conflict, the following two Articles are of interest; 
 
Art 2:  
It recognizes that under Art 2 of the Treaty of Peace, which Japan signed at the 
city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951…, Japan renounces all right, title and 
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores as well as the Spratly islands and the Parcel 
islands.   
Art 4:  
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It recognizes that all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded before 9 
December 1943 between Japan and China have become null and void as a 
consequence of war. 
 
In comparison to the SFPT, it is interesting to note that Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Taipei ads the Spratly and the Parcel islands to the list of islands 
Japan has to renounce its claim to. Further, similar to the SFPT, the issue 
of which Chinese government should be the recipient of these territories 
was left circumnavigated. 
5.3 Stances by the claimant States towards the 
Wartime declarations 
The PRC’s official stance towards the Wartime declarations is that they 
refute the validity of the SFPT, claiming that it violates both the spirit and 
the letter of the New Year’s Day agreement and the Cairo and Potsdam 
declarations. This stance was expressed by then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai 
on August 16, 1951. This critique however, aimed at the SFPT in its entirety 
without mentioning the disputed islands.215 Although the PRC protested 
against the signing of the SFPT, this protest was disregarded, arguably 
because the PRC didn’t have diplomatic relations with the US or Japan at 
the time.216 Since the PRC refutes the validity of the SFPT, they instead 
contend that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations ultimately settled all 
territorial issues between China and Japan, caused by Japan during its 
imperialistic era. The PRC claims that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
should’ve been reverted to China pursuant to the Cairo and Potsdam 
declarations since the former expresses that Japan shall “be expelled from 
all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed” and the latter 
that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”. 
Hence, the PRC argues, Japan is under a legal obligation to revert the 
disputed islands, a circumstance that also the signatories to the Cairo and 
Potsdam declarations (primarily the US and the UK) are well aware of. 
Additionally, since the disputed islands legally became Chinese territory as 
a consequence of the document signed at Tokyo Bay, the SFPT is also 
invalid on the ground that other States cannot sign legal documents, which 
affect the territorial status of a third party. Furthermore, the PRC also rejects 
the Treaty of Taipei claiming that the PRC succeeded the ROC as the 
legitimate government of the Chinese people on October 1, 1949, and as a 
consequence, the government in Taipei cannot, enter into legal contracts.   
 
The official stance by the ROC towards the present dispute is fundamentally 
the same as the PRC’s, since they both share a common history. However, 
their stances towards the Wartime declarations deviate. Contrary to the 
PRC, the ROC doesn’t claim that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations 
ultimately settled the territorial issues; they argue that the Treaty of Taipei 
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should be regarded as the final arbiter since the legal implication of Article 
4 of this treaty is that the Treaty of Shimonoseki becomes null and void. 
Since the Treaty of Shimonoseki, according to the Chinese perception, 
ceded the disputed island to Japan, these islands should’ve been reverted 
once this treaty became null and void.217 The ROC’s stance towards the 
SFPT is rather ambiguous. When the ROC ambassador to the US first learnt 
about the SFPT he initially objected due to the lack of reparations demanded 
from Japan together with the fact that the Chinese recipient wasn’t 
mentioned. Later, when the ambassadors’ demands were rejected by the US, 
he expressed that the ROC couldn’t accept the terms but wouldn’t publically 
remonstrate against it.218 The ROC therefore officially took a stance of 
silence towards the SFPT, a stance that also applied to the subsequent US 
administration of the islands.219 Another complication for the ROC is that 
the Treaty of Taipei, through its Article 2, recognizes Article 2 of the SFPT. 
This Article however, only deals with the territories that Japan has to 
renounce and the ROC has expressed that it doesn’t consider this Article to 
have any relevance on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, a reasonable 
stance since they aren’t mentioned.  Furthermore, the ROC argues that the 
reason why it didn’t protest against US administration of the disputed 
islands, which was the effect of the SFPT, was that they were dependent on 
US military support for its existence during the post World War II period.220  
 
The Japanese official stance is firstly, that the Cairo and Potsdam 
declarations are completely irrelevant to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue 
since these declarations aimed to revert what Japan acquired through its 
war-aggression while the disputed islands were acquired through peaceful 
occupation. Secondly, Japan contends that the SFPT should be considered 
as the final arbiter of all the post war dispositions between China and Japan. 
Article 2 (b) stated that “Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to 
“Formosa and the Pescadores” and since the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
weren’t mentioned among the islands that Japan had to renounce, they 
remain sovereignty. Japan further claims that although the disputed island 
weren’t an integral part of Article 2 (b), they were an integral part of Article 
3 since they are included in the phrase “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degree 
north latitude”. Because of this inclusion, the US was allowed to place the 
disputed islands under its administration and hence USCAR No. 27 is 
legally valid. The legal implication of this stance is that Japan didn’t loose 
her sovereignty, since the islands were only temporarily placed under US 
trusteeship.221  
5.4 The years following the oil discovery 
During the period of US administration from the early 1950s until the early 
1970s, the disputed islands stirred very little Chinese and Japanese interest. 
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This drastically changed however towards the end of the US administration 
when it was learned, through a UN sponsored expert committee, that there 
might exist large quantities of natural resources located in the vicinity of the 
disputed islands. This sensational report was published in 1968 and 
significantly changed the political landscape.222 The Japanese response 
came in May 1969 when the Okinawa Prefecture for the first time erected 
national markers on Diaoyu Island. This action was followed on July 17, 
1970, by the delivery of a diplomatic note to the ROC in which Japan 
claimed sovereignty over the disputed islands. The Japanese claim wasn’t 
received well in Taiwan. In September the same year, Taiwanese protesters 
hoisted a flag on the islands, which Japanese authorities removed days later. 
These Japanese actions triggered anti-Japanese sentiments among patriotic 
Chinese people worldwide, which led to the foundation of the protest 
movement “Safeguard the Diaoyutai”. This movement gained widespread 
support, especially among Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
the US and reached its height just before the reversion of the disputed 
islands to Japanese rule on May 15, 1972.223 The ROC launched its official 
protest against Japanese sovereignty in February 1971, which was followed 
by the PRC’s ditto, in December the same year.  
 
The years of 1971-1972 was eventful for the Chinese people on both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits and turned out to be detrimental for the ROC who up 
until this time had been recognized as the legitimate government of the 
Chinese people by a majority of all States and held China’s seat as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council. In October 1971, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, which not only permitted the 
PRC to occupy China’s seat at the Security Council, but also expelled the 
ROC entirely from the UN. After being expelled from the UN, the ROC 
experienced other diplomatic setbacks in 1972. Most importantly, Japan 
withdrew its recognition of the ROC in order to establish diplomatic 
relations with the PRC in accordance with the Sino-Japanese communiqué 
of September 29, 1972. In order to achieve diplomatic relations, Japan had 
to renounce the legality of the Treaty of Taipei and in return the PRC 
abandoned their claim to war reparations from Japan.224 Another important 
event that took place during 1972 was the Shanghai Communiqué between 
the US and the PRC. This agreement was particularly important for the 
future political cooperation between China and the West and it started a 
process wherein a large number of States switched from recognizing the 
ROC to the PRC as the legitimate Chinese government. This process 
culminated with the US altering its position in 1978.225 
 
The main event during 1972 with direct relevance to the present dispute was 
the Okinawa Reversion Treaty226 (ORT henceforth), which entered into 
forced on May 15, 1972. Its Article 1 (1) reads the following,  
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With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 
below, the United States of America relinquishes in favour of Japan all rights and 
interests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San 
Francisco on September the 8, 1951, effective as of date of entry into force of this 
Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the 
exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the 
territory and inhabitants of the said islands.    
 
Obviously the disputed islands aren’t expressly mentioned in this Article but 
through the reference to Article 1.2 it becomes clear that “the Ryukyu 
Islands and the Daito Islands”, refers to the same area that the US was 
awarded pursuant to Article 3 of the SFPT except for the territories already 
reverted pursuant to previously concluded treaties. Hence, if the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were an integral part of Article 3 of the SFPT, they 
were consequently also an integral part of the ORT.  
 
The PRC remonstrated against the ORT, understanding that it could affect 
the underlying sovereignty issue and this made an impact on the US who 
felt obliged to clarify its position. The first official US statement regarding 
its stance towards the ORT was expressed in October 1971, by Legal 
Advisor Robert Starr and the same stance has been reiterated on several 
occasions ever since. The first statement reads as follows, 
 
The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to 
Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying 
claim. The United States cannot add to the legal rights of Japan possessed before it 
transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving 
back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has 
made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to 
the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.227  
5.5 Analysis 
The first section of this chapter dealt with the Wartime declarations and 
although it is evident that all of the described treaties and declarations aimed 
at reverting the Japanese territorial boundaries to where they were prior to 
its expansionist era, none of these treaties or declarations explicitly 
mentioned the disputed islands. In fact, there’s no information, from either 
the official governments or legal scholars, which indicate that the disputed 
islands were ever discussed during the negotiations. The Japanese stance is 
that the Cairo and Potsdam declarations are irrelevant in relation to the 
sovereignty issue since the SFPT was the final arbiter regarding the 
Japanese post war territories and this treaty neither explicitly nor implicitly 
included the territories among which Japan had to revert. The stance of the 
ROC is similar to that of the PRC, the only difference is that the Treaty of 
Taipei is binding on the ROC, which means that they first need to refute that 
this treaty has any relevance for the sovereignty issue. Since The Treaty of 
Taipei is silent in relation to the sovereignty issue, the ROC has a strong 
argument in claiming that this treaty is irrelevant and therefore place 
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themselves in a position similar to that of the PRC. Since the stances of the 
ROC and the PRC are essentially the same and since Japan’s claim is that 
the Wartime declarations are irrelevant, the further analysis will focus on the 
PRC’s claim.  
 
The PRC’s stance towards the Cairo, Potsdam, Tokyo Bay and Taipei 
agreements have already been sufficiently described and analyzed. Of 
primary interest is therefore its stance towards the SFPT. The official stance 
of the PRC is that they refute it in its entirety. Chinese scholars however, 
has provided a more sophisticated critique and from analyzing their work it 
becomes apparent that theirs stance is derived from two different arguments. 
The first argument can de described as the “illegality argument”, which is 
grounded on the New Year’s Day agreement, which imposes an obligation 
on the signatories not to conclude separate peace treaties with Japan. The 
second argument can be described as the “non-party argument” and rests on 
the principle that a State is not bound by a treaty to which it isn’t party, a 
principle expressed in the VCLT framework as well as in case law.  
 
The Chinese non-party argument appears to be strong. The principle that a 
State isn’t bound by a treaty to which it isn’t party is a general rule with 
only one exception. Two conditions must be met in order to deviate from 
this principle. The first is that the signatories must intend for a provision to 
afford a right to the third party, obligations or limitations cannot be imposed 
this way. The second is that the third party must consent. None of these 
conditions are met in the case of the PRC and the SFPT and therefore the 
non-party argument appears to have solid support.  
 
The illegality argument appears comparatively weaker and according to the 
author, there are four reasons for this. First and primarily, it isn’t certain 
whether the SFPT would constitute such a “separate armistice with the 
enemy” that the New Year’s Day agreement aims to prohibit. The reason 
why the SFPT isn’t necessarily an “armistice” relates to this word itself. 
According to the oxford dictionary, an armistice is “An agreement made by 
opposing sides in a war to stop fighting for a certain time; a truce”.228 The 
crucial part of this definition is that an armistice refers to an agreement 
aimed to stop the fighting during the war. The SFPT was signed in 1951 and 
the World War II officially ended with the Japanese surrender in October 
1945. The “armistice” in this case, between the Allies and Japan was the 
document signed at Tokyo Bay on October 1945. Therefore, the SFPT 
shouldn’t be regarded as an armistice because the war had already ended 
and the SFPT didn’t aim to stop the fighting, but to define Japan’s post war 
territories.  
 
Secondly, although the SFPT would be regarded as an “armistice”, the 
discussion provided in relation to the first argument, nevertheless needs to 
be taken into account in order to understand the context of both the New 
Year’s Day agreement and the SFPT. The New Year’s Day agreement was 
signed with the aim of establishing a war alliance in order to fight the Axis 
                                                
228 Oxford Online Dictionary, search word ”armistice”  
 89 
powers and if the signatories had signed separate armistices, this would 
have weakened the chances of the Allies to ultimately win the war. 
Therefore the New Year’s Day agreement has to be understood as a treaty 
that primarily aimed to strengthen the Allies while the fighting was still 
ongoing and not to limit the signatories in dividing the territories of the Axis 
powers once the war was over.  
 
Thirdly, although the SFPT would be regarded as a “separate armistice with 
the enemy”, since it was concluded without China (both ROC and PRC), it 
isn’t evident how far-reaching the obligations stipulated in the New Year’s 
Day agreement really are. It would be unreasonable if the wording of the 
New Year’s Day agreement are understood too literally, if one signatory 
could stop the other signatories from entering into treaties aimed at defining 
the post war territorial boundaries it would give that signatory an 
unreasonable “veto power” that the New Year’s Day agreement didn’t aim 
to provide. Lastly, although the SFPT would be considered as a violation of 
the New Year’s Day agreement, the legal implication of this isn’t 
necessarily to render the SFPT of its legality. The New Year’s Day 
agreement doesn’t explicitly state that all signatories needs to be present and 
in agreement for a subsequent armistice to be lawful. The New Year’s Day 
agreement was signed by four States and the SFPT by 48229 and it is 
therefore highly doubtful, and not entirely reasonable, to conclude that the 
SFPT is illegal per se, merely because of the absence of China. Further, 
taking the political realties into consideration, with a clear majority of all 
States which recognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of the 
Chinese people while the PRC were in de facto control over Mainland 
China, this strengthens the argument that Chinese absence cannot 
singlehandedly render the SFPT of its legality.  
 
Another element of the illegality argument, which wasn’t mentioned above, 
which deserves to be analyzed separately is the contention by Chinese 
scholars that not merely the New Year’s Day agreement is the source that 
renders the SFPT of its legality, also the Cairo and Potsdam declarations 
makes SFPT illegal. This argument however also has an inherent weakness 
which is that both these declarations were, at least in relation to the defining 
the Japanese post war territories, only meant to be interim agreements 
intended to be finally settled after the war. The ultimate territorial settlement 
was the SFPT, which therefore has to be regarded as a de facto codification 
of these Wartime declarations. Additionally, the SFPT is also in conformity 
with the Cairo and Potsdam declarations because these declarations didn’t 
mention or imply that the disputed islands should be reverted to China.  
 
The argumentation above has concluded that the illegality argument has 
inherent weaknesses while the non-party argument is strong. Since the SFPT 
cannot be regarded as illegal per se, it is relevant to discuss its content and 
the author will here focus on the two arguments made by Lee and Ming. The 
first argument made by these authors was that Article 2 (b) is more 
ambiguous than it appears since the disputed islands could be perceived as 
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an integral part of the phrase “Formosa” (Taiwan). The author is of the 
opinion that this argument has to be completely disregarded. Although it 
isn’t evident whether the disputed islands could be regarded as 
“appertaining and belonging” to Taiwan according to the treaty of 
Shimonoseki, they cannot be regarded as an integral part of the phrase 
“Taiwan” pursuant to the SFPT. The second argument put forward by these 
authors relates to Article 3 and the phrase “Nansei Shoto south of 29 
degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands)” and 
they argue that “Nansei Shoto” has both a historical/geographical and an 
administrative meaning and that it is more reasonable to assume that the 
phrase in this circumstance refers to the historical/geographical according to 
the ordinary meaning of the treaty. This argument however, has limitations, 
since as Maijiao expresses, the disputed islands are geographically included 
in the second half of the phrase “south of 29 degree north latitude 
(including the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands)”. Therefore, regardless of 
which interpretation of the phrase “Nansei Shoto”, historical/geographical or 
administrative, is more in line with the ordinary meaning of the treaty, they 
were undoubtedly included in this geographically specified area and should 
therefore reasonably considered as an integral part of Article 3. The legal 
implication of this is that the US was allowed to place these islands under its 
administration, which they also did pursuant to USCAR No. 27.  
 
The argumentation above, which concluded that USCAR No. 27 has to be 
considered as legally valid is based on the circumstance that Japan was in a 
position to grant the US these administrative rights. The only way Japan 
could have been in such a position was if they held sovereign title to the 
islands prior to the conclusion of the SFPT and whether this was the case 
depends on factors, which have been analyzed in previous chapters.  
 
The last section of this chapter focused on the eventful years following the 
oil discovery. The main focus was on the ORT and according to the author it 
appears evident from the wording of this treaty, and additionally 
strengthened by subsequent statements from the US, that the US was only 
reverting administrative rights to Japan and hence this treaty provides no 
useful information regarding the underlying sovereignty issue.  
 
In conclusion, the focus of this analysis has been to determine whether, as 
China argues, the Wartime declarations created an obligation on Japan to 
revert the disputed islands to China. Although it is evident that all of the 
described treaties and declarations aimed at reverting the Japanese territorial 
boundaries to where they were prior to its expansionist era, it is equally 
evident that none of these treaties or declarations explicitly mentioned the 
disputed islands and making the argument that these islands were an integral 
part of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations is highly difficult. Therefore it 
has to be concluded that the Chinese stance can hardly be supported and that 
treaty law is most likely irrelevant for the sovereignty issue of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  
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6 Concluding analysis 
The purpose of this paper was to describe and analyze which of the 
competing States has the better claim to sovereignty under international law. 
However, since the author wasn’t in a position similar to that of a judge or 
arbitrator, with all available data the parties chose to present and with 
unbiased linguistic translations at his disposal, the purpose wasn’t 
necessarily to take a position on the critical legal issues that a court or 
tribunal would have to adjudicate. The present dispute is immensely 
complex and given these limitations, it appears unreasonable to aim at 
decisively adjudicating the dispute. The secondary purpose of this paper is 
interconnected with the primary purpose and it was to analyze how this 
conflict, should it ever be adjudicated, could enrich and clarify the contents 
of international law.  
 
Should the present dispute ever be adjudicated, the author finds it quite 
likely that the first issue the court or tribunal would have to determine 
concerns what kind of framework the present dispute should be adjudicated 
against. More specifically, the adjudicating body would have to decide how 
the international law rules of territorial acquisition should be applied in non-
western parts of the world where this system has historically been 
completely unknown. Should international law be inclusive towards 
different systems of international relations and accommodate for a special 
treatment wherein regional perceptions of sovereignty are taken into 
account? In the Eritrea and Yemen Arbitration, the Tribunal emphasized the 
inherent difficulties of applying the international law rules of territorial 
acquisition in non-western parts of the world. Although the Tribunal 
expressed that difficulties with the establishment of historical facts 
prevented it from accepting the claim of historic title based on a different 
legal framework than international law, it indicated a willingness to accept 
such claims if only the existence of such a claim could be sufficiently 
proven. Hence it appears not entirely unreasonable to believe that 
international law in the future could become more inclusive towards 
different systems of government control and international relations in 
matters of territorial acquisition. Having stated this, it needs to be clarified 
that the aforementioned Award didn’t elaborate on how different systems 
could be dealt with within the international law discipline, it merely opened 
up for such consideration.  
 
Arguably the most controversial aspect of this paper has been the inclusion 
of the alternative framework labeled “ancient possession since time 
immemorial”. The reason behind this inclusion is derived from the critique 
articulated by Chinese scholars that since international law was completely 
unknown to East Asia until the mid 19th century, it isn’t entirely reasonable 
to evaluate whether China acquired sovereignty solely through the lens of 
international law. As expressed in the introductory chapter, this framework 
cannot be supported by positive international law. However, the author is of 
the opinion that, should the present dispute ever be adjudicated, it isn’t 
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entirely unreasonable that the PRC would raise the argument that 
international law cannot properly adjudicate this territorial dispute since 
East Asia has historically been governed by a different system of 
international relations. The PRC might contend that in order to reach a 
substantively fair adjudication, the political realities of the EAWO need to 
be taken into account. Therefore, the author deemed it relevant to analyze an 
alternative framework and the aforementioned framework was chosen 
because it provides reasonable and balanced prerequisites for territorial 
acquisition that are sufficiently clear and less euro-centric. Although the 
author is of the opinion that the political realities of the EAWO, from a de 
lege ferenda perspective, needs to be taken into account, the issue of how 
international law can accommodate different concepts within the 
international law discipline itself is a highly difficult matter. In this paper, 
the alternative framework has been analyzed parallel to the international law 
framework. However, the author is of the opinion that should international 
law develop a more inclusive approach towards different regional systems 
of international relations in non-western parts of the world, it appears more 
likely that this development would take place within the international law 
discipline itself, rather than dispatched from it as it has been described in 
this paper. From a de lege ferenda perspective, the international law rules of 
territorial acquisition needs to be reasonable and fair also towards non-
western parts of the world and therefore, international law need to 
accommodate for regional differences, should the existence of such a system 
be sufficiently proven. Therefore, arguably the most interesting feature, 
should the present dispute ever be adjudicated, is if and how the 
adjudicating body would facilitate for a more inclusive approach towards 
non-western perceptions of territorial acquisition and sovereignty.    
 
After choosing a framework to evaluate the sovereignty issue against; strict 
application of international law or accommodating for an inclusive approach 
towards the political realities of the EAWO within international law, the 
second issue the court or tribunal would be faced with is the critical date 
concept. The notion of a critical date within international law hasn’t been 
sufficiently developed and the present dispute could therefore enrich and 
clarify the contents of international law in this regard. The critical date 
concept has sometimes been characterized as a matter of substantive law 
and sometimes as procedural law and in some cases the concept has not 
been elaborated on or otherwise dismissed as being of little value. The 
general rule however appears to be that the critical date is “the date when 
the dispute crystalized”, which is the date when the parties formally oppose 
each other’s claim, typically when one State asserts sovereignty and the 
other disputes this claim. Therefore, should this concept be utilized under 
the present conflict, the most reasonable conclusion would be to set the 
critical date at the date of the first formal protest of the PRC, which was in 
December 1971. The PRC would most likely argue in favor of an earlier 
critical date, possible October 1945 when Japan officially surrendered and 
the islands became lawfully Chinese or 1951 when they first protested 
against the SFPT. The weaknesses of both these critical dates are that it can 
hardly be concluded that the dispute had crystalized in either 1945 or 1951. 
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The weakness of arguing in favor of choosing 1945 as the critical date is 
that although the document of official Japanese surrender incorporated the 
Cairo and Potsdam declarations, neither of these documents explicitly nor 
implicitly referred to the dispute islands. The weakness arguing in favor of 
choosing 1951 as the critical date is that the protest of the PRC aimed at the 
SFPT in its entirety, without expressing any objection towards how the said 
treaty were handling of the disputed islands. Additionally, there exists no 
evidence that the disputed islands were ever discussed in Mainland China or 
Taiwan from 1895 to 1968 and therefore, the only reasonable conclusion is 
that the present dispute had not crystalized prior to 1971, since the Chinese 
protest had not been sufficiently expressed prior to this.  
 
The third issue that a court or tribunal would have to adjudicate is how to 
apply the intertemporal principle to this case. The implication of the first 
branch of the said principle is theoretically rather straightforward. 
According to this branch, the issue of whether Ming China acquired 
sovereignty shall be evaluated against the international law prevailing 
during 1368-1644. Likewise, the issue of whether Qing China acquired 
sovereignty shall be evaluated against the law in place during 1644-1895 
and lastly the issue of whether Japan acquired sovereignty shall be evaluated 
against the law of January 21, 1895 (given that Japan claims to have 
acquired sovereignty based on the Emperors ratification of the Cabinet 
Decision). There exists however a difficulty with the application of the first 
branch under the present dispute which is that the international law 
prerequisites of occupation, prevailing during the Ming dynasty, but also 
during large parts of the Qing dynasty, haven’t been established.  
 
The second branch of intertemporal law is both theoretically and practically 
more difficult. Theoretically, what this branch means is that the continued 
manifestation of occupation shall follow the evolution of the requirements 
of occupation. Applied to the present dispute, this means that since the 
requirements of occupation increased throughout the analyzed period, and 
specifically increased through the establishment of effective occupation, the 
demands of manifestation on the State holding sovereign title increased in 
order for this State to maintain its title.  
 
The application of the second branch of the intertemporal principle is highly 
problematic under the present dispute since there are a number of 
unresolved legal issues that first needs to be independently adjudicated 
before it is possible to determine what State has the better claim to 
sovereignty. According to the Chinese perception, China held sovereign title 
from immemorial times until April 17, 1895 when the disputed islands 
lawfully became Japanese through the mode of cession. After this, the 
islands continued to be lawfully Japanese until October 1945 when the 
document of Japanese surrender was signed. This document incorporated 
the Potsdam and Cairo declarations and hence Japan became bound to these 
declarations through signing the document of formal surrender. With 
reference to the present dispute, the legal consequence of Japan signing this 
document was that the disputed islands became lawfully Chinese, according 
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to the Chinese stance. However, because of the political situation that 
emerged following the end of World War II, with two Chinese governments 
claiming to be the legitimate rulers of the same territory and States 
worldwide adopting different approaches regarding which government to 
recognize, China was largely prevented from conducting international 
affairs. Additionally, the geopolitical interests of the US soon after the end 
of the war became to contain the spread of communism and to fight the 
communist block, which had a detrimental effect on the newly established 
PRC. The PRC therefore claims to have been deprived of its legal rights and 
for this reason hasn’t been able to fulfill the requirements of effective 
occupation from October 1945 until today, as demanded by the second 
branch of the intertemporal law, primarily by the US and Japan.  
 
Applying the second branch of intertemporal law to Japan is relatively 
easier. The application of the second branch in territorial disputes means 
that claimant States need to fulfill the requirement of effective occupation 
defined as “the actual, continuous and peaceful display of State functions in 
regard to the territory”. In this context, being peaceful means that the 
territory in question is not occupied by another State and that the occupation 
has not been disputed by another State. From the previous chapters Japan 
appears to have a strong argument that she acquired sovereign title in 1895 
and treated the islands in accordance with the requirements of effective 
occupation at least until the outbreak of World War II in the pacific and 
possibly also until the SFPT came into effect in 1952. During the following 
twenty years the islands were under US administration and Japan had no 
active relationship with the islands. However, from the wording of the ORT 
and subsequent official statements by the US it appears evident that US 
administration didn’t affect any underlying sovereignty claims. The islands 
were reverted to Japan in 1972 and they have since maintained control. 
However, both the ROC and the PRC disputed Japanese sovereignty in 1971 
and hence the “peaceful-requirement” cannot be regarded as fulfilled during 
the period from the fall of 1971 until today. This circumstance however isn’t 
necessarily relevant because of the critical date analysis above concluded 
that the critical date reasonably most be set at December 1971.  
 
The application of the second branch of the intertemporal principle in 
territorial disputed undoubtedly favors the State currently in de facto control 
over the territory. The present dispute however has particular circumstances 
consisting of the political realities which emerged after the end of World 
War II and therefore, if this conflict should ever be adjudicated, the present 
dispute could enrich and clarify the contents of international law regarding 
whether it is of any legal significance that one State has been deprived of its 
right to fulfill the requirements of effective occupation based on political 
and military strategic factors completely outside of its control.  
 
Should the present dispute ever be adjudicated, the author finds it most 
probable that the adjudicating body would adopt a similar approach as was 
adopted in the Palmas Island Arbitration. In this Award, the Arbitrator 
decided on a critical date and then, through an application of the second 
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branch of the intertemporal principle, focused on whether Spain could prove 
that she had exercised sovereignty in accordance with the law applicable at 
the critical date. Since Spain couldn’t prove that she had exercised 
sovereignty in accordance with the requirements of effective occupation 
prevailing at the critical date, while the Netherlands could, Spain lost the 
case and the arbitrator never had to decide whether Spain ever held 
sovereign title. If the framework provided by this case would be applied to 
the present dispute, the adjudicating body would most likely determine the 
critical date to be December 1971 and then rule that the PRC couldn’t prove 
an exercise of sovereignty in accordance with the law applicable at this date. 
Japan on the other hand, would most likely be able to prove meeting the 
requirements of effective occupation during 1895-1952 after which they 
maintained residual sovereignty during the US administration.  Hence, the 
Chinese claim would fall on the second branch of intertemporal law and the 
adjudicating body wouldn’t have to rule on the issue of whether imperial 
China ever held sovereign title (the issue analyzed in chapter 3) or the issue 
of through which mode Japan lawfully acquired sovereign title (the issue 
analyzed in chapter 4) or whether the wartime declarations obliged Japan to 
return the islands to China (the issue analyzed in chapter 5). This perception 
is additionally strengthened by the Minquiers and Ecrehos case wherein the 
Court determined the historical data to be of little value and instead focused 
on the evidence relating to the effective occupation.  
 
The above analysis has concluded that Japan appear to have a stronger claim 
under contemporary international law, based on the critical date and the 
intertemporal principle since the second branch of this principle 
undoubtedly favors the State in control over the territory at the critical date. 
Additionally, the author is of the opinion that the issues analyzed under 
chapters 3-5, appear to favor the Japanese claim. Firstly, chapter 3 dealt 
with the issue of whether imperial China ever acquired sovereignty. The 
main difficulty of this analysis relates to the fact that the international law 
prerequisites of occupation weren’t sufficiently established prior to the 
concept of effective occupation emerged around the mid 19th century. If 
mere visual discovery were to be regarded as sufficient to create sovereign 
title, China undoubtedly has a strong claim but if the visual discovery needs 
to be coupled with formal acts, China has a weaker case. Having stated this 
China did incorporate the disputed islands into her coastal defense system 
and in some local gazetteers. Further, Chinese scholars and non-Chinese 
scholars depicted the islands as constituting Chinese territory and it 
therefore isn’t entirely unreasonable that an adjudicating body would 
conclude that China held sovereign title prior to 1895. The author is 
however of the opinion that a conservative approach towards territorial 
acquisition appears more reasonable and therefore, China appears to have a 
weaker claim vis-à-vis Japan under international law.  Having stated this, it 
appears rather evident from the historical data presented that both Ming and 
Qing China regarded the disputed islands as her territory, a perception that 
the Ryukyuans most likely also shared, but since they were uninhabited, 
small and remotely located, imperial China didn’t pay them much attention 
which probably is connected with the Confucian ideas of government 
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control, wherein the Emperor ruled men and not territorial space. Therefore, 
should the political realities of the EAWO be included in the evaluation, 
China appears to have a stronger claim vis-à-vis Japan.  
 
Secondly, the analysis provided under chapter 4 also favors the Japanese 
stance, according to the author. Although the Japanese process of 
incorporation undeniably appears deceitful and dishonest, China is in a 
difficult position if she wants to contest the validity of the incorporation. 
China’s strongest argumentation is to contest the validity of the Japanese 
incorporation is to claim that the disputed islands weren’t terra nullius by 
January 1895 and therefore couldn’t be subject to occupation. This claim 
would however depend on he adjudicating body deciding that the disputed 
islands were Chinese at this date. Another argumentation China could use if 
she wants to refute the legal validity of the incorporation is to claim that the 
Japanese animus occupandi wasn’t sufficiently expressed since the Cabinet 
decision wasn’t made public until the 1950’s and erection of national 
markers didn’t take place until the very late 1960’s, which deprived China 
of her right to protest. The strength of such an argument is however 
questionable since positive international law doesn’t demand notification to 
foreign countries in order to fulfill the animus occupandi requirement. A 
different legal issue concerns interpretation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
which according to the author also favors the Japanese position since neither 
the textual or the contextual analysis nor the subsequent conduct of the 
parties can be regarded as sufficient proof that the disputed islands were 
regarded as “belonging” to Taiwan according to the treaty. This perception 
is further strengthened by case law, which has expressed that an almost 
identical phrase should be understood to refer to islands in the immediate 
vicinity of the main islands.  
 
Thirdly, the analysis provided under chapter 5 also favors the Japanese 
stance, according to the author. The main reason behind this is that if the 
wartime declarations are analyzed independently, it has to be concluded that 
the Cairo and Potsdam declarations are merely interim agreements that 
didn’t aim to ultimately settle the territorial issues. Instead the SFPT, which 
cannot be considered as illegal per se, has to be regarded as the final arbiter 
of the territories the Japanese military had acquired since the signatories to 
this treaty aimed for it to be the final arbiter.  
   
Another factor, which strengthens the Japanese claim, relates to the lack of 
official Chinese protest during the period following the end of the war until 
1971 (February in the case of the ROC and December in the case of the 
PRC). Although the PRC claims to have protested against the SFPT in 1951, 
this remonstration was aimed towards the said treaty in its entirety and not 
towards the handling of the disputed islands and therefore the author is of 
the opinion that this protest doesn’t constitute a sufficient protest of 
Japanese sovereignty. Additionally, it appears rather evident from the SFPT 
that the disputed islands weren’t integrated in Article 2 (b) but were 
integrated in Article 3 which means that Japan wasn’t obliged to renounce 
its rights and claim permanently but were obliged to temporarily accept US 
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administration should the US chose to include the islands under its 
administration. The US exercised this right through USCAR no. 27, a 
circumstance all claimants could learn about through the said document as 
well as subsequent US handling of the disputed islands. Since according to 
the Chinese perception, the disputed islands were lawfully Japanese until 
1945 but became lawfully Chinese following the Japanese surrender, they 
should have protested against the legal implications of Articles 2 (b) and 3 
of the SFPT together with USCAR no. 27. The legal implications of these 
documents were rather evidently that the disputed islands wouldn’t be 
included in the territories Japan had to renounce and therefore Japan would 
remain residual sovereignty, a circumstance China should have protested.   
The PRC might argue that they didn’t have diplomatic relationship with the 
US until 1978 and was therefore unable to protest and the ROC has argued 
that they were dependent on US military support for their survival and 
therefore could protest. However, the author is of the opinion that none of 
these excuses could be supported by international law. Even though neither 
the PRC nor the ROC perceived US administration as problematic, they 
should have protested Japanese residual sovereignty since it was fairly 
predictable from the SFPT that the US would eventually revert the control 
to Japan. The fact that Japan, the PRC and the ROC didn’t claim 
sovereignty until they learned about the oil discovery indicates that 
sovereignty over the islands weren’t regarded as an important matter by any 
of the claimants, a circumstance that is detrimental to the Chinese claim.    
 
The discussion above has contended that the strength of the Japanese claim 
is derived from the fact that the critical date and the intertemporal principle 
is favorable towards Japan but also supported by the analysis of the three 
enclasping legal issues dealt with under chapters 3-5 together with the lack 
of Chinese official protest during 1945-1971. Having stated this, it lastly 
needs to be emphasized that this is a highly complex conflict and that all of 
these issues, which have been dealt with separately, are connected and the 
outcome of one issue depends on the outcome of another and therefore the 
conflict cannot be properly adjudicated within the limited scope of this 
paper.  
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